Framework for Modeling High-Impact, Low-Frequency Power Grid Events to Support Risk-Informed Decisions

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Abstract—Natural and man-made hazardous events resulting in loss of grid infrastructure assets challenge the security and resilience of the electric power grid. However, the planning and allocation of appropriate contingency resources for such events requires an understanding of their likelihood and the extent of their potential impact. Where these events are of low likelihood, a risk-informed perspective on planning can be difficult, as the statistical basis needed to directly estimate the probabilities and consequences of their occurrence does not exist. Because risk-informed decisions rely on such knowledge, a basis for modeling the risk associated with high-impact, low-frequency events (HILFs) is essential. Insights from such a model indicate where resources are most rationally and effectively expended. A risk-informed realization of designing and maintaining a grid resilient to HILFs will demand consideration of a spectrum of hazards/threats to infrastructure integrity, an understanding of their likelihoods of occurrence, treatment of the fragilities of critical assets to the stressors induced by such events, and through modeling grid network topology, the extent of damage associated with these scenarios. The model resulting from integration of these elements will allow sensitivity assessments based on optional risk management strategies, such as alternative pooling, staging and logistic strategies, and emergency contingency planning. This study is focused on the development of an end-to-end HILF risk-assessment framework. Such a framework is intended to provide the conceptual and overarching technical basis for the development of HILF risk models that can inform decision-makers across numerous stakeholder groups in directing resources optimally towards the management of risks to operational continuity.

Index Terms—Cyber, Cyclones, Earthquakes, Hurricanes, Power Grids, Risk Analysis, Terrorism, Risk Management

I. BACKGROUND

Natural and man-made hazardous events resulting in the simultaneous loss of multiple grid infrastructure assets challenge the electric power grid's security and resilience. However, the planning and allocation of appropriate contingency resources for such events requires an understanding of their likelihood and the extent of their potential impact. Where these events are of low likelihood, a risk-informed perspective on planning can be problematic as

there exists an insufficient statistical basis to directly estimate the probabilities and consequences of their occurrence. Since risk-informed decisions rely on such knowledge, a basis for modeling the risk associated with high-impact low frequency events (HILFs) is essential. Insights from such a model can inform where resources are most rationally and effectively expended. The present effort is focused on development of a HILF risk assessment framework. Such a framework is intended to provide the conceptual and overarching technical basis for the development of HILF risk models that can inform decision makers across numerous stakeholder sectors.

The North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) Standard TPL-001-4 (NERC, 2014) considers events for transmission reliability planning. The planning criteria includes consideration of severe events, such as the simultaneous loss of multiple co-located assets, but does not address events of such severity that they have the potential to fail a substantial fraction of grid assets over a region, such as geomagnetic disturbances, extreme seismic events, and coordinated cyber-physical attacks. These are beyond current planning guidelines. As noted, the risks associated with such events cannot be statistically estimated based on historic experience; however, there does exist a stable of risk modeling techniques for rare events that have proven of value across a wide range of engineering application domains.

The value of a risk model is reflected in the degree to which it can be exercised to provide insight to stakeholders and decision-makers, and in the process by which it is maintained as an evergreen and continually improving model of the domain it represents. Elements of risk management include the modeling, evaluation of management options based on interrogation of the model, implementation of the selected options, communication of strategy and actions to stakeholders, and monitoring new data and insights to update the model as appropriate. The framework defined here is focused on the means of developing the underlying risk model.

There is an active and growing interest in evaluating the value of risk management techniques in the transmission planning and emergency response communities, some of this interest in the context of grid modernization activities. The availability of a grid HILF risk model, integrated across multi-hazard domains which, when interrogated, can support transparent, defensible and effective decisions, is an attractive prospect among these communities.

In this paper, we document an integrated HILF risk framework intended to inform the development of risk models. These

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models would be based on the systematic and comprehensive (to within scope) characterization of hazards to the level of detail required for modeling risk, identification of the stressors associated with the hazards (i.e., the means of impacting grid and supporting infrastructure), characterization of the vulnerability of assets to these stressors and the probabilities of asset compromise, the grid's dynamic response to the asset failures, and assessment of subsequent severities of consequence with respect to selected impact metrics, such as power outage duration and geographic reach. Specifically, the current framework is being developed to:

1. Provide the conceptual and overarching technical paradigms for the development of risk models.
2. Identify the classes of models required to implement the framework - providing examples of existing models, and also identifying where modeling gaps exist.
3. Identify the types of data required, addressing circumstances under which data are sparse and the formal elicitation of informed judgment might be required.
4. Identify means by which the resultant risk models might be interrogated to form the necessary basis for risk management.

As the framework was under development, anticipated challenges for implementation were identified. One key challenge is that there is substantial lack of uniformity in the extent to which domain models are available across hazard categories. For instance, while fully quantitative models of seismic hazard and stressors have been developed, the same is not true of geomagnetic disturbances. While risk models do not generally require the availability of detailed quantitative domain models, the expectation is that implementation of the framework will require the elicitation of informed opinion to augment areas in which models are less mature and data are sparser. Another key finding is that given the large number of alternative impact scenarios associated with potential combinations of asset failures, this will necessitate use of approximation techniques that can establish scenario samples that allow acceptably accurate estimates of risk to be produced. In this context, a Monte Carlo approach is considered.

II. INTRODUCTION

A HILF is the realization of a specific hazard that has the potential to produce a high impact on grid operability. Such high impact events are, by virtue of their rarity, considered low frequency. The types of hazards that, when realized in severe degree, could produce HILFs are listed in Table 1.

Table 1. Examples of Hazards that could produce HILFs

Hazard Category	Examples
Natural hazards	Meteorological (e.g., hurricane, tornado, snowstorm) Geological (e.g., seismic, volcanic) Hydrological (e.g., coastal flooding) Space Weather (e.g., geomagnetic

	storm)
Biological hazards	Biological (e.g., pandemic)
Human (non-intentional) hazards	Operational Error
Human (malicious) hazards	Physical attack, cyber-attack, coordinated cyber-physical attack, electromagnetic pulse

A specific realization of a HILF is referred to as an initiating event (IE), or initiator. For instance, a realization of the seismic hazard might be an earthquake of specified magnitude at a specified epicenter. This initiator then begins a sequence of events resulting in an accident scenario. Such a sequence will involve damage to some combination of grid and supporting infrastructure assets that then results in a given level of consequence, such as loss of power over a given geographic area for a given duration. A risk model seeks to systematically and comprehensively (to within the scope of the model) identify the accident sequences, to estimate their probabilities of occurrence, and to quantify their degrees of impact. It is the concurrent quantitative consideration of event probabilities and event consequences that characterizes a risk model.

