Why More *Is* Better: Simultaneous Modeling of EEG, fMRI, and Behavioral Data

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Abstract

The need to test a growing number of theories in cognitive science has led to increased interest in inferential methods that integrate multiple data modalities. In this manuscript, we show how a method for integrating three data modalities within a single framework provides (1) more detailed descriptions of cognitive processes and (2) more accurate predictions of unobserved data than less integrative methods. Specifically, we show how combining either EEG and fMRI with a behavioral model can perform substantially better than a behavioral-data-only model in both generative and predictive modeling analyses. We then show how a trivariate model – a model including EEG, fMRI, and behavioral data – outperforms bivariate models in both generative and predictive modeling analyses. Together, these results suggest that within an appropriate modeling framework, more data can be used to better constrain cognitive theory, and to generate more accurate predictions for behavioral and neural data.

Keywords: joint modeling framework, Bayesian modeling, EEG, fMRI, Linear Ballistic Accumulator model

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1. Introduction

The field of cognitive science is faced with many options for studying how experimentally-derived variables are systematically related to the dynamics underlying a cognitive process of interest. To date, much of our understanding of cognition has been advanced by two dominant, but non-interacting groups. The largest group, cognitive neuroscientists, rely on statistical models to understand patterns of neural activity. These models are typically purely data-mining techniques, and often disregard the computational mechanisms that might detail a cognitive process. The other group, mathematical psychologists, is strongly motivated by *theoretical* accounts of cognitive processes, and instantiates these theories by developing formal mathematical models of cognition. The models often assume a system of computations and equations intended to characterize the process assumed to take place in the brain. To formally test their theory, mathematical psychologists rely on their model’s ability to fit behavioral data. A good fit is thought to reflect an accurate theory, whereas a bad fit would refute it.

Although both groups are concerned with explaining behavior, they tend to approach the challenge from different vantage points. Thinking in terms of Marr (1982)’s levels of analysis, mathematical psychologists tend to focus on the computational and algorithmic levels, whereas cognitive neuroscientists focus more on the implementation level. Although progress can be made by maintaining a tight focus on one level, certain opportunities are missed. As a result of their single-level focus, both approaches suffer from critical limitations (Love, 2015), and these limitations have inspired researchers to combine neural and behavioral measures in an integrative fashion. The primary payoff of this endeavor is the localization of mechanisms assumed to underly the computations supporting task-specific behavior within the brain. The importance of solving the integration problem has spawned several entirely new statistical modeling approaches developed through collaborations between mathematical psychologists and cognitive neuroscientists, collectively forming a new field often referred to as “model-based cognitive neuroscience” (e.g., Forstmann and Wagenmakers, 2015; Daw, 2011; Forstmann et al., 2011b; van Maanen et al., 2011; Turner et al., 2013a; Mack et al., 2013; Boehm et al., 2014; Love, 2015; Palmeri et al., 2015; Turner et al., 2015b).

So far, the field of model-based cognitive neuroscience has established links between both structural measures such as diffusion-weighted imaging (Forstmann et al., 2010; Turner et al., 2013a), and functional measures such

38 as electroencephalography (EEG; e.g., Nunez et al., 2015), functional mag-
 39 netic resonance imaging (fMRI; e.g., van Maanen et al., 2011; Mulder et al.,
 40 2012; Summerfield and Koechlin, 2010; Bai et al., 2007; Forstmann et al.,
 41 2008, 2010; White et al., 2014; Mack et al., 2013; Turner et al., 2015b) and
 42 magnetoencephalography (e.g., Amano et al., 2006). These efforts, while
 43 elucidating, have focused on relating model parameters to one modality of
 44 neural measure. However, the limitations of these modalities in their appli-
 45 cation to understanding cognition are well known. Superficially, measures
 46 like EEG provide excellent temporal resolution with a continuous read out
 47 of brain activity propagated to the scalp. These measures are well suited
 48 for studying fine-grained details of a decision process where many brain re-
 49 gions interact to perform a given task, but they are limited by the specificity
 50 of spatial information they can provide. On the other hand, measures like
 51 fMRI provide good spatial resolution, but offer limited information on the
 52 temporal properties of the interesting neural signature.

53 Given the orthogonal nature of the benefits and limitations of EEG and
 54 fMRI, it is a natural question to ask whether these measures can be combined
 55 in an effort to capitalize on the temporal and spatial resolutions provided by
 56 each modality. There currently exist several methods for “fusing” multimodal
 57 functional neuroimaging data together, such as partial least squares correla-
 58 tion (Lin et al., 2003; Martinez-Montes et al., 2004), independent component
 59 analysis (Beckmann and Smith, 2005; Liu and Calhoun, 2007; Calhoun et al.,
 60 2006, 2009; Eichele et al., 2009; Franco et al., 2008; Teipel et al., 2010; Xu
 61 et al., 2009; Calhoun et al., 2011; Calhoun and Adali, 2009), structural equa-
 62 tion modeling (Astolfi et al., 2004; Hamandi et al., 2008), multiple regression
 63 (De Martino et al., 2010; Eichele et al., 2005), and canonical correlation
 64 analysis (Correa et al., 2010a,b, 2008). However, the focus of these methods
 65 is either source localization (for reviews, see Sui et al., 2012; Dähne et al.,
 66 2015), or relating behavioral measures (e.g., response times) to brain data
 67 (for a review, see Krishnan et al., 2015). While these methods have eluci-
 68 dated several theoretically interesting questions (for reviews of applications,
 69 see Krishnan et al., 2015; Sui et al., 2012), they are unable to directly inform
 70 cognitive models in a quantitative fashion.

71 The goal of this article is to develop a statistical method for linking neural
 72 data from EEG and fMRI to the (latent) parameters of a cognitive model. To
 73 accomplish this, we extend the recently-proposed joint modeling framework
 74 (Turner et al., 2013a) to multimodal functional measures. Our method is
 75 unique because it allows a theoretical account of the cognitive process to

76 drive the analysis of the neural and behavioral measures. Furthermore, our
77 method is holistic, putting forth a single model to account for all aspects
78 of our data. As we will detail below, such a strategy provides numerous
79 advantageous on both generative and predictive modeling fronts.

80 We begin by first describing the joint modeling framework and explain-
81 ing how it can be extended to multiple neural measures. We then describe
82 an experiment on an intertemporal choice task that was collected for the
83 purposes of testing the framework on imbalanced experimental designs. To
84 provide clarity about our modeling approach, we first describe the experi-
85 mental effects present in the EEG, fMRI, and behavioral data separately.
86 We then illustrate some of the benefits of the joint modeling framework by
87 showing how a “bivariate” model taking into account only one functional
88 measure can be used to boost performance of a behavioral-data-only model.
89 In all of our analyses, we show this boost from both a generative model-
90 ing perspective through analyses of the estimated parameters (i.e., posterior
91 distributions), and a predictive modeling perspective by assessing the mod-
92 els’ performance in a cross-validation test. We then show how the extended
93 “trivariate” model that incorporates both functional neural measures further
94 enhances the performance of the model relative to both bivariate models
95 and the behavioral-data-only model. We close with a discussion of limita-
96 tions and future directions for our approach to integrating data from multiple
97 modalities.

98 1.1. Joint Modeling

99 Given the technical hurdles involved in simultaneous EEG/fMRI, in this
100 article we propose an alternative for performing EEG/fMRI integration. In-
101 stead of obtaining the neural measures simultaneously, our method works
102 around potential artifacts by simply aggregating the effects of interest across
103 experimental contexts. That is, our method explicitly models changes in
104 neural activity present in EEG and fMRI by binding these effects to changes
105 in the behavioral data. In this way, the behavioral data serve as a bridge
106 connecting the two modalities to one another, even if the EEG and fMRI
107 data were obtained at different points in time for the same subject, or say
108 EEG data was collected for some subjects and fMRI data was collected for
109 others.

110 Our method builds on a recently developed joint modeling framework
111 (Turner et al., 2013a). This framework was originally proposed as a way to
112 integrate neural and behavioral data in one cognitive model, but in Turner et

113 al. only structural data were considered. Here, we extend the original frame-
114 work to functional measures and to trivariate scenarios (i.e., including EEG,
115 fMRI, and behavior). A typical joint model consists of three components,
116 which we will discuss in turn.

117 First, the behavioral data B are described in terms of a behavioral model,
118 such as the Linear Ballistic Accumulator (LBA; Brown and Heathcote, 2008)
119 model or classic signal detection theory model (Green and Swets, 1966). Im-
120 portantly, the behavioral model consists of a set of model parameters θ , which
121 are of lower dimensionality than the full behavioral data set B . For example,
122 in the SDT model, θ would consist of parameters such as discriminability (d')
123 and bias (β). Ideally, the chosen behavioral model should consist of mech-
124 anisms that provide insight into how the data arise, and how experimental
125 manipulations predictably affect these mechanisms (a property known as se-
126 lective influence; Heathcote et al., 2015).

127 Second, the neural data N are described in terms of a neural model.
128 The key property of the neural model is that it should consist of a set of
129 parameters δ that describe the important parts of the neural data N in a way
130 that is of significantly lower dimensionality. For example, the neural model
131 could describe increases in neural activity across time through a general
132 linear model (GLM). Alternatively, the neural model could also be of a more
133 mechanistic nature, describing the computations purportedly implemented
134 by a brain region.