Blackouts for the past four decades have been extensively studied by the power engineering society (Kundur et al., 2007). The consequence of an initiating extreme event in most circumstances has been loss of a single grid asset quickly followed by cascaded events such as heavy loading and further asset loss due to reduced ability to perform time-sensitive corrective actions. The impact is more catastrophically significant when the recovery time is more than a day.

North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) Standard TPL-001-4 (NERC, 2014) identifies event scales and a corresponding list of specific combination of critical asset failures that need to be taken in to consideration as thresholds for transmission system planning purposes. These include loss of at most two generating stations in a wide area or loss of any one asset locally. Single assets include substations that represent one voltage level and all transformers, a generating station having any number of generating units, and all transmission lines that share the same right-of-way. These extreme events were named as 'Category D' events in an earlier NERC standard (NERC, 2005). However, such plans are not based on an understanding of the relative or absolute risks associated with the hazards. Furthermore, hypothetical scenarios may be conceived that are substantially more severe than those identified with Category D and the question arises of what resources are warranted to plan for them. Here a risk-perspective is crucial. In the framework defined here, events that potentially result in failure of asset combinations of greater magnitude than those identified in the NERC standard are considered for the purposes of assessing HILF risk to the grid. The current focus is on HILFs that might result in widespread asset failures.

There has been a history of power grid events to which grid infrastructure has proven resilient or rapidly recoverable. But the set of hypothetical HILFs widely exceeds the events that have been realized. A meaningful risk framework must therefore provide the basis for the systematic identification of such hypothetical scenarios, and their incorporation into an assessment of risk. That is the goal of the current framework, intended to provide the conceptual and high-level technical guidelines for development of HILF risk models that can provide insight to decision- and policy-makers. The intended users of the framework include transmission and system planners, and state planners that need risk tools to make mid-to-long-term planning decisions.

The maturities of methods for assessing risk are uneven across hazard categories. While this paper is not intended as a review of existing methods, a broad characterization of the state of the art across hazard categories forms the basis for presaging the modeling challenges that will need to be addressed when developing the risk models. Where challenges revolve around data availability, we address methodologies available for the formalized use of informed opinion to supplement available data. The framework is intended to be sufficiently general to accommodate a range of hazards and asset types.

There are at least five principal components to the framework which guide the elements of risk modeling:

1. Characterization of hazards and initiating events.
2. Knowledge of the geographic configuration of grid-supporting assets.
3. Assessment of the means by which an initiator can impact a grid or supporting asset in terms of relevant stressors and the level of vulnerability to such stressors.
4. Understanding of the operational logic dictating the reliance of grid assets on supporting infrastructure.
5. Power outage or other consequence implications of loss of various combinations of grid assets.

Finally, the number of assets associated with a power grid system is large, which means that the number of hypothetical scenarios involving various combinations of assets failures can be substantial. Therefore, an issue to be addressed is the tractability of analyzing all scenarios and the identification of simplifying analytical processes that do not compromise risk insights. Prospective means of addressing tractability are considered in the framework.

A. Precedents

Some precedent for modeling HILFs in a risk framework does exist. For instance, Scherb et al. (2015) developed a probabilistic risk assessment framework to study the risk impact of hurricanes on infrastructure networks with applications to the electrical power grid. In this approach, the hazard intensity given the occurrence of a hurricane is a

probabilistic distribution informed by historic maximum wind speed data. The probability of failure of a network component is conditional on the damage state induced by the hurricane, which is itself a function of the wind speed informed by a fragility model. Consequence has been quantified using a physical power-flow model.

Francis et al. (2011) developed a natural disaster mitigation framework for electric power infrastructure that has the capability to account for hazard intensity, asset fragility, and expected utility cost. In this approach, the expected failure probability of an asset is an aggregation over hazard intensity distribution and the fragility function given the hazard intensity. The expected utility cost is attributable to service disruption and restoration. Revenue loss resulting from service disruption is dependent on the restoration time, which is in itself a function of the hazard intensity and certain decision-making parameters specific to the hazard and the asset under study.

Garrick et al. (2004) developed a framework for quantitative risk assessment of terrorist initiated high-consequence events with application to cyber-physical attacks on the electrical power grid. The grid was viewed as a system with four constituent elements: 1) substations, 2) transmission lines, 3) supervisory control and data acquisition systems, and 4) energy management systems. They emphasize the notion of probability of frequency through Bayes inference to derive probability curves that characterize likelihood of a scenario.

Panteli and Mancarella (2015) furnished a conceptual framework that employs fragility curves to evaluate the impact of high-impact, low probability events on the power grid with an implementation for hurricane winds on a section of the United Kingdom's transmission network. A sequential Monte Carlo simulation was used to sample intensities from transmission tower and line fragility curves. The Loss-of-Load Expectation reliability index was used to measure the average number of hours of customer disconnection.

Current grid risk models and tools tend to focus either on detailed consequence modeling at the level of localized transmission and distribution systems, or on consideration of a single, specific hazard. Given the narrow focus of such models, this precludes broader risk insight across numerous hazard classes that could support planning and prioritization. Our current intent is to develop a framework for creating risk models that integrate across hazards and associated HILFs to aid planners in understanding decision tradeoffs across disparate hazards and asset types.

B. Models and Frameworks

We have been making distinction throughout between risk frameworks and risk models, and this subsection is intended to provide some clarification. Risk modeling in this current context involves:

1. Hazard identification and probabilistic characterization (frequencies of associated events)

2. Initiating event development (selection of representative events for analysis)
3. Grid and supporting infrastructure response characterization (probabilities of asset failures)
4. Consequence assessment (power outage or other metrics)
5. Model integration to develop risk profiles.

While a risk model generally produces a bottom-line quantitative risk estimate, this is seldom the principal value of the model. Rather, greater insights come from improved understanding of the distribution of risk: among hazards, among initiating events, among assets, and over geographic areas. Interrogation of the model generally involves asking the question, “If I make the following adjustment to system design, system operations, or contingency measures, how is the risk impacted?” When applied in combination with costing models, a risk model provides a basis for cost-benefit analysis that identifies where resources can be most effectively be expended. The primary objective is to evolve the model as a useful and practical decision-support tool that aids planners in risk-ranking of various HILFs and appropriately allocating resources in anticipation of such risks.

A risk framework in the present context is a conceptual structure intended to guide the development of risk models. It identifies the elements of a model and the means by which they are integrated. The framework is not intended to be prescriptive and so it leaves flexibility in the specifics of its implementation, but at the same time ensures that the essential components of the resultant risk model are present.

C. Risk Management Paradigms

Figure 1. Elements of risk management paradigm

The HILF risk framework is intended to underlie risk models that have value to decision-makers in the context of conventional risk-management paradigms. Several paradigms have been described (Apostolakis et al., 2012) but they all coincide in essential features. Figure 1 represents typical concepts. It would allow risk to the electric power grid due to extreme events to be managed as part of a continuous improvement lifecycle.

Analysis, evaluation and decision implementation are major elements of any risk management paradigm. Methods for analysis are exemplified by probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) methodology (see Garrick [2008] for PRA fundamentals), where most experience is in the nuclear power arena. In the analysis phase, the system under study is quantitatively characterized, supported by subject matter experts, to systematically identify adverse scenarios, their frequencies of occurrence, and their severities of outcome. A scenario is a set of events triggered by an initiating event and followed by the failure of mitigative systems, resulting ultimately in an end state associated with a given severity of consequences. For low-frequency events where direct statistical data are unavailable, frequency estimates generally derive from models, some of which extrapolate from available data, often augmented by informed judgment. Consequence estimates are generally derived from domain models of the systems under analysis.

The evaluation phase is the digestion of results of the analysis which are cast in forms that support decision-making. This may be ranking or importance analysis of factors such as hazards, events, assets, and conducting “*what-if*” assessments in which the risk impact of engineered or operational changes are evaluated. Based on the evaluation, decisions are made on the best risk-management strategies. Elements of risk control tend to be either preventive or mitigative in nature, where the former prevents or reduces the likelihood of a scenario, and the latter reduces its impact. Cost-benefit analysis is often a factor in selecting between risk management options. A risk model may also identify the need for reducing uncertainties through either additional data collection or model enhancement. The efficacy of risk management decisions is generally dependent on strong communications to all stakeholders. Such stakeholders may include policymakers, operational decision-makers, regulators, and the public. Once implemented, the risk model and associated risk management strategy are maintained evergreen through monitoring and analysis of emerging hazard and operational data to validate the model or to update it where warranted.

III. HILF RISK FRAMEWORK ELEMENTS

This section provides the essential elements of the HILF framework, portrayed graphically in Figure 2. This figure represents the flow of analysis and information transfer associated with a risk model developed in conformance with the framework. In this section, each element of the framework is described. Appendix A lays out the framework in greater mathematical rigor, while the other appendices provide clarification of the framework elements.

Figure 2. Elements of the HILF framework

1) Study Initiation

Prior to implementation of the framework, the objective of the resulting risk model should be established. How will the model be used and by whom? This will dictate the model scope (such as hazards, assets, and geographic application), its level of resolution, and likely data requirements. These insights are then among the bases for implementing subsequent elements.

2) Identify Grid Assets/Types

In this element, critical grid infrastructure assets relevant to the application scope are identified. If the study is driven more by hazard scope than asset focus, then the subsequent element identifying assets vulnerable to specific hazards will be needed to define the asset classes of interest. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Grid Technology Team, as part of its grid modernization strategic plan, categorizes electric grid in to these asset domains(Bose et al., 2013):

1. Generation
2. Transmission
3. Distribution and end users.

Within each of these categories, specific assets are identified as part of this element. Other facilities, systems and equipment that might be listed include control centers and special systems required to maintain reliability of the bulk power system (NERC, 2009). In a subsequent element, each member of the list of assets will be characterized in terms of its vulnerability to HILFs. That will depend on factors such as its fragility to stressors associated with the hazard, its protective features, and its geographic location.

3) Identify Hazards in Scope

The hazards to be captured in the model scope are identified. If the study is driven more by asset scope than hazard focus, then the subsequent element identifying assets vulnerable to specific hazards will be needed to define the hazards of interest. In this element, the stressors associated with each hazard are identified. A stressor is the mechanism by which

an event realized by the hazard can challenge the integrity of an asset. For instance, a seismic event is associated with the stressor of peak ground acceleration to which an asset may be vulnerable. An example list of candidate hazards and their associated stressors are listed in Appendix C.

Note that not all hazards are credibly associated with HILFs and some may be screened out on this basis. The current focus is to consider events that can potentially result in outages on a wide-area scale with asset failures occurring in disparate locations. The element therefore requires establishment of screening criteria by which hazard classes are included.

4) Identify Support Infrastructure Assets

Infrastructure dependence models are used to identify assets that service the grid assets of interest. The boundary between core grid assets and the assets on which the grid relies for reliable functionality are delineated. Grid assets that directly rely on support systems are identified. The risk model must ultimately model the vulnerabilities associated with those assets comprising the support systems.

The basis for support infrastructure identification and the associated support assets can be driven by interdependency modeling methodologies (Ouyang 2014; Pederson et al., 2006; Rinaldi et al., 2001). These assets can be identified under the categories such as means of transport for essential supplies, crew logistics, professional services, and information infrastructure.

It is likely impractical to identify a comprehensive set of support infrastructure assets given the complexity of interoperability between infrastructure types, such as cyber, transportation, and electrical power, for example. The challenge is to establish a basis for model simplification. The practical basis for such simplification might be a focus on assets most vulnerable to the hazard types under review, supplemented by a screening assessment that demonstrates the major contributors to risk have been captured. This will likely require iteration between the current element and the asset/stressor development element to follow.

5) Develop Stressor/Asset Matrix

A matrix connecting hazard classes to asset classes is developed. This pairs assets to hazards via the stressor types to which the assets are potentially vulnerable. For instance, distribution lines may be linked to meteorological hazards via high winds and generated projectiles, while transmission lines may be coupled via generated projectiles only. This matrix forms the basis for developing scenarios in which the loads associated with certain stressors exceed the capacities of specified assets to withstand them. Appendix D provides an example of a stressor/asset matrix.

Depending on the asset/hazard combinations within scope, it is likely that this step will require the exploration of asset vulnerabilities to stressors that are beyond established, standard methodology. That is, some degree of methodology development, supported by use of informed opinion, will be necessary. For instance, hazards associated with pandemics

require a characterization of stressors and vulnerabilities that appropriately reflect the potential impact of loss of human resources to control and maintain grid and infrastructure assets. In this sense, the current framework goes beyond establishment of the basis for developing risk models to identifying methodology development needs.