135 Third, the lower-dimensional features of both the neural and behavioral
136 data are linked by establishing an explicit relationship between the behavioral
137 model parameters θ and the neural model parameters δ . Although there are
138 many types of linking functions one could use, one particularly successful
139 linking approach has been a hierarchical multivariate Gaussian distribution
140 (Turner et al., 2013a; Turner, 2015; Turner et al., 2015b).

141 The joint modeling framework extends other exploratory type approaches
142 in model-based cognitive neuroscience (see Turner et al., 2015a) by formal-
143 izing these three components into a single model. Furthermore, fitting the
144 joint model via Bayesian statistics allows the model to inherit many of the ad-
145 vantages of Bayesian modeling, which have been discussed by many authors
146 (e.g., Shiffrin et al., 2008; Lee and Wagenmakers, 2013). In the context of
147 model-based cognitive neuroscience, most of these advantages center around
148 flexibility. First, joint models are agnostic – there is no commitment to any
149 particular behavioral model, neural model, or linking function, and similarly,
150 there is no commitment to any particular behavioral (e.g., response time,

151 accuracy, confidence) or neural (e.g., EEG, fMRI) measurements. Second,
 152 the parameter estimates for the behavioral model are affected by the infor-
 153 mation contained in the neural measurements. Because this is a hierarchical
 154 Bayesian model, information from the neural measures first affects the neural
 155 model parameters, and if this effect is consistent across subjects (or even tri-
 156 als, see Turner et al., 2015b) it affects the parameters of the linking function.
 157 Once the linking function has been affected, the behavioral model param-
 158 eters are systematically altered to account for these changes. This process
 159 also goes in the other direction, where changes in the behavioral model pa-
 160 rameters affect the neural model parameters. Third, joint models are fit to
 161 data within one single regime instead of using separate parameter estimation
 162 stages in an exploratory manner (e.g., Forstmann et al., 2010, 2008, 2011a;
 163 Ho et al., 2012; van Maanen et al., 2011). Furthermore, joint models are
 164 unique in that they do not require elaborate retraining or refitting strategies
 165 to generate predictions for either neural or behavioral measures. Fourth,
 166 due to the Bayesian component of the estimation process, joint models can
 167 naturally handle sparse, imbalanced, or missing data structures. This aspect
 168 is extremely useful when the number of observations that can be obtained
 169 is limited, or the cost of obtaining neural measures is high. Given all of
 170 these advantages, joint models seem ideally suited to tackle the problem of
 171 integrating behavioral, EEG, and fMRI measures into one cohesive model.

172 Figure 1 depicts a graphical diagram of the models we will investigate
 173 in this article. Graphical diagrams are useful in making variable depen-
 174 dencies explicit by illustrating their relationship through connections in the
 175 graph. Observable variables are represented as gray boxes (e.g., B), whereas
 176 unknown (latent) model parameters are shown as empty circles (e.g., θ). **Al-**
 177 **though all of the parameters influence one another when fitting the model**
 178 **to data, only explicit dependencies among variables in the graph are repre-**
 179 **sented by the arrows.** So, for example, the graphical diagram shows that the
 180 behavioral data B is a function of the behavioral model parameters θ , which
 181 are functions of other model parameters Ω known as *hyper* parameters. The
 182 orange plate represents the behavioral data/model, the green plate represents
 183 the EEG data/model, and the blue plate represents the fMRI data/model.
 184 All of the models we will use in the present article can be represented via
 185 some combination of the plates in Figure 1. In previous work (Turner et al.,
 186 2013a), we made the connection between a single modality of neural data and
 187 the behavioral data explicit. So, for example, the orange plate was connected
 188 to the green plate. In the present article, the goal is to formally extend this

Figure 1: Graphical diagram of models presented in the text. Observable data are represented as gray boxes, whereas unknown (latent) variables are represented as empty circles. The orange plate represents the behavioral data/model, the green plate represents the EEG data/model, and the blue plate represents the fMRI data/model.

189 framework to two modalities of neural data, namely fMRI and EEG. The mo-
 190 tivation for our endeavor is clear: by combining the temporal resolution of
 191 EEG with the spatial resolution of fMRI, the link between multiple measures
 192 of cognition (i.e., EEG, fMRI, and behavior) can be better understood.

193 We begin by describing our three experiments, specifically detailing the
 194 imbalance of our task design. We reiterate the basic patterns present in our
 195 data, some of which have been detailed extensively for other purposes (Ro-
 196 driguez et al., 2014, 2015b,a). To better illustrate some of the advantages
 197 joint modeling provides, we begin our analyses by applying bivariate joint
 198 models to each data modality separately. In the final section, we apply a
 199 trivariate joint model to the full (imbalanced) data set and highlight many
 200 of the advantages that are realized when EEG, fMRI, and behavioral data

are fused. In each joint modeling application, we evaluate the model from a generative and predictive perspective, showing that not only do joint models help in the interpretation of our data, they also improve the predictive performance of the behavioral model.

2. Materials and Methods

In total, we conducted three separate intertemporal choice experiments, collecting data on three important variables: behavior, EEG, and fMRI. However, because we originally had no intention of integrating these three measures *simultaneously*, some experiments only targeted two of the three measures. The structure of our data is illustrated in Figure 2. In all, we have 54 subjects (rows) and three measures (columns). The first experiment consisted of 23 subjects who provided both behavioral and EEG data. In this case, the fMRI data can be thought of as “missing”, and this arrangement is illustrated in Figure 2 with red cells. The second experiment also consisted of 23 subjects, but these subjects provided both behavioral and fMRI data, and no EEG data (again illustrated by red blocks in Figure 2). The final experiment consisted of 8 subjects who provided both EEG and fMRI data in two separate conditions (randomly counterbalanced). For each of these conditions, we also collected behavioral data, and this structure is illustrated in Figure 2 as striped cells. In the modeling results below, it was useful to withhold some elements of the data selectively as a test of the model’s generalizability. These withheld data are illustrated in Figure 2 as orange cells.

2.1. Data collection

2.1.1. Subjects

Sixty-one healthy adults participated in this study (32 females, ages 19-46 years, median 24 years). All subjects gave written informed consent. Stanford University’s Institutional Review Board approved the study. Two subjects were excluded because their behavior did not allow us to estimate reliable temporal discounting parameters. Another five subjects were excluded because of data collection problems. Data from a total of fifty-four subjects were analyzed (30 females, ages 19-46 years, median 25 years).

Subject	Behavioral	EEG	fMRI
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Figure 2: Design matrix for the trivariate model simulation. Our data consist of behavior, EEG, and fMRI measures (columns) for different combinations of subjects (rows). The red cells represent observations that were not recorded, the orange cells represent observations that were withheld from the model in various simulation studies (see text for details), and striped cells represent dual-purpose observations (i.e., we collected behavioral measures during both fMRI and EEG sessions).

2.1.2. Temporal discounting model and task design

The first two experiments were conducted over two sessions, whereas the third experiment consisted of three sessions. The purpose of the first session was to estimate each individual’s discount rate using a hyperbolic discounting model. In the first experiment ($n = 23$), the second session consisted of an electroencephalography (EEG) experiment. In the second experiment ($n = 23$), the second session consisted of a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) experiment. In the third experiment ($n = 8$), subjects performed in both the EEG and fMRI experiments in sessions separated by one week. The purpose of the one week lag was to reduce any practice effect that might occur, while assuming only small deviations in the temporal discounting behavior (Kirby, 2009). In the first session, we began by estimating each individual’s discount rate, exactly as in the first two experiments. However, during the third session, we assumed this discount rate was equivalent to what had been estimated one week prior. The task for the first session used a staircase procedure to measure each individual’s discount rate k , assuming a hyperbolic discounting function

$$V_D = \frac{r}{1 + kt} \quad (1)$$

where V_D is the subjective value of the delayed reward, r is the monetary amount offered, and t is the delay. The staircase procedure required participants to select between a delayed reward (of r dollars available at delay t) and a fixed immediate reward of \$10 (V_I). For any choice, indifference between the immediate and delayed options implies a discount rate of $k = (r - V_I)(V_I t)^{-1}$. We refer to this implied equivalence point as k_{eq} ; our procedure amounted to varying k_{eq} systematically until indifference was reached. Specifically, we began with $k_{eq}=0.02$. If the subject chose the delayed reward, k_{eq} decreased by a step size of 0.01 for the next trial. Otherwise, k_{eq} increased by the same amount. Every time the subject chose both a delayed and an immediate offer within five consecutive trials, the step size was reduced by 5%. Participants completed 60 trials of this procedure. We placed no limits on the response time, and presented both offers on the screen, as “\$10 now” on the left side, and “\$ r in t days” on the right.

After completing the first session, we fit a softmax decision function to participants’ choices. We assumed that the likelihood of choosing the delayed reward was given by

$$P_D = \frac{1}{1 + e^{-m(V_D - V_I)}}, \quad (2)$$

267 where m accounts for sensitivity to changes in discounted value.