6) *Characterize Hazards*

In this element, a probabilistic characterization of hazard degree is developed. For example, a hazard characterization for the seismic hazard is a curve that specifies the annual frequencies of exceedance of a given earthquake magnitudes, specified by location. Of all hazards, seismicity is probably the most mature in terms of quantitative characterization in the U.S. (e.g., USGS, 2015; EPRI/DOE/NRC, 2012). Characterizations of other hazards are also available, albeit generally in less quantitative form. This characterization ultimately forms the basis for scenario initiating event identification. A list of available hazard models, geographic information system-based tools and guidance resources are listed in Appendix B. Because of the substantial variability in maturity of methods for characterizing the various hazards, it is anticipated that elicitation of informed judgment will play a substantial role in this element, for which several systematic methodologies are available (e.g., Budnitz et al., 1997; Ortiz, 1991). Elicitation methods are discussed further in Section V. Informed opinion becomes even more significant while characterizing threats given the difficulties in quantifying frequencies or probabilities of an attack (Brown and Cox, 2011; Cox, 2008).

7) *Model Asset Fragilities*

The asset/stressor matrix developed in a previous element is the starting point for the current element. Each asset's capacity to withstand a stressor of given intensity is modeled probabilistically. A fragility curve defines the probability of functional failure of the asset conditional on specified stressor magnitudes. For practicality, assets could be grouped into equivalence classes for each stressor type (e.g., seismic ground excitation, wind speed, projectile impulse, etc.), and the fragility curves developed for each class/stressor combination. An equivalence class would include all assets with approximately equal fragility characteristics. Fragility models and guidance resources are listed in Appendix B. It is expected that some methodology development will be required for stressor types not conventionally modeled in a stressor/fragility (i.e., load/capacity) paradigm. Ultimately, the convolution of such fragility curves with probabilistic stressor curves at the asset location will produce asset failure probabilities.

8) *Identify Initiating Events*

The hazard curves provide the basis for identification of scenario initiating events. Discrete representative events must be chosen as initiators. Hazard curves generally define a continuum of hypothetical events, both in terms of magnitude and, if applicable, geographic location, and these continua need to be discretized to identify specific events that capture

the range of possible event magnitudes and other discriminating hazard characteristics (e.g., earthquake location, hurricane path, etc.). An initiator is the first event in a sequence that ultimately results in an adverse impact. These event sequences, or "scenarios", provide the underlying structure of the risk model. It is the frequencies and consequences of these scenarios that are the fundamental components of the risk calculation.

9) *Estimate Initiating Event Frequencies*

Based on comparison of the hazard curves or other source hazard characterization with the discrete initiating events selected for analysis, annual frequencies of those events are estimated. At the completion of this step, we now have a set of probabilistically characterized initiating events from which the scenarios will be generated.

10) *Determine Stressor Transfer to Assets*

The stressor to which an asset is exposed as a consequence of a specified initiator requires an understanding of the way in which the energy associated with the initiator is transferred to the asset. For example, a seismic event results in an energy release and ground motion that is attenuated between the earthquake epicenter and the asset. The degree of attenuation is dependent of factors such rock and soil properties between the two locations. There exist several ground attenuation models to assess the seismic stressor transfer (e.g., Stewart et al., 2015). The transfer model is likely to be probabilistic in nature, reflecting uncertainties in the degree of stressor attenuation. Examples of stressor transfer models are presented in Appendix B.

Depending on the maturity of methods and availability of geographically relevant data, it is likely that this element will require informed judgment to play a significant role. For example, the process for conducting a probabilistic seismic hazard assessment substantially incorporates informed judgment elicited through formal methods (Budnitz et al., 1997).

11) *Scenarios Formulation*

At this point, the elements are in place to systematically identify scenarios. A scenario is a deterministic, hypothetical sequence of events that begins with an initiating event and results in the functional failure of some combination of assets. Combinatorially, there is an extremely large set of scenarios that could be generated from the information developed, and so means of representing that set, without compromising risk insights, are necessary. A Monte Carlo approach is likely the most practical. The expectation is that for each initiating event, the scenarios will be sampled from joint distributions over stressor magnitudes and asset fragilities. That is, a given scenario will include the occurrence of an initiator and the subsequent failure of a set of assets, where for each asset in that set, at least one associated stressor exceeds the corresponding capacity to withstand it. Therefore, for each initiator, the number of scenarios generated is equal to number of members in the Monte Carlo sample for which at least one

asset fails. The methodology and sample size selected must be demonstrated to generate good estimates of the risk characteristics.

12) *Generate and Map to Representative Scenarios*

The severity of consequence associated with each scenario must ultimately be estimated. The consequence metric of interest (e.g., power outage duration and geographic extent) is evaluated using existing grid simulation models such as PSS/E (Siemens, 2015). Public, private and open-source grid models have been developed over the past several years which can characterize cascading grid failures in response to initiating events. A list of grid simulation models and tools is listed in Appendix E.

Because the run times render impractical execution of such a model for every sample member (i.e., for every scenario), this element involves the identification of representative scenarios for which the consequences will be calculated and to which the full Monte Carlo sample of scenarios will be mapped. The methodological basis for establishing representative scenarios will need to be established. One possibility is the clustering of the sample members such that each member of a cluster (i.e., each scenario) has attributes that would result in similar consequences. Then a single scenario can be used to represent each cluster in the consequence analysis.

Note that in this element, there is the opportunity to screen from further analysis those scenarios, or scenario clusters, that lack potential to result in high-impact consequences per the criteria established. This notion is discussed more in Section IV.A.

13) *Exercise Grid/Infrastructure Models for Representative Scenarios*

Support infrastructure models that map loss of supporting assets to loss of grid assets, as well as grid operability models for the representative scenario set are exercised to assess the degrees of impact for the consequence metrics identified.

Identification of grid assets lost either due to HILF stressors or to service system failures will be primary inputs to the grid operability models (e.g., Siemens, 2015). Implications of the relative immaturity of grid support infrastructure models were addressed in the fourth element.

This element produces consequence estimates in terms of the selected impact metrics such as power outage by geographic extent and duration, for each representative scenario.

14) *Characterize Asset Recovery Times*

The recovery times associated with each representative scenario are estimated as the basis to adjust consequence estimates. Recovery models are discussed in Appendix F.

While reliability databases containing mean times to asset repair will be of value, the sheer extent of impact associated with a HILF will necessitate the elicitation of informed judgment to address the practicality of repairs in the wake of a

major event (see Section V). The task of quantifying repair times becomes challenging because of possible asset inaccessibility in emergency conditions, occupational hazards, loss of manpower, loss of service systems, and combinations thereof.

15) *Risk Integration*

The realized scenarios, their frequencies of occurrence, and the consequence estimates are integrated to characterize the risk to the electric power grid due to the multiple hazards addressed. The mathematical structure that brings together the elements of the framework is outlined Appendix A.