268 We used individually determined values of k and m to generate choices
269 for the second session. At every trial, t was randomly selected from a range
270 of 30-45 days. We then calculated and offered an amount r that would give
271 P_D of 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, or 0.9 (Figure 3a-b). The EEG group completed 30
272 trials at every P_D level, except at $P_D=0.5$, for which they completed 60 trials.
273 The fMRI group completed 40 trials at every P_D level, except at $P_D=0.5$, for
274 which they completed 80 trials. Non-uniform trial distributions as a function
275 of P_D were introduced to allow us to study the effects of choice difficulty on
276 EEG and fMRI measures, with equal numbers of trials at each difficulty level.
277 The results of these analyses have been reported elsewhere (Rodriguez et al.,
278 2014, 2015b,a). Trial types were randomized and counterbalanced over two
279 blocks for the EEG group and over four blocks for the fMRI group. We also
280 counterbalanced the mapping between choices and button presses for every
281 subject. During the first half of the second session, approximately half of
282 subjects (17 in EEG, 15 in fMRI) indicated choices of the delayed reward
283 by pressing a button with their left index finger and immediate choices by
284 pressing a different button with their right index finger. The other sub-
285 jects indicated their choices by the inverse left-right mapping. All subjects
286 switched the initial response mapping during the second half of the session.

287 We used a sequential presentation of delay and amount during the sec-
288 ond session (Figure 3c). The rationale for this sequential presentation has
289 been explained elsewhere (Rodriguez et al., 2014, 2015b). We report RT as
290 measured from the onset of the decision period, 1000ms into the trial. The
291 duration of the decision period was fixed at 4000ms. When subjects made
292 choices in less than 4000ms the amount information disappeared and the
293 screen remained blank until 4000ms elapsed. Trial length was thus fixed at
294 5000ms. We discarded any trial in which a response was made in less than
295 200ms or fell outside of the decision period. To optimize experimental time
296 and separability of neural signals across trials for both groups, we introduced
297 a long inter-trial-interval (ITI) for the fMRI sessions (between 4-10s), and a
298 shorter ITI for the EEG sessions (100-350ms). In exchange for participation
299 subjects received \$10 cash for the EEG session or \$20 for the fMRI session,
300 plus an additional amount, determined by their choice in a randomly selected
301 trial.

302 EEG data was collected using a 128 channel Geodesic Sensor Net (Elec-
303 trical Geodesics, Inc., Eugene OR, USA), with a 500 Hz sampling rate, us-
304 ing the vertex as reference. During pre-processing, we re-referenced to the

Figure 3: Experimental design: (a) Delayed reward offers corresponded with one of five different levels of discounted value. Each level of discounted value corresponded to one of five probabilities of choosing the delayed reward: 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7 or 0.9. (b) Every delay could be combined with any of five different amounts to yield a different discounted value and probability of choosing the delayed reward. (c) Delay and amount information was presented sequentially. Delays were presented first for 1000ms. Amounts were presented second, replacing the presentation of the delay and remaining on the screen for a maximum of 4000ms. After every trial, a fixation cross was presented on the center of the screen for a randomly chosen inter-trial-interval in the order of hundreds of milliseconds during the EEG experiment and several seconds during the fMRI experiment.

average reference, epoched trials from -1500 to +6500ms around the onset of delay presentation, baseline corrected trials using the average from 0 to 5000ms, and band-pass filtered the data at 0.5-200Hz. Trials were visually inspected and rejected if excessive artifacts were present. Normally occurring artifacts were rejected using an independent component analysis algorithm from the EEGLab toolbox (Delorme and Makeig, 2004). Epochs were then transformed to current source density (CSD) using the CSD toolbox (Kayser and Tenke, 2006).

fMRI data was collected using a GE Discovery MR750 Scanner. fMRI analyses were conducted on gradient echo T2*-weighted echoplanar functional images with BOLD-sensitive contrast (42 transverse slices; TR, 2000 ms; TE, 30 ms; 2.9mm isotropic voxels). Slices had no gap between them and were acquired in interleaved order. The slice plane was manually aligned to the anterior-posterior commissure line. The total number of volumes collected per subject varied depending on random inter-trial intervals. The first 8 seconds (4 volumes) of data contained no stimuli and were discarded to allow for T1 equilibration. In addition to functional data, we collected whole-brain, high-resolution T1-weighted anatomical structural scans (0.9mm isotropic voxels). Image analyses were performed using SPM8 (<http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/>). During pre-processing, we first performed slice-timing correction, and re-aligned functional volumes to the first volume. Next, we co-registered the anatomical volume to the realigned functional scans, and performed a segmentation of grey and white matter on the anatomical scan. Segmented images were then used to estimate non-linear Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) normalization parameters for each subject’s brain. Normalization parameters estimated from segmented images were used to normalize functional images into MNI space. Finally, normalized functional images were smoothed using a Gaussian kernel of 8 mm full-width at half-maximum.

2.2. Description of the Data

To provide some rationale about the specific assumptions we made in developing our models, we will briefly discuss the primary details of the behavioral and neural data, as well as a “folding” process we used to make a seamless connection from brain to behavior.

2.2.1. Behavioral Data

The behavioral data consisted of choice response time measures on each trial, and the aggregate of these measures is illustrated in Figure 4. We illus-

Figure 4: Summary of behavioral data from the experiment. Moving from left to right, each histogram represents the choice response time distribution corresponding to the five levels of probability of delayed reward P_D arranged in increasing order. Response times corresponding to the immediate reward option (I) are shown on the negative x -axis, whereas response times corresponding to the delayed reward option (D) are shown on the positive x -axis.

341 trate the choice response times by plotting the response time distributions
342 for the immediate option (i.e., \$10 now; I) on the negative x -axis, and the
343 response time distributions for the delayed option (i.e., \$X in Y days; D)
344 on the positive x -axis. Plotting the distributions in this way allows us to
345 assess the relative choice probabilities by comparing the heights of the two
346 distributions. Figure 4 shows these response time distributions for each of
347 the P_D values: $P_D = 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7$, and 0.9 , left to right, respectively.
348 The figure shows that at low values of P_D , the probability of choosing the
349 immediate option is high, and as P_D increases, so does the probability of
350 choosing the delayed option. This indicates that our hyperbolic discounting
351 model captured the choice process well enough to show a behavioral effect
352 within the experimental manipulation.

353 Given the linear relationship to P_D and symmetric properties of the neu-
354 rophysiological measures reported below, it was convenient to fold our data
355 symmetrically around $P_D = 0.5$. The folding process created three new
356 experimental variables: $V1$ consisting of data from $P_D = \{0.1, 0.9\}$, $V2$ con-
357 sisting of data from $P_D = \{0.3, 0.7\}$, and $V3$ which was equivalent to data
358 from the previous $P_D = 0.5$ condition. To elaborate, we recoded immediate-
359 option decisions in the $P_D = 0.1$ condition and delayed-option decisions in the
360 $P_D = 0.9$ condition to a variable called “subjectively high valued” (SHV),
361 and delayed-option decisions in the $P_D = 0.1$ condition and immediate-option
362 decisions in the $P_D = 0.9$ condition to a variable called “subjectively low val-

Figure 5: Summary of behavioral data from the experiment. The top row shows the choice response time distributions for the three new conditions $V1$ (first column), $V2$ (second column), and $V3$ (third column) after the folding process (see main text). The response times corresponding to the subjectively low-valued option (SLV) are shown on the negative x -axis, whereas the response times corresponding to the subjectively high-valued option (SHV) are shown on the positive x -axis. The fourth column shows a violin plot of the response times collapsed across the response choice for each condition, with the green line/dots representing the mean, and the white dots representing the median. The bottom row shows predictions from the LBA model for each condition (corresponding to the top row) according to three different sets of shift parameters in the drift rate, illustrated in the fourth column.

ued” (*SLV*). The same mapping was applied to the $P_D = 0.3$ and $P_D = 0.7$ conditions, but no mapping was necessary for the $P_D = 0.5$ condition. The top row of Figure 5 shows the response time distributions for the variables *V1* (first column), *V2* (second column), and *V3* (third column), where *SLV* choices are shown on the left and *SHV* choices are shown on the right. The figure shows that as the levels of *V* increase, preference of the *SHV* option decreases until indifference in condition *V3*. In addition to a relationship between response probability and condition, the top-right panel of Figure 5 shows a violin plot of the response time distributions for each condition, collapsed across response probability. The white dots on each violin plot represent the median response time, whereas the green dot represents the mean response time. The figure shows that the response times increase from *V1* to *V2*, and from *V2* to *V3*, but to a lesser degree.

In previous work (Rodriguez et al., 2014), we modeled the (unfolded) intertemporal choice data within a sequential sampling framework, using the Linear Ballistic Accumulator (LBA; Brown and Heathcote, 2008) model to explain this choice behavior. In Rodriguez et al. (2014), we fit a variety of different models positing different theoretical accounts of how the choice process should change across values of P_D in order to best capture the behavior. We compared these models on the basis of conventional model fit statistics, taking into account model complexity and fit, and found that the best model allowed both a drift rate and nondecision time parameter to vary as a function of P_D values. In subsequent analyses, we found justification for these choices by comparing the drift rate parameters across the levels of P_D , and concluded that the drift rate was systematically related (i.e., sigmoidally) to P_D across subjects. Furthermore, this relationship was symmetric about $P_D = 0.5$. For the nondecision time parameter, we did not find any substantive relationship with P_D , but did find relationships with the median response time in each P_D condition. Our conclusion was that the nondecision time parameter was not systematically related to P_D , but that the nondecision time parameter afforded us a level of flexibility that enhanced the model’s fit to the data.