The platform for implementation and integration of the model is not prescribed by the framework which allows flexibility in approach – from a simple Excel framework to a custom software platform.

16) *Model Interrogation to Support Decision-making*

Once implemented, the risk model can be interrogated in numerous ways to provide insight to decision-makers. Some of the most common means of manipulating a model to provide insight are:

1. Identification of principal risk drivers: hazards, initiators, asset classes, specific assets, geographic regions. This points to where there is the greatest potential for risk reduction.
2. Sensitivity/*what-if?* analysis to understand the risk impact of hypothetical engineered or operational risk-management measures.
3. In conjunction with use of costing models, cost-benefit analysis undertaken to determine where risk reduction can be most cost efficiently achieved.

IV. IMPLEMENTATION

Based on the framework as described in Section III, implementation will require the availability or development of a mix of underlying model types. These types are depicted in Figure 3.

Figure 3. Scenario elements and constituent models of the risk framework

Asset fragility models characterize, in probabilistic terms, the vulnerability or performance of an asset subject to stressors associated with a hazard (Straub et al., 2008). An example vulnerability model addresses loss-of-load probability, which is described as a function of the number of cyber-attack attempts (Xiang et al., 2014). Quantitative seismic fragility models (Pitilakis, 2014) couched in terms of the stressor of peak ground acceleration represent the most mature of the methodologies among natural hazards. Fragility models for other types of stressors are sometime qualitative in nature, such as those that characterize the extent of structural damage associated with specified wind speeds.

Grid behavior models consist of combinations of simulation, physics-based or probabilistic models that analyze cascading failures due to overloads, voltage deviations, loss of protection systems, and operator actions (Morgan, 2011) given a set of initial degraded conditions. There are a number of research and commercial software packages that perform contingency analysis either conservatively based on steady-state solutions or in more detail involving dynamic interaction of events. Some of these readily available packages are shown in Appendix E.

Grid support models would provide two key functionalities: 1) fragility models that identify supporting assets likely to fail in response to the initiating event and critical to the operation of the grid, and 2) identification of grid assets that are impacted due to loss of supporting assets. The availability of such models may be a key constraint on the comprehensiveness of the integrated risk model. An important element of risk modeling is determination of what depth of domain modeling is essential to support usable risk insights. Implementation of the current framework will shed light on such questions.

Finally, risk and decision models then aggregate the component model analyses into information and insights that are of value to decision-makers.

A. Steps in Implementation

In modeling a system as large and complex as the power grid, it is inevitable that there will be issues of model tractability due to the sheer number of hypothetical scenarios that can be generated. In Section III, some observations have already been made on how some tractability issues can be addressed, such as the Monte Carlo generation of a scenario sample and the subsequent identification of representative scenarios for consequence estimation.

Tractability can also be enhanced by consideration of the constraints associated with the scope of the HILF model; that is, our interest is in the subset of scenarios that give rise to high impact. Screening of scenarios against the HILF criteria will further reduce the scenario set to be explicitly modeled. For example, some scenarios are likely to fall within the extreme event criteria defined by the NERC performance requirements standard (NERC, 2014) and so are considered outside the scope of the current HILF framework.

Given the availability of high-performance computing and parallelization, run time challenges for grid models may be significantly reduced. There are three classes of grid operability models that perform contingency analysis following the initial loss of a set of assets: 1) power-flow models, 2) dynamic-transient models, and 3) hybrid modeled that combine elements of the first two. Power-flow models evaluate post-contingency, grid equilibrium conditions and run faster than other models, yielding conservative consequence estimates. However, certain conditions that cause significant asset losses may result in convergence issues during the runtime. Such numerical instabilities are likely to happen given the extreme nature of HILFs under study. This occurs when dynamic models search for stable steady-state solutions through tracking power flow over smaller time steps. However, these models are known to be resource intensive, time consuming, and possibly demand the use of supercomputers. For this reason, hybrid models that default to conservative analysis in the event of convergence challenges would likely be preferred for the purposes of implementing the framework.

Grid operability models do not typically consider support infrastructure assets (such as communications) in the network topology. As noted before, the immaturity of available infrastructure models may demand approximate approaches to addressing infrastructure failures. For example, a conservative approach might be to associate grid assets with supporting infrastructure assets and assume that loss of the supporting asset leads deterministically to loss of the associated grid assets.

V. USE OF INFORMED OPINION

Where historical data or statistical information is deemed incomplete or insufficient to represent uncertainty in a classical, statistical sense, the formal and structured elicitation of informed judgment has substantial precedent as a basis for augmenting sparse or ambiguous data (Meyer and Booker, 2001; Boring et al., 2005). The risk framework requires modeling of an inhomogeneous set of phenomena with regard to data and model availability. It is therefore inevitable that model development will demand the use of informed opinion in some areas. To maximize the transparency and defensibility of informed judgment, the methodology for its elicitation must itself be defensible and widely accepted. There are several such methods available.

Expert elicitation methods were first developed in conjunction with the development of decision-analysis techniques in the late 1960s and early 1970s (Spetzler and von Holstein [1975] is recognized as the seminal work). Since then, they have become standard—and in some domains, proceduralized—tools for uncertainty characterization (e.g., Wheeler et al. 1989, Budnitz et al., 1997). The methods have drawn extensively from research in cognitive psychology (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974; Kahneman et al., 1982) showing that, when unaided, individuals tend to use various heuristics when making judgments about uncertainty, resulting in systematic biases in their assessment, such as overconfidence. If these biases are not identified and managed by the interviewer in the

elicitation process, then the resulting probability assessment will suffer accordingly.

For example, the Delphi method of elicitation was initially developed by RAND Corporation. In a study for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Ortiz et al. (1991) adopted another example of an elicitation methodology during their assessment of severe accident risks for several nuclear power plants. One of the most widely applied methods for elicitation is described in the Senior Seismic Hazard Analysis Committee report (Budnitz et al., 1997), which has been used in the context of hazard characterization for seismicity and volcanism. Budnitz et al. describe multiple, optional levels of elicitation, depending on the study objectives and the resources available to achieve them. Factors that distinguish methodologies include whether experts are elicited individually or in groups, whether individual experts provide point estimates of parameters from which distributions are generated or they provide probability distributions over the parameter space, whether there is an opportunity for discourse between/among experts allowing adjustment of individual opinions, etc. The appropriate methodology is driven by objectives and resources (Cooke and Goossens, 2004).

In the context of the current framework, the anticipation is that elicitation will be of greatest value in hazard characterization and asset fragility analysis.

VI. UNCERTAINTY QUANTIFICATION

The current framework does not make explicit distinction between epistemic (state of knowledge) and aleatory (randomness inherent in the system) uncertainty, and consequently does not advocate the overlay of an explicit epistemic uncertainty analysis over an underlying aleatory model. The decision was made that implementation of the framework would produce an analysis based on point estimates of risk, and there are two principal reasons for this. One is the practical consideration that there is a substantial jump in the resources required to implement a full, probabilistic uncertainty analysis that distinguishes epistemic and aleatory uncertainties. Second, while epistemic uncertainty analysis is crucial if the study is being conducted to obtain absolute measures of risk, as noted previously, this is seldom the prime application of a risk model and greater insights always derive from an understanding of relative risks. Examples include the risk-informed prioritization of issues or assessment of the risk-reduction impact associated with a risk-management measure. While for such applications there may remain an argument for conducting an explicit uncertainty analysis, adequate insights can generally be gained from sensitivity studies which are substantially less resource-intensive.

VII. CONCLUSIONS

The framework established here provides a systematic structure in which disparate hazards and their risk to the grid can be modeled. As the framework was under development, anticipated challenges for implementation were

identified. A key challenge is that there is substantial lack of uniformity in the extent to which domain models are available, or in the maturities of those models, across hazard categories. For instance, while there is substantial literature on fully quantitative models of seismic hazards and ground motion stressors, the same is not true of geomagnetic disturbances. However, risk models generally accommodate some level of approximation in analysis of the underlying domain, and detailed domain models are not always required. The expectation is that implementation of the framework will require some reliance on the elicitation of informed opinion to augment areas in which models are less mature and data more sparse. Nevertheless, the framework should be viewed not only as a template for the development of risk models, but also as a means of systematically identifying methodological and data development needs.

Another key finding is that given the large number of alternative impact scenarios associated with potential combinations of asset failures, approximation techniques will need to be established to generate samples of scenarios that allow acceptably accurate estimates of risk. In this context, a Monte Carlo approach is considered, but the non-prescriptive nature of the framework allows alternative approaches to be considered.

The anticipation is that early implementation of the framework will not necessarily focus on capturing the full range of hazards and assets that the framework is developed to accommodate but, rather, will be used to address a more limited objective focused on specific hazard and/or asset types. Depending on the selected applications, the expectation is that some risk methodology development will be necessary for implementation of the framework. Another expectation is that application of the framework for different needs will reveal gaps in the data and modeling requirements to produce useful risk assessment results. This framework should then provide the structure and risk context in which those development needs can be identified and their relative importance assessed.

APPENDIX A. HILF RISK MATHEMATICAL FORMULATION

The building blocks of the HILF risk framework are tabulated in Table A.1.

Let the stressors associated with a hazard category j and an asset type i be enumerated by $r(j, i)$. If there is only one stressor, $r(j, i)=1$, associated with a given hazard class-asset combination, then the probability that asset A_i functionally fails given the occurrence of initiating event E_{kj} is:

$$(1) \quad P_{ik(j)} = \int_0^\infty C_{ir}(L_r) dL_r \int_{L_r}^\infty Q_{ik(j)r}(L_r') dL_r'$$

If there are multiple stressors that connect a hazard class with an asset then:

$$(2) \quad P_{ik(j)} = \sum_{r(i,j)} \int_0^\infty C_{ir}(L_r) dL_r \int_{L_r}^\infty Q_{ik(j)r}(L_r') dL_r'$$

As a framework is intended to be much more generic, no assumption is made regarding correlation between stressors. For long term planning purposes and to gain relative insight into hazards/threats, it is imperative that independence be assumed. However, the framework does lend itself to much more intensive stressor dependence assumptions if implementation resources are adequately available. In this case, probabilistic combination of failure events each due to a different stressor would be accounted through the cross terms. As an example, effects of wind and rain associated with a hurricane could be correlated. While wind affects transmission lines, rain induces hydrodynamic forces on structures.

We are now interested in identifying scenarios that involve some combination of asset failures. Consider occurrence of initiator $E_{k(j)}$. A subset of A_i fail and some survive with a given probability. Say B_i is an indicator such that

$$\begin{aligned} B_i &= 1 \text{ if asset } A_i \text{ fails} \\ B_i &= 0 \text{ if } A_i \text{ survives.} \end{aligned}$$

So vector $\underline{B}$ defines a single asset failure/survival scenario. Conditional on the initiator $E_{k(j)}$ occurring, the probability of N specific assets failing and the remainder (M assets) surviving is:

$$(3) \quad T_{k(j)}(\underline{B}) = \prod_{i=1}^N P_{ik(j)} \cdot \prod_{i=N+1}^M (1 - P_{ik(j)})$$

where the probabilities on right hand side are associated with the elements of the vector $\underline{B}$.

At this stage of the formulation, the asset failures are assumed to be independent. During the later steps when a grid simulation model (e.g. PSS/E) is executed, it is assumed that cascading and other types of dependent failure mechanisms will be captured based on the physics of power flow. For a more conservative and time-sensitive practical analysis, assets could be assumed independent throughout the implementation.

Therefore, the frequency with which initiator $E_{k(j)}$ occurs resulting in the failure vector $\underline{B}$ is:

$$(4) \quad F(\underline{B})_{k(j)} = F_{k(j)} \cdot T_{k(j)}(\underline{B})$$

Assume the consequence of this scenario is $D_{k(j)}(\underline{B})$. Note that this D factor accounts for recovery times associated with the scenario, accounting for challenges associated with the recovery environment that the scenario has created. Therefore, the risk contribution from this scenario is now:

$$(5) \quad R_{k(j)}(\underline{B}) = F(\underline{B})_{k(j)} \cdot D_{k(j)}(\underline{B})$$

and the total risk contribution from initiator $E_{k(j)}$ is:

$$(6) \quad R_{k(j)} = \sum_{\underline{B}} R_{k(j)}(\underline{B})$$

where the summation is effected over all asset failure combinations. Therefore, the total risk associated with hazard category H_j is:

$$(7) \quad R_j = \sum_{k(j)} R_{k(j)}$$

and the grand total risk over all hazard categories is given by

$$(8) \quad R = \sum_j R_j$$

or, partially expanding this out:

$$(9) \quad R = \sum_j \sum_{k(j)} F_{k(j)} \cdot \sum_{\underline{B}} T_{k(j)}(\underline{B}) \cdot D_{k(j)}(\underline{B})$$

Note that the calculational tractability issue addressed is associated principally the large size of the set of possible $\underline{B}$ vectors; i.e. asset failure combinations. It is assumed that Monte Carlo methods will prove the most practical means of implementing Equation 9 and the challenge is to demonstrate good risk approximations associated with practical sample sizes.