Given that the best-fitting LBA model from our previous work relegated the systematic effects of P_D to the drift rate, when folding the data, we maintained a symmetric relationship between drift rate and value condition. We also allowed the nondecision time to vary across value conditions. To parallel the neural model we describe below, we reparameterized the model such that a “base” drift rate accounted for the choice response times in Condition *V3*, a parameter $\eta^{(1)}$ additively shifted the model’s drift rate between Condition

401 V3 to V2, and another parameter $\eta^{(2)}$ additively shifted the model’s drift
 402 rate between Condition V3 to V1. Although Appendix A contains all of the
 403 mathematical details of our implementation, the basic equations of our drift
 404 rate parameterization for the subjectively high valued option are

$$\begin{aligned}\mu_{V3} &= \text{logit}^{-1}(\nu), \\ \mu_{V2} &= \text{logit}^{-1}(\nu + \eta^{(1)}), \text{ and} \\ \mu_{V1} &= \text{logit}^{-1}(\nu + \eta^{(2)}),\end{aligned}$$

405 where μ_k is the drift rate for the subjectively high valued option in condition
 406 k , and ν represents the “base” drift rate. This drift rate reparameterization is
 407 mathematically equivalent to our previous account (Rodriguez et al., 2014),
 408 although this new formulation of the nondecision time component in our
 409 model has two fewer parameters.

410 To illustrate how the LBA model accounts for the folded data, we simu-
 411 lated the model – described in Appendix A – for three different settings of the
 412 shift parameters for each of the three value conditions, shown in the bottom
 413 row of Figure 5. The settings of the shift parameters are represented in the
 414 bottom-right panel of Figure 5, where the x -axis corresponds to $\eta^{(2)}$ (i.e., the
 415 shift from V3 to V1), and the y -axis corresponds to the $\eta^{(1)}$ (i.e., the shift
 416 from V3 to V2). The first parameter setting – illustrated by the black dot
 417 in the bottom right panel of Figure 5 – was $(0, 0)$. This setting produces no
 418 change in drift rate across any of the value conditions. The first, second, and
 419 third columns show the predicted choice response time distributions from
 420 the LBA model (black lines) for the value conditions V1, V2, and V3, re-
 421 spectively. Here, because no change in drift rate occurred, the model makes
 422 equivalent predictions across value conditions. Other parameter settings are
 423 more interesting. For example, the red dot in the bottom-right panel of Fig-
 424 ure 5 shows the model predictions under the setting $(\eta^{(2)}, \eta^{(1)}) = (1.5, 0.5)$.
 425 Moving from V3 (third column) to V2 (second column), we see a marked
 426 increase in the probability of endorsing the *SHV* option. This change is
 427 produced by the 0.5 unit increase (i.e., on the logit scale) in the drift rate for
 428 the *SHV* option. Moving from V3 (third column) to V1 (first column), we
 429 see an even larger increase in the probability of endorsing the *SHV* option.
 430 Again, this increase follows directly from the value of $\eta^{(2)} = 1.5$. The third
 431 parameter setting produces response time distributions that are similar to
 432 the second parameter setting, but the magnitude of the effect is in the op-
 433 posite order with respect to value conditions. These predictions are not in

434 line with what the pattern present in the data, shown in the top row of Fig-
 435 ure 5, whereas the simulation produced from the second parameter setting
 436 does closely match the empirical data. In interpreting the parameter values
 437 in subsequent sections, we should keep in mind that in general, parameters
 438 falling in this lower triangular area are more reflective of the pattern in the
 439 observed data than are parameters in the upper triangular area.

440 2.2.2. Neural Data

441 Our neural data consisted of both EEG and fMRI recordings. In a pre-
 442 vious analysis (Rodriguez et al., 2015a), we first identified the elements of
 443 the EEG data that were significantly related to P_D . Figure 6a shows a topo-
 444 graphic plot of the GLM analysis relating EEG activity by electrode to the
 445 levels of P_D . The strongest relationship was observed at an area of the scalp
 446 that roughly corresponds to the dorsal medial frontal cortex (dmFC), and
 447 these electrodes are illustrated in Figure 6a with white circles (i.e., electrodes
 448 E5, E6, E11, and E12). Following this result, we investigated the temporal
 449 properties of this signature by plotting the average EEG signal for each of the
 450 levels of V , shown in Figure 6b. This analysis revealed a key time window
 451 where the average EEG signal was differentiated across the levels of V rang-
 452 ing from 300-850 milliseconds, illustrated by dashed vertical lines. Figure 6c,
 453 6d, and 6e show the average EEG signal for the four electrodes in Figure 6a
 454 in the 300-850 milliseconds time window for V_1 , V_2 , and V_3 , respectively,
 455 color coded according to the key on the right hand side. The figures show
 456 that as V increases, the average EEG signal decreases. Having identified the
 457 key spatial and temporal aspects of the neural signal, we can then use these
 458 results to facilitate our joint behavioral-neural analyses below by reducing
 459 the dimensionality of the neural data. Specifically, the single-trial EEG data
 460 observed at the four electrode locations in Figure 6a and in the time window
 461 300-850 milliseconds were used as input into the models below.

462 A similar procedure was used to identify the key neural signature in the
 463 fMRI data (Rodriguez et al., 2015b). The first analysis investigated which
 464 brain regions were linearly related to the levels of V through a GLM analysis.
 465 Figure 6f shows that the dmFC was significantly related to V across subjects,
 466 a finding that is consistent with our EEG analysis in the top row (Rodriguez
 467 et al., 2015a). Having identified this area, we estimated single-trial β s for the
 468 neural activity in the dmFC by fitting a general linear model to the blood
 469 oxygenation level dependent (BOLD) responses. Each GLM specified the
 470 onsets of the delay presentation and the subjects' response in every trial,

471 plus the onset of the amount presentation for a single trial. Events in all three
 472 onset regressors were modeled as impulse delta functions and convolved with
 473 the canonical hemodynamic response function (HRF). In addition, the model
 474 included six regressors corresponding to the motion parameters estimated
 475 during data preprocessing and constants to account for the mean activity
 476 within each of the four sessions over which the data were collected. Figure
 477 6g shows the average of the single-trial β s in $V1$ (blue), $V2$ (black), and $V3$
 478 (red), and this average activity is also illustrated in the brain on the same
 479 axial slice given in Figure 6f for $V1$ (h), $V2$ (i), and $V3$ (j). Collectively,
 480 Figures g-j show that as the levels of V increase, activation of the dmFC
 481 increases, an effect that is opposite in direction to our EEG data. In our
 482 analyses below, we will use the single-trial β estimates in the dmFC as input
 483 to our joint behavioral-neural model.

484 **3. A Bivariate Joint Model of Value Accumulation**

485 Our ultimate goal is to demonstrate that a trivariate joint model can be
 486 useful in modeling EEG and fMRI data from a descriptive and predictive
 487 perspective. However, to show that this is a useful extension, we must also
 488 demonstrate that the trivariate model provides something beyond bivariate
 489 joint models (Turner et al., 2013a). Furthermore, it might be useful to first
 490 show some of the advantages a bivariate joint model provides through two
 491 pedagogical examples. Hence, we begin our analyses by examining the extent
 492 to which each of the neural measures are related to the latent parameters of
 493 the behavioral model. To accomplish this, we constructed a joint model
 494 that simultaneously captures the effects present in the choice response time
 495 data and the neural recordings. Because we are only examining two sets of
 496 variables (i.e., behavior and EEG measures), we will refer to this model as a
 497 bivariate joint model. Figure 1 illustrates the Trivariate model that subsumes
 498 the bivariate model presented in this section; that is, in this section we are
 499 only concerned with relating the behavioral data (orange plate) to either the
 500 EEG data (green plate; first analysis) or the fMRI data (blue plate; second
 501 analysis). We will now conceptually summarize each of the three components
 502 of the bivariate model, and refer the interested reader to Appendices A and
 503 B for the formal details.

Figure 6: Summary of neural data from the experiment. (a) Topographic plot of the test value statistics relating EEG activity to the levels of P_D in a GLM analysis. The electrodes with the strongest relationship are represented with white circles. (b) Mean stimulus-locked event-related potential (ERP) for the three value conditions: V1 (blue line), V2 (black line), and V3 (red line). The time window used in the analysis was from 300 to 850 milliseconds, which is indicated by the dashed vertical lines. (c, d, e) Topographic plots of the average EEG signal in the four electrodes shown in (a) during the time window in (b), for each of the three value conditions: V1 (c), V2 (d), and V3 (e). These trial-by-trial EEG values were used in the modeling applications below. (f) Axial view of the brain region (i.e., the dmFC) found to significantly correlate with value condition. (g) Average of the single-trial beta estimates for each value condition, based on a GLM analysis of dmFC activity during the decision period. (h, i, j) Similar information in Panel g, but illustrated in the dmFC, and separated across the three value conditions: V1 (h), V2 (i), and V3 (j). These trial-by-trial β values were used in the modeling applications below.

504 3.1. Details of the Model

505 The joint modeling approach is particularly well-suited for situations in
506 which the measures of interest can be described independently of one an-
507 other, and the research goal is to infer and constrain the model parameters
508 describing each of these measures (see Turner et al., 2015a, for a survey of
509 different statistical strategies for linking neural and behavioral measures).
510 These independent “submodels” are then linked together, comprising an en-
511 tirely new model with different – albeit similar – properties of its constituent
512 parts. Furthermore, the linking process inherently changes the submodels,
513 due to the added constraint provided by the additional measures. That is,
514 data from one submodel affects the parameter estimates of the other sub-
515 model, and vice versa. Perhaps more interesting is that the full model is fit
516 to the full data set in one setting, so elaborate retraining techniques are not
517 necessary in generating flexible predictions (e.g., for missing data). The bi-
518 variate joint model can be described in three parts: (1) the neural submodel
519 which succinctly describes the important statistical properties of the neural
520 data, (2) the behavioral submodel consisting of latent model parameters as-
521 sumed to produce an observer’s set of choice response time data, and (3)
522 a linking structure that binds the two submodels together. We will discuss
523 each of these pieces of the model in turn.

524 3.2. The Neural Submodel

525 The first piece of the bivariate joint model is the neural submodel describ-
526 ing the neural data. The choice of a neural submodel is an important one,
527 but in our experience, the most important factor in this choice is reducing
528 the neural data to a (smaller) set of neural model parameters. The neu-
529 ral submodel can be generative, expressing how the neural data arise from
530 a theoretically-oriented process (e.g., Manning et al., 2014; Friston et al.,
531 2003; Gershman et al., 2011), or statistical, describing the statistical prop-
532 erties of the neural data without theoretical considerations (e.g., Norman
533 et al., 2006). One effective strategy within the joint modeling framework for
534 functional data is to average the trial-to-trial neural signal across an impor-
535 tant time window in the decision process (e.g., Turner et al., 2015b). This
536 procedure allows one to easily justify choices of the linking function via the
537 central limit theorem. Specifically, averaging the neural data produces a ran-
538 dom variable that is Gaussian in distribution, making multivariate Gaussian
539 linking functions both justified and convenient (see Appendix B for details).

Our data consist of two neural measures – EEG and fMRI – and so to examine the modality-specific relationships present in each neural measure, we will use the bivariate joint model in two separate analyses: one that includes behavior and only EEG data, and one that includes behavior and only fMRI data. As discussed above, Figure 6 illustrates the EEG data from the experiment. Panel a shows the group average across value conditions in the critical time period. To reduce the dimensionality of our data, we focused on the four electrodes centered over dorsal medial frontal cortex (dmFC), which are represented in Panel a as white circles. Panel b shows the average stimulus-locked EEG signal for each value condition across time, where the critical time period is marked by the dashed vertical lines. Panels c, d, and e show the average topography for each electrode in the same window, but separated according to value condition (i.e., $V1$, $V2$, and $V3$, respectively). We used the single-trial measures of EEG activity as input to the model on a particular trial; hence, for a particular subject on a particular trial, our neural measures were a vector consisting of four values: the time-averaged EEG signal amplitude between 300 and 850 milliseconds for each of the four electrodes represented in Panel a of Figure 6.

We used a similar strategy for the fMRI data. Panel f in Figure 6 shows the t -statistic obtained for linear trend across value conditions (a statistic that we had previously obtained in Rodriguez et al., 2015b). This GLM analysis identified the dmFC as a key brain area in the deliberation of intertemporal choices, which motivated its use in the analyses in this article. Having identified the dmFC in this group analysis, we could then establish single-trial β estimates of dmFC activation. Next, we can group these single-trial values according to the value condition. Panel g shows these average beta estimates across value conditions in a bar graph, whereas Panels h, i, and j show these same average values in the identified dmFC area in Panel f, to be consistent with the top row of Figure 6. We used the single-trial β estimates of dmFC activity as input to the bivariate joint model. Compared to the EEG data, our fMRI data are more sparse (i.e., consisting of a single value rather than four values).

As described in Appendix B, the bivariate joint model uses a parameter to capture the mean neural (i.e., either EEG or fMRI) signal in the $V3$ condition, where the choice options have approximately the same subjective value, as well as additive parameters that capture the change in the mean neural signal from value condition $V3$ to $V2$, and from $V3$ to $V1$. At the individual subject level, these parameters are called $\delta_j^{(1)}$, and $\delta_j^{(2)}$, respec-

578 tively, for Subject j . However, at the group level, they are referred to as
579 $\delta_{\mu}^{(1)}$, and $\delta_{\mu}^{(2)}$. These parameters are important because they are linked to
580 parameters in the behavioral model that capture an analogous additive ef-
581 fect in the behavioral data. We will use these parameters interchangeably in
582 the analyses that follow to describe differences in the EEG signal or β values
583 across conditions.

584 3.2.1. *The Behavioral Submodel*

585 To characterize the behavioral data, we used the Linear Ballistic Accumu-
586 lator (LBA; Brown and Heathcote, 2008) model. While the technical details
587 of the model are described in Appendix A, the concept of the LBA model
588 is similar to all other sequential sampling models of choice response time
589 (e.g., Ratcliff, 1978; Usher and McClelland, 2001; Shadlen and Newsome,
590 2001; Busmeyer and Townsend, 1993). The model assumes that, upon pre-
591 sentation of a stimulus, a competition ensues among the choice alternatives
592 to gather evidence sequentially, leading to a threshold amount of evidence.
593 In the LBA model, this accumulation process occurs ballistically and inde-
594 pendently for each choice alternative. Once one of the alternatives gathers
595 enough evidence to reach a threshold, a choice is made by the observer to
596 correspond to the winning accumulator. Rodriguez et al. (2014) showed
597 that the LBA model provided an explanation of decision-making behavior in
598 intertemporal choice that facilitated an understanding of how reward and de-
599 lay information simultaneously mapped to choice probabilities and response
600 times.

601 In our model, the parameters of greatest interest are the parameters that
602 correspond to the rate of evidence accumulation (i.e., the “drift rate” param-
603 eters) across value conditions. As described in Appendix A (see also Figure
604 5), our model uses a parameter to capture the base drift rate in the $V3$ con-
605 dition, where the options are equally preferable, as well as parameters that
606 capture the additive shift in the drift rate from $V3$ to $V2$, and from $V3$ to
607 $V1$. At the individual subject level, these parameters are called $\eta_j^{(1)}$, and $\eta_j^{(2)}$,
608 respectively, for Subject j . However, at the group level, they are referred to
609 as $\eta_{\mu}^{(1)}$, and $\eta_{\mu}^{(2)}$.

610 3.2.2. *The Linking Structure*

611 The final component of the model simply links the parameters of the neu-
612 ral and behavioral submodels together. To accomplish this, we exploit the
613 Gaussian properties of our neural submodel, and directly connect the param-

eters $\delta_{\mu}^{(1)}$, $\delta_{\mu}^{(2)}$, $\eta_{\mu}^{(1)}$, and $\eta_{\mu}^{(2)}$ by way of a multivariate Gaussian distribution (i.e., Equation B.1). The consequence of the linking function is a formal association between the shift parameters in the neural and behavioral setting. Specifically, if the model learns that larger changes in $\delta^{(2)}$ are accompanied by larger changes in the drift rates $\eta^{(2)}$, then for a new subject, the model will predict changes in the behavioral data that are proportional to the changes observed in the neural data between conditions V3 and V1. The multivariate Gaussian distribution is convenient because it provides clear interpretations for the parameters of interest. Namely, the variance-covariance matrix can be transformed into a correlation matrix that carries with it a quantification of the magnitude and direction of the relationship between pairs of model parameters. This is particularly useful in our analyses because it directly informs us about the type of associations that exist between the parameters of the neural and the behavioral submodels.

3.3. Application To EEG Data

The first analysis only considers the effects of adding EEG data to the analysis of behavioral data. To examine this, we focus on the first 23 subjects in our data (i.e., the first 23 rows shown in Figure 2). These subjects will be used again in the Trivariate Joint Model analysis below. We did not use the last eight subjects (i.e., Subjects 47-54) in our experiment, even though they did provide EEG data in one condition.

3.3.1. Results

We present our results in two parts. First, we discuss our results from a generative modeling perspective, by evaluating the relative merits of our modeling approach through an examination of the posterior distributions. To do this, we compared the parameter estimates of the joint model, which takes into account both the neural and behavioral data, to the parameter estimates of a behavioral-data-only model, which is effectively the behavioral submodel of the bivariate joint model discussed above. Such a comparison allows us to evaluate the magnitude of the constraint that the neural data provide on the behavioral model (cf. Turner, 2015; Cassey et al., 2015). Second, we discuss our results from a predictive modeling perspective, where we use out-of-sample predictions to assess the generalizability of the bivariate joint model relative to the behavioral-data-only model. Such an analysis allows us to assess the importance of the neural data in making predictions about

649 behavioral data, and avoid problems of interpretation that are associated
650 with overfitting (Wilson et al., 2015).

651 *Generative Model Analysis.* A central theme in the joint modeling framework
652 is that the neural data should guide the behavioral model in the inference pro-
653 cess. Ideally, the joint model would identify a statistical pattern in the neural
654 data that resembles the mechanism(s) assumed by the behavioral model. Due
655 to the particular assumptions of our linking function, if a statistically similar
656 (i.e., correlated) mechanism to the behavioral model is found in the neural
657 data, the amount of information inferred about the latent variable from the
658 full data set will increase, which can affect both the mean and variance of
659 the posterior distribution (Turner, 2015). Both of these posterior properties
660 are important because they can affect the accuracy of the predictions about
661 new data. One way to examine the amount of information gained from the
662 neural data is to compare the parameter estimates obtained from fitting a
663 behavioral-data-only model to the behavioral data to the estimates obtained
664 from fitting the bivariate joint model to the behavioral and neural data. Dif-
665 ferences in the estimates of the behavioral model parameters are attributable
666 to information from the neural data that has propagated upward through the
667 hyperparameters, and downward to the behavioral submodel parameters.