APPENDIX B. STATE OF THE ART IN HAZARD AND FRAGILITY MODELING

Quantitative characterization of hazards and asset fragilities are key elements of the high-intensity, low-frequency risk framework. There is a broad range of maturities and availabilities of methods and data across the spectrum of hazard types. For this reason, implementation of the framework is likely to demand some degree of methodology development depending on the scope of application. In this appendix, we tabulate an overview of the state of methods maturity in hazard and fragility analysis.

A tabulated overview of the state of maturity of methods for the types of hazards that risk models might include is provided in Table B.1.

APPENDIX C. HAZARDS AND ASSOCIATED STRESSORS

Implementation of the framework requires understanding of the range of event severities associated with specific hazards and the mechanisms by which the events can impact the integrity of grid and support infrastructure assets. This appendix lists some hazards potentially associated with HILFs, examples of the scales by which they're measured, and the associated stressors to grid/infrastructure assets. Some historic events are also identified.

Some of the prominent hazards along with scale of the most recent largest known event to give some perspective are provided in Table C.1.

APPENDIX D. STRESSORS/ASSET INTERACTION

Assessment of the fragility of grid and infrastructure assets to HILF-generated stressors is an element of the risk framework. In this appendix, some resources to support assessment of the impact of stressors on assets and associated fragilities are identified. (Table D.1).

APPENDIX E. GRID OPERABILITY MODELS

The risk framework requires use of existing grid models to assess how the grid responds to an initiating event and to estimate consequences. There is a variety of tools for transmission and distribution modeling which are publicly or commercially available. These models perform conservative, steady-state analysis or comprehensive time-step varying dynamic simulations.

This wide variety of available tools, their scope, features and maturity are described in Table E.1.

APPENDIX F. GRID RECOVERY MODELS

The risk framework requires a characterization of asset recovery times to produce realistic estimates of scenario consequences. There is some precedent for modeling recovery times and this appendix identifies available resources.

Some of the prominent models are described in Table F.1.

Table A.1. Building Blocks of the HILF Risk Framework

Object	Definition	Example
A_i	i'th asset associated with geographic/functional scope of interest: could belong to grid or support system	The substation located at $x^0N y^0W$
H_j	j'th hazard category	Seismic hazard
$E_{k(j)}$	k'th initiating event in hazard category H_j	Magnitude M=3 earthquake occurs at epicenter $x^0N y^0W$, depth 100m
$F_{k(j)}$	Annual rate of occurrence of initiating event $E_{k(j)}$	Annual occurrence rate of magnitude M=3 earthquake at epicenter $x^0N y^0W$, depth 100m
$S_{r(j,i)}$	r'th stressor type associated with hazard category H_j to which asset type A_i is vulnerable	Distribution line segment x vulnerability to impact from projectiles associated with hurricane hazard
$P_{ik(j)}$	The probability that asset A_i functionally fails given the occurrence of initiating event $E_{k(j)}$	Probability that Substation located at $x^0N y^0W$ fails given the occurrence of a magnitude M=3 earthquake at epicenter $w^0N z^0W$, depth 100m
$Q_{ik(j)r(i,j)}(L_r)$	Probability (density) that the stressor load at asset A_i associated with stressor type $S_{r(j,i)}$ given occurrence of initiator $E_{k(j)}$ is at magnitude L_r	Probability density at 0.5g for peak ground acceleration at Substation located at $x^0N y^0W$ given magnitude M=3 earthquake occurs at epicenter $u^0N v^0W$, depth 100m
$C_{ir(i,j)}(L_r)$	Probability (density) that the threshold failure load (i.e., capacity) for asset A_i associated with stressor type $S_{r(j,i)}$ is L_r	Probability density at gust wind speed of 100 mph for the failure threshold for Substation located at $x^0N y^0W$

Table B.1. State of Availability of Supporting Hazard Models and Data

Hazard	Frequency Characterization	Associated Fragility
Seismic	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Full quantitative hazard models for several geographic regions (USGS, 2015; EPRI/DOE/NRC, 2012) – Quantitative ground-motion attenuation models for selected geographic regions (Stewart et al., 2015) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Quantitative fragility models for limited asset types (FEMA-HAZUS, 2015; EPRI 2002)
Pandemic	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Quantitative pandemic outbreak probability models – Quantitative spread rate and transmission probability models (CDC, 2012; DHS, 2007, 2009) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Exploratory impact models available across some aspects of national infrastructure (DHS, 2007)
Hurricane	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Quantitative near-term forecast of wind speed and storm surge probabilities for coastal and inland locations (NHC, 2009) – Quantitative hurricane wind field models for inland wind decay (NHC, 2009) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Quantitative fragility models for structures (FEMA-HAZUS-MH, 2003; DOE, 2002)
Tornado	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Site-specific probabilistic wind hazard assessment for key locations (LLNL 2000, DOE 2002) – Site-specific wind velocity intensity distributions for high-risk sites (Boissonnade, 2000) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Projectile probabilistic risk evaluation methodology for nuclear power plant structures (EPRI, 1981)
Geomagnetic Storm	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Estimated frequency of geomagnetic storms of different magnitudes (DHS-RMA, 2011) – Latitude-specific probability of a North American event for a given disturbance intensity (DHS-RMA, 2011) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Power grid failure probability analysis from GIC threat scenario (Kappenman, 2010)
High-altitude Electromagnetic Pulse	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Propagation characteristics of high-altitude pulse waves to electric fields in the Earth (ORNL, 2010) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Probabilistic loss of critical assets
Cyber-attack ^a	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Cyber-attack frequency metric (Mateski et al. 2012) – Probabilistic threat characterization (Duggan et al, 2007) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Probabilistic characterization of cyber-asset loss due to cyber-attack (McQueen et al., 2005)
Physical Attack ^a	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Probabilistic threat detection (Jones et al., 2006) – Probabilistic threat intensity characterization (Jones et al., 2006) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Probabilistic breach of physical security (Jones et al., 2006)

^a Possibility of a coordinated cyber-physical attack.