668 As discussed above, the key parameters in our analysis are the parameters
669 that capture the additive effects of evidence accumulation across value condi-
670 tions. Because our model assumes a structural relationship from subject-to-
671 subject, the important parameters to examine are $\eta_j^{(1)}$ and $\eta_j^{(2)}$. To examine
672 the effects of such a linking structure, one strategy is to selectively withhold
673 and reveal some aspects of the neural data from the model. To implement
674 this, we arbitrarily removed the behavioral data for Subject 1 before either
675 model was fit, but still modeled Subject 1’s parameters in the fitting routine.
676 We did not withhold the neural data for Subject 1 because these data will
677 have no influence on the parameters of the behavioral-data-only model (but
678 they will influence the parameters of the bivariate joint model). When fit-
679 ting the behavioral-data-only model to these data, the resulting parameter
680 estimates are akin to a prior predictive distribution. However, when fitting
681 the bivariate joint model to data, the resulting parameter estimates are still
682 the prior predictive distribution, but importantly, they are now a conditional
683 prior predictive distribution because the parameters of the neural submodel
684 are estimable. The resulting predictive distributions can then be used to
685 make predictions about data across all value conditions in the experiment.

Figure 7: Comparison of the value effect parameters $\eta_1^{(1)}$ (left panel), and $\eta_1^{(2)}$ (right panel) obtained from the behavioral-data-only model (orange) and the bivariate joint model (green) for the withheld subject in the EEG experiment.

686 We first fit the behavioral-data-only (i.e., a hierarchical LBA) model to
 687 the behavioral data, and then fit the bivariate joint model to the full data.
 688 The algorithmic details of our fitting procedure are outlined in Appendix B.
 689 Figure 7 shows the estimated posterior distributions for the parameters $\eta_1^{(1)}$
 690 (left), and $\eta_1^{(2)}$ (right) for Subject 1. In both panels, the orange histograms
 691 correspond to the estimated parameters for the behavioral-data-only model,
 692 whereas the green histograms correspond to the bivariate joint model. Recall
 693 that $\eta_1^{(1)}$ and $\eta_1^{(2)}$ represent the increase in the drift rate from the V1 (i.e., the
 694 most difficult) condition to V2 and V3, respectively. Increases in the drift
 695 rate from one condition to another reflect increases in the subject’s propensity
 696 to choose the response that is subjectively larger in value. Hence, we should
 697 expect to see increasingly positive values for $\eta_1^{(1)}$ and $\eta_1^{(2)}$ such that $\eta_1^{(2)} > \eta_1^{(1)}$
 698 (Rodriguez et al., 2014). However, we should keep in mind that this intuition
 699 is derived from group-level analyses, and does not necessarily describe the
 700 data for each individual subject. Furthermore, the posterior distributions
 701 in Figure 7 have not been estimated from behavioral data. Instead, they
 702 represent the model’s ability to generalize the information contained in the
 703 remaining 22 subjects in the data subset.²

704 Figure 7 shows that for both models, the prediction for $\eta_1^{(1)}$ is centered
 705 on zero, whereas for $\eta_1^{(2)}$, the posteriors are shifted slightly upward. This
 706 indicates that both models were capable of using reasonably sparse data (i.e.,
 707 just 22 subjects) to generalize predictions for a subject whose data were not
 708 observed in a way that is reflective of our previous behavioral analyses on a
 709 full data set (consisting of 46 subjects; Rodriguez et al., 2014). However, the
 710 important question was whether the bivariate joint model was more sensitive
 711 to the effects of value condition due to its ability to exploit the information
 712 in the neural signal. To answer this, we only need to compare the orange
 713 and green posterior predictions in both panels. Visually, it is clear that
 714 the green histograms have less variance, and the locations of the green and
 715 orange histograms are approximately equal. For $\eta_1^{(1)}$, the means are 0.393
 716 and 0.437 and the standard deviations are 1.005 and 0.500 for the behavioral-
 717 data-only and the bivariate joint model, respectively. For $\eta_1^{(2)}$, the means are
 718 1.068 and 0.946 and the standard deviations are 1.147 and 0.628 for the
 719 behavioral-data-only and the bivariate joint model, respectively. We can

²For the bivariate joint model, if you count Subject 1, who only had neural data, then
 the posteriors reflect a generalization from 23 subjects.

also evaluate the models' predictions for the probability that $\eta_1^{(1)}$ and $\eta_1^{(2)}$ are greater than zero. The behavioral-data-only model predicts that $p(\eta_1^{(1)} > 0) = 0.657$ and $p(\eta_1^{(2)} > 0) = 0.828$, whereas $p(\eta_1^{(1)} > 0) = 0.819$ and $p(\eta_1^{(2)} > 0) = 0.937$ for the bivariate joint model. This suggests that the relative generalizability to patterns across conditions is greater in the bivariate joint model, although it is worth emphasizing that this generalization may not result in better predictions for behavioral data. To address that question, we will use predictive modeling techniques in the next section.

Another generative modeling analysis would be to inspect the correlation parameters between the neural and behavioral submodels. In the bivariate models, two correlation parameters exist that describe the relationship between the additive shift parameters in the neural and behavioral submodels. Specifically, the parameter ρ_1 describes, across subjects, the degree to which $\eta_j^{(1)}$ is related to $\delta_j^{(1)}$ for all j , and the parameter ρ_2 describes, across subjects, the degree to which $\eta_j^{(2)}$ is related to $\delta_j^{(2)}$. Hence, the parameters ρ_1 and ρ_2 describe how much the effects present in the neural and behavioral data from conditions $V2$ to $V3$ and from $V1$ to $V3$, respectively. Figure 8 shows the estimated posterior distributions for the hyper correlation parameters ρ_1 (left panel), and ρ_2 (right panel). Figure 8 shows that ρ_1 is centered near zero, whereas ρ_2 is centered on positive values. Hence, the posterior estimate of ρ_2 suggests that the additive effects that give rise to higher drift rates in condition $V1$ are correlated with the additive effects of the EEG signal. Hence, across subjects, increases in the EEG signal in condition $V1$ relative to condition $V3$ are predictive of higher drift rates in condition $V3$ (see also Figure 7).

Predictive Modeling Analysis. We also evaluated the generalizability of our results by performing a leave-one-out cross-validation analysis for both models. Although we could have performed a similar analysis on the EEG data, we chose to focus our attention on predicting behavioral data because we felt it was the more likely application of our modeling framework (but see the Trivariate modeling section for predictions of neural data). To do this, we first hid the behavioral data for a single subject (but left the EEG data intact), then fit both the bivariate joint model and the behavioral-data-only model to the remaining data. The fitting process allowed us to estimate the posterior distribution of the model parameters, from which we generated predictions about the behavioral data – a distribution known as the posterior predictive distribution (PPD) – for each model. These predictions

Figure 8: Estimated posterior distributions for the hyper correlation parameters relating the additive shift parameters in the neural and behavioral submodels across the $V3$ and $V2$ conditions (left panel), and the $V3$ and $V1$ conditions (right panel) for the EEG data. In each panel, a reference line is plotted to indicate zero correlation.

were made “out of sample”, meaning that the data that was being predicted was not revealed to the model. Importantly, when generating predictions for behavioral data, the model was told which condition to make a prediction for, but was not told anything about the behavioral data themselves. The final step was to evaluate the likelihood of the (hidden) data under the PPD, which gave us a distribution of likelihood values. We took the median of these distributions for each model and plotted them against one another in Figure 9. Figure 9 compares the (log) likelihood values for each subject in our data. A better model fit is acquired by having a higher (log) likelihood value. The green region in Figure 9 represents areas where the bivariate joint model outperforms the behavioral-only model, whereas the orange region in Figure 9 represents areas where the behavioral-only model outperforms the bivariate joint model. Figure 9 shows that for 19 of the 23 subjects in our data, the bivariate joint model outperforms the behavioral-data-only model.

3.3.2. Summary

In this first analysis, we found that the bivariate joint model was able to generalize predictions to drift rate parameters better than a behavioral-data-only model. We found that these generalizations had similar expected values, but had considerably less variance and were better aligned with the patterns we already expected to see from previous experience with subsets of these data (Rodriguez et al., 2014). We then assessed whether or not this additional constraint was actually a good thing by cycling the models through a standard leave-one-out cross-validation test. We found that for 19 out of the 23 subjects in the EEG data subset, the bivariate joint model outperformed the behavioral-data-only model. **A large part of this predictive power comes from the enhanced reliability of the model parameters. Having less variance associated with each parameter facilitates performance on cross-validation tests, as we have shown on predictions for single-trial model parameters (Turner et al., 2015b).** Taken together, these results suggest that the neural data do indeed provide more insight to decision making in a way that facilitates prediction of behavioral data. Despite these promising findings, it remains an open question of whether this generalization ability works for other measures, such as fMRI.

3.4. Application To fMRI Data

Our second analysis only considers the effects of adding fMRI data to the analysis of behavioral data. To examine this, we focus on the second 23

Figure 9: Predictive performance of the joint and behavioral models on the EEG dataset. Each node in the graph represents the models' performance for the subject indicated, where the performance for the joint model is represented on the y -axis and the performance for the behavioral-data-only model is represented on the x -axis. Nodes located in the green region indicate that the performance for the bivariate joint model was better than the behavioral-data-only model. In total, the bivariate joint model performed best for 19 of the 23 subjects.

793 subjects in our data (i.e., rows 24-46 in Figure 2). These subjects will also
794 be used in the trivariate joint model analysis below. We did not use the data
795 from the last eight subjects (i.e., Subjects 47-54) in our experiment, even
796 though they did provide fMRI data in one condition.

797 3.4.1. Results

798 We present our results in an analogous manner as in the EEG application
799 above. First, we present our generative modeling analysis by evaluating the
800 models' ability to generalize the patterns in the data to new subjects where
801 behavioral data are not observed. We then inspect the estimated posterior
802 distributions for the correlation parameters relating the additive shifts in the
803 neural and behavioral measures. Second, we perform another cross-validation
804 test to assess the models' ability to predict behavioral data.

805 *Generative Model Analysis.* We assessed the benefits of the bivariate joint
806 model relative to the behavioral-data-only model in an analogous way as in
807 the EEG application above. Specifically, we withheld the behavioral data for
808 Subject 24, but did not withhold Subject 24's neural data. We then estimated
809 parameters from the full hierarchical model, and specifically Subject 24. To
810 accomplish this, we first fit the behavioral-data-only (i.e., a hierarchical LBA)
811 model to the behavioral data, and then fit the bivariate joint model to the full
812 data. The algorithmic details of our model-fitting approach were equivalent
813 to the EEG application above (also see Appendix B).

814 Figure 10 shows the resulting posterior distributions for Subject 24's main
815 behavioral effect parameters: $\eta_{24}^{(1)}$ (left panel) and $\eta_{24}^{(2)}$ (right panel). In both
816 panels, predictions from the bivariate joint model are shown as blue his-
817 tograms, whereas predictions from the behavioral-data-only model are shown
818 as orange histograms. Figure 10 shows that while the parameter $\eta_{24}^{(1)}$ is cen-
819 tered on zero, the parameter $\eta_{24}^{(2)}$ has a slightly positive effect, suggesting that
820 as the subjective values of the two alternatives become more dissimilar, the
821 drift rate for the subjectively higher valued alternative increases. Compar-
822 ing across models, we see that visually both models produce posteriors with
823 similar expected values, the posteriors are again substantially different. For
824 $\eta_{24}^{(1)}$, the means are 0.340 and 0.329 and the standard deviations are 0.999 and
825 0.512 for the behavioral-data-only and the bivariate joint model, respectively.
826 For $\eta_{24}^{(2)}$, the means are 1.132 and 1.277 and the standard deviations are 1.166
827 and 0.693 for the behavioral-data-only and the bivariate joint model, respec-
828 tively. We can also quantitatively evaluate the models' generalizations for the

Figure 10: Comparison of the value effect parameters $\eta_{24}^{(1)}$ (left panel), and $\eta_{24}^{(2)}$ (right panel) obtained from the behavioral-data-only model (orange) and the bivariate joint model (blue) for the withheld subject in the fMRI experiment.

probability that $\eta_{24}^{(1)}$ and $\eta_{24}^{(2)}$ are greater than zero. The behavioral-data-only model predicts that $p(\eta_{24}^{(1)} > 0) = 0.638$ and $p(\eta_{24}^{(2)} > 0) = 0.836$, whereas $p(\eta_{24}^{(1)} > 0) = 0.747$ and $p(\eta_{24}^{(2)} > 0) = 0.967$ for the bivariate joint model. Similar to the EEG application above, these results suggest that the bivariate joint model is better able to generalize patterns in the data due to its ability to capture the influence of neural data on the behavioral submodel. In the predictive analysis section below, we will evaluate whether or not this added constraint is a good thing when predicting behavioral data.

As a final generative model evaluation, we can also examine the posterior distributions of the parameters controlling the degree of correlation between the additive effect parameters in the neural and behavioral submodels. Figure 11 shows the correlation parameters ρ_1 (left panel), and ρ_2 (right panel). In the model, ρ_1 controls the degree of correlation between the shift in drift rate parameter $\eta_j^{(1)}$ and the shift in the average single-trial beta values $\delta_j^{(1)}$, whereas ρ_2 controls this same shift in drift rate parameter $\eta_j^{(2)}$ and the shift in the average single-trial values $\delta_j^{(2)}$. Importantly, these correlations are

Figure 11: Estimated posterior distributions for the hyper correlation parameters relating the additive shift parameters in the neural and behavioral submodels across the V3 and V2 conditions (left panel), and the V3 and V1 conditions for the fMRI data. In each panel, a reference line is plotted to indicate zero correlation.

845 assessed across subjects, so for any new subject, we can condition on one
846 shift parameter to generate predictions for the other (e.g., see Figure 10).
847 Figure 11 shows that the estimated correlation parameter ρ_1 is centered at
848 zero, reflecting that the information in the neural and behavioral submodel
849 parameters is not strongly related across subjects. However, the estimated
850 posterior distribution for the correlation parameter ρ_2 is centered on nega-
851 tive values off of zero, reflecting shared information between the submodel
852 parameters.

853 *Predictive Modeling Analysis.* In the predictive modeling analysis, we used
854 the same procedure described above in the EEG application to carry out a
855 cross-validation test. We first removed the behavioral data for a single subject
856 worth of data. Next, we fit both the bivariate joint model and the behavioral-
857 data-only model to the remaining data set. Third, we generated predictions
858 for the withheld behavioral data. Finally, we evaluated the log likelihood of
859 the withheld data under each predictive distribution and compared the log

860 likelihood values across models. Figure 12 shows this comparison. The figure
861 shows that the bivariate joint model obtained a higher log likelihood value
862 for each of the 23 subjects’ data.

863 *Summary.* Similar to the EEG application above, we find that the model
864 predictions for the effects of the behavioral data are in line with our intuition
865 derived from the group data. The shifted effect parameters across the neural
866 and behavioral submodels were strongly correlated between Conditions V1
867 and V3. The effects present from Condition V3 to V2 were not as pronounced
868 as those observed from Conditions V3 to V1. Together these results suggest
869 that there is shared information between the neural and behavioral measures
870 in this condition, leading to greater constraint on the behavioral submodel
871 parameters (see Figure 11). We then evaluated the utility of this additional
872 constraint via a leave-one-out cross-validation study. We again find that the
873 predictions of the bivariate joint model were appreciably better than the
874 behavioral-data-only model.

875 These analyses have established the unimodal utility of the neural data in
876 both the EEG and fMRI measures. Both analyses produced better constraint
877 of the behavioral submodel, and more importantly, this constraint lead to
878 more accurate predictions about the behavioral data. However, the question
879 remains as to whether or not the integration of behavior and *all* neural
880 measures can improve on what could be obtained in separate bivariate joint
881 model analyses. In the next section we evaluate this question by extending
882 our bivariate joint model to all three measures simultaneously – a model that
883 we refer to as a trivariate joint model.

884 4. A Trivariate Joint Model of Value Accumulation

885 To fit the data, we extended the bivariate joint model used in the previous
886 sections by simply combining the neural submodels presented in the bivariate
887 EEG and bivariate fMRI models above. This creates a model illustrated
888 in Figure 1 that captures behavior, EEG, and fMRI data in one cohesive
889 structure. The technical details of this extension are presented in Appendix
890 C.

891 4.1. Results

892 Similar to the bivariate applications to EEG and fMRI data above, we
893 performed both generative and predictive modeling analyses. In addition, in

Figure 12: Predictive performance of the joint and behavioral models on the fMRI dataset. Each node in the graph represents the models' performance for the subject indicated, where the performance for the bivariate joint model is represented as the y -axis and the performance for the behavioral model is represented as the x -axis. Nodes located in the blue region indicate that the performance for the bivariate joint model was better than for the behavioral-data-only model. In total, the bivariate joint model performed best for all 23 subjects.

the predictive modeling section below, we show how the trivariate model can be used to generate predictions for neural data conditioned on behavior. We present these analyses in turn.

4.1.1. Generative Model Analysis

Our generative analysis was similar to the bivariate applications above. In our first analysis, we focused on the effects of the neural data on the shift parameters $\eta^{(1)}$ and $\eta^{(2)}$ in the behavioral submodel. Unlike our bivariate applications above, we now have two neural measures we can consider adding to the model, creating four different models to test. The first model only considers the behavioral data, the second model considers only the behavioral and EEG data, the third model considers only the behavioral and fMRI data, and the fourth model considers the behavioral, EEG, and fMRI data, as in Figure 1. For illustration purposes, we again withheld the behavioral data for one subject – Subject 53 – to compare and contrast each model’s predictions.³ In the predictive modeling analysis section below, we will use an extension of this technique in a cross-validation test. Although we withheld Subject 53’s behavioral data, the EEG and fMRI data were left intact. Because some of these models are unable to use all components of the neural data, each model’s ability to generalize to a new subject’s behavioral data depends on the reliability of the usable neural data.