Table C.1. Prominent Hazards Along With Scale of the Most Recent Largest Known Event

Hazard	Example Severity Scales	Stressor(s)	Example Historic Event(s) and Scale
Seismic	– Moment Magnitude (Mw), or the Modified Mercalli Intensity Scale (I to XII)	Peak ground acceleration Tsunami inundation	1964 Great Alaska Earthquake, magnitude Mw 9.2
Pandemic	– Pandemic Severity Index Category 1 to 5 – (Mild, Moderate and Severe)	Reduction in workforce / expertise	1918 Influenza Pandemic (Category 5)
Hurricane	– Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Wind Scale – Category 1 to 5	Peak gust wind Storm surge Inundation Hurricane-induced projectile Hydrostatic loading	Hurricane Katrina, 2005 (Category 3); Hurricane Sandy, 2012 (Category 1)
Tornado	– Enhanced Fujita Scale EF0 to EF5	Peak gust wind Tornado-induced projectile Lightning	Joplin, 2011 (EF-5)
Geomagnetic Storm	– G1 to G5 – Minor to Extreme	Geomagnetic Induced Current (GIC)	March 13, 1989. Canada and U.S.A. (Extreme)
High-Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse	– To be identified	Blast Shock Thermal Pulse Geomagnetic Induced Current (GIC)	Starfish, 1962 (high-altitude nuclear test in Hawaii)
Cyber-attack ^a	– To be identified	- Degradation of cyber functionality - Data breach	Stuxnet, 2010. Computer worm attack in Iran
Physical ^a Attack	– To be identified	- Chemical attack - Radiological attack - Kinetic attack	Metcalf substation breach, 2013
^a Possibility of a coordinated cyber-physical attack			

Table D.1. Stressor/Asset Interaction

Asset	Hazard/ Stressor	Asset-Stressor Interaction	Sources Characterizing the interaction
Substation	Hurricane	Storm surge causing damage to building and equipment	Winkler 2010
	Seismic	Loss of integrity and structural damage. Structural loss due to tsunami hydrodynamic force and inundation	Pitilakis 2014, Schultz 2010, Portante 2010, Suppasri 2011
	Physical Attack	Loss of integrity and structural damage due to sabotage	Stewart 2006
	Cyber-Attack	Compromise of remote field devices and control systems potentially causing cascading events	Xiang et al. 2014
Transmission Line Support System	Hurricane Wind	Intense gusts of downburst winds cause loss of structural integrity of the transmission line tower	Panteliand Mancarella2015, Salman 2014 for distribution steel poles
	Hurricane Flooding	Very strong currents erode the land and undercut the transmission line tower foundation	Simm 2008 for embankments
	Seismic	Loss of structural integrity and reliability of transmission tower	Xie 2012
	Hurricane Wind	Live wires touch each other causing short circuit and power flash.	Winkler 2010
	Hurricane Flooding	Buried transmission lines fail due to salt water intrusion	
Road	Hurricane	Debris/stormwater/landslide/sinkhole/erosion/land subsidence. Fallen branches or severed lines.	Pitilakis 2014

Asset	Hazard/ Stressor	Asset-Stressor Interaction	Sources Characterizing the interaction
Rail	Geomagnetic storm	Failure of SCADA equipment causes disruption in signaling	Pitilakis 2014
	Hurricane – Wind	Train tankers carrying fuel overturn causing disruption in power generation	
	Hurricane Flooding Seismic	Disruption in fuel transportation for generation Deformation of rail roads and bridges leading to disruption in fuel transportation for generation	
Pipelines	Geomagnetic storm	Failure of SCADA equipment causes disruption in load forecasting and hence supply of natural gas to generation facilities	Pitilakis 2014
	Hurricane – Wind	Rupture or leakage is likely due to wind-borne projectile causing disruption in supply of natural gas to generation facility	
	Hurricane Flooding	Stress aftermath a mudslide/erosion causes disruption in oil and gas supply for electricity generation	
	Seismic	Structural damage and loss containment causing disruption in supplying fuel to generation facility	
Telecom	Geomagnetic storm	Satellite and radio communications are disrupted leading to failure of GPS and time sync	
Transformer	Geomagnetic storm	Geomagnetic induced current, overheat, saturate and fail multiple transformer cores (severe if line is long)	Pitilakis 2014, Shinozuka 2003, Anagnos 1999
	Hurricane Flooding	Damage to wires prevent transformers to detect spikes in electricity leading to overheating and melting	
	Seismic	Transformer malfunction due to leaks and internal failure	
Generating Station	Seismic	Structural damage due to ground motion and/or tsunami	Pitilakis 2014, EPRI 2002, Portante 2010

Table E.1. Grid Operability Models

Grid Operability Model	Scope	Maturity Level and Availability
PSS/E	Transmission	Tool, Commercial
GE-PSLF	Transmission	Tool, Commercial
PowerVolt	Transmission	Open source/free to use
MatPower	Transmission	Open source
GridLAB-D	Distribution	PNNL owned – Open source
DSA Toolbox	Transmission	Tool, Commercial
Power System Analysis toolbox	Transmission	Free to use
Power system toolbox	Transmission	Free to use
TRELS	Transmission	Free to use
HAZUS	Transmission; Distribution	Free to use
HURRTRAK	Transmission; Distribution	Tool, Commercial
ESRI ArcGIS	Transmission; Distribution	Tool, Commercial
SELFE	Transmission; Distribution	Open source
MATCASC	Transmission	Open source Matlab-based
OMNeT++, INET, ReaSE	Smart Grid	Free to use
ASKxELP	Power Networks	Open source
BROKE	Transmission line systems	Open source
Metatech Tools	Transmission	Commercial

Table F.1. Grid Recovery Models

Recovery Model Characteristics	HILF Context	Reference
The restoration time is assumed to be double that of normal weather conditions. Restoration delay is attributed to situational awareness and information sharing.	Hurricane winds	Panteli and Mancarella 2015
The restoration time is the sum of a minimum fixed required time to assemble and dispatch crew, and a random repair time that follows exponential distribution.	General Blackout	Anghel <i>et al.</i> 2007
It is assumed that repair cannot be performed during major adverse weather periods. Random failure rates for transmission lines are associated with an error factor to reflect increase in failure rate during adverse weather conditions.	Major adverse weather	Billinton and Singh 2006
Repair duration of a line is not length-dependent and not more than that of normal conditions since extra manpower and resources are made available.	Adverse weather	Bhuiyan and Allan 1994
A network recovery-planning model is implemented to produce repair schedule that minimizes cost of power loss. Test cases involved placing 4% to 20% of network assets out of service. Transportation time for spare large-sized transformers is also accounted.	Hurricane and terrorist attacks	Chee Chien 2006
The causal factors associated with restoration time are assumed to be hazard intensity and decision-making factors related to system repairs. Though the factors are listed, the illustrative estimates used for restoration time in the consideration of wind and surge-induced damages are independent of the factors. The cost attributable to service disruptions is a function of restoration time.	Hurricane winds and storm floods	Francis <i>et al.</i> 2011

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