We fit each of the four models using the methods described in the appendices. Figure 13 shows the resulting posterior distributions for Subject 53’s main behavioral effect parameters: $\eta_{53}^{(1)}$ (left panel) and $\eta_{53}^{(2)}$ (right panel). In both panels, predictions from the behavioral-data-only, bivariate EEG, bivariate fMRI, and trivariate models are shown as orange, green, blue and red densities, respectively. Figure 13 shows that both $\eta_{53}^{(1)}$ and $\eta_{53}^{(2)}$ are centered on

³Unlike the bivariate modeling applications above, the trivariate modeling analyses must deal with a sparsity issue in the number of subjects providing all three measures (i.e., behavioral, EEG, and fMRI). For this reason, Subject 53 was not chosen arbitrarily, but was instead selected on the basis of having the fewest number of trials. Specifically, after data preprocessing, Subject 53 provided 240 observations of joint behavior and EEG data, but only 98 observations of joint behavior and fMRI data, whereas the other 7 subjects provided (on average) 226.14 and 239.71 trials, respectively. **This choice makes use of the most amount of data, but should have little impact on the results. For example, choosing another subject might weaken the correlation observed between EEG and fMRI, but only proportional to the difference between the number of data points for this hypothetical subject and the number of data points for Subject 53, which is on average 127.85 trials.**

positive values, with $\eta_{53}^{(2)}$ being larger than $\eta_{53}^{(1)}$. These results are consistent with the previous bivariate joint model analyses above. Comparing across models, we see that while all models produce posteriors with similar expected values, the dispersion of those posteriors differs substantially. Namely, the behavioral-data-only model has the widest variance, the bivariate EEG and fMRI models have similar and slightly less variance, and the trivariate model has the smallest variance. We will evaluate whether this pattern in variances across models leads to better predictions of the behavioral data in the predictive modeling analysis section below.

We can also quantitatively evaluate the models' generalizations for the probability that $\eta_{53}^{(1)}$ and $\eta_{53}^{(2)}$ are greater than zero. The behavioral-data-only model predicts that $p(\eta_{53}^{(1)} > 0) = 0.666$ and $p(\eta_{53}^{(2)} > 0) = 0.874$. The bivariate EEG model predicts that $p(\eta_{53}^{(1)} > 0) = 0.766$ and $p(\eta_{53}^{(2)} > 0) = 0.950$. The bivariate fMRI model predicts that $p(\eta_{53}^{(1)} > 0) = 0.796$ and $p(\eta_{53}^{(2)} > 0) = 0.929$. Finally, the trivariate model predicts that $p(\eta_{53}^{(1)} > 0) = 0.839$ and $p(\eta_{53}^{(2)} > 0) = 0.970$. The basic pattern is consistent with the pattern of variance above: the models whose posteriors have less variance predict greater probabilities that the η parameter is greater than zero. Furthermore, the behavioral-data-only and the bivariate models predict greater probabilities that η is greater than zero compared to the bivariate analyses above, suggesting that the additional data is consistent with the subsets considered in the above sections.

The dominant factor contributing to the pattern of predictions observed in Figure 13 is the variance-covariance matrix Σ linking neural and behavioral model parameters. Recall that each shift effect uses a separate variance-covariance matrix, such that $\Sigma^{(1)}$ corresponds to the differences between conditions $V2$ and $V3$, and $\Sigma^{(2)}$ corresponds to the differences between conditions $V1$ and $V3$. In addition, each model's use of Σ varies by the type of neural measure. Specifically, the behavioral-data-only model does not use any neural data, and so it does not use a variance-covariance matrix at all. The bivariate EEG and fMRI models do capture the effects of the shifts between conditions, but in a way that is unique to the type of neural measure used. Hence, the two Σ matrices will be different across the two bivariate models. Finally, the trivariate model has larger Σ matrices to capture the associations between behavioral, EEG, and fMRI data sources. At the outset, we might expect the trivariate model's Σ matrix to resemble components of the bivariate models with corresponding parts. For example, the bivariate

Figure 13: Comparison of the value effect parameters $\eta_{53}^{(1)}$ (left panel), and $\eta_{53}^{(2)}$ (right panel) obtained from the behavioral-data-only model (orange), the bivariate EEG model (green), the bivariate fMRI model (blue), and the trivariate model (red) for the withheld subject (i.e., Subject 53).

Figure 14: Estimated posterior distributions for the hyper correlation parameters. The top row shows the correlations between the additive shift parameters across the V3 and V2 conditions, whereas the bottom row shows the correlations between the shift parameters across V3 and V1. The first column shows the correlations between the behavioral and EEG shift parameters for the bivariate (green) and trivariate (red) joint models. The second column shows the correlations between the behavioral and fMRI shift parameters for the bivariate (blue) and trivariate (red) joint models. The third column shows the correlations between the EEG and fMRI shift parameters for the trivariate joint model. In each panel, a reference line is plotted to indicate zero correlation.

957 EEG model should have a Σ matrix that is similar to the components of the
 958 trivariate model that capture the correlations between behavior and EEG
 959 data. To examine this, we can separate out the effect parameters within Σ of
 960 the trivariate model, and compare them to similar effect parameters within
 961 Σ in the bivariate joint models.

962 Figure 14 shows the important components of the Σ matrices for the Con-
 963 ditions V2 and V1 ($\Sigma^{(1)}$; top row), and for the Conditions V3 and V1 ($\Sigma^{(2)}$;
 964 bottom row). Each column represents the corresponding correlation param-
 965 eters relating the three measures: behavioral and EEG model parameters
 966 (left column), behavioral and fMRI model parameters (middle column), and
 967 EEG and fMRI model parameters (right column). The estimated correlation

968 parameters for each of the three joint models are illustrated with histograms
 969 of different colors: bivariate EEG as green, bivariate fMRI as blue, and the
 970 trivariate model as red. Figure 14 shows that components of the bivariate
 971 models do closely align with the corresponding components of the trivariate
 972 model; however, the variance of the estimate posterior distribution for
 973 the trivariate model is smaller, especially for the $\Sigma^{(2)}$ matrix. Akin to the
 974 other comparisons of behavioral-data-only and joint models above, this ad-
 975 ditional constraint comes from having additional measures in the model that
 976 are correlated. The right column of Figure 14 shows that the additive shift
 977 parameters in the EEG and fMRI data are uncorrelated across Conditions
 978 V2 and V3, but strongly negatively correlated across Conditions V1 and
 979 V3. Although this relationship is something that we might have logically de-
 980 duced from two separate bivariate model analyses, only the trivariate model
 981 is able to use this information to provide statistical constraint in generating
 982 predictions for new data.

983 4.1.2. *Predictive Modeling Analysis*

984 We again performed a leave-one-out cross-validation test to assess the
 985 models' ability to generate predictions for behavioral data. To accomplish
 986 this, we focused on the eight subjects who provided both EEG and fMRI
 987 measures, so that the bivariate and trivariate models could be directly com-
 988 pared. First, we removed all data for one subject (e.g., Subject 47). Second,
 989 we fit all four models to the remaining 53 subjects' data. Third, we generate
 990 predictions for the withheld subject's behavioral data, conditional on some
 991 aspect of the neural data. For example, the bivariate EEG model only takes
 992 EEG data as an input, whereas the trivariate model can take both EEG and
 993 fMRI data as inputs. Finally, we examined the models' predictive accuracy
 994 by calculating the (log) likelihood of the withheld subject's data from the
 995 estimated posterior distributions via Monte Carlo procedure (Robert and
 996 Casella, 2004). Specifically, we integrated over the posterior distributions to
 997 numerically estimate the probability that any given observation for a partic-
 998 ular subject was best predicted by a particular model. In the end, we arrived
 999 at an estimate of the probability that a particular subject's data was best
 1000 captured by each model, a value that summed to one across models. Figure
 1001 15 shows a ternary plot of these probabilities for the eight subjects in our
 1002 data. In the figure, we removed the behavioral-data-only model from consid-
 1003 eration because (1) we have already established the bivariate model's ability
 1004 to out predict the behavioral-data-only model, and (2) in this analysis, it

Figure 15: Results of the cross-validation test on the behavioral data from the last eight subjects of the experiment. The three vertices of the ternary plot each designate areas favoring one type of joint model: bivariate EEG (red; bottom left), bivariate fMRI (green; bottom right), and the trivariate model (blue; top). Reference lines are plotted to reflect points of indifference between the models. The nodes correspond to each of the eight subjects in the EEG/fMRI condition (i.e., Subjects 47-54). For each of the subjects, the trivariate model made the most accurate prediction.

performed the worse of the four models.

The reference lines in Figure 15 designate the areas best predicted by a particular model. In addition, the color values illustrate the graded nature of the model selection process. The trivariate model is represented as blue, the bivariate EEG model is represented as red, and the bivariate fMRI model is represented as green. The nodes in the graph mark the probability of a given model, conditional on the behavioral data. The figure shows that for each of the subjects in our data, the trivariate model provides the best predictions than any of the other three models (although the behavioral-data-only model is not shown).

Generalizations for Neural Data. Although Figure 15 shows the trivariate model’s predictive abilities for behavioral data relative to the bivariate models, there are other predictive tests we could have performed. As a final test of the utility of our trivariate model, we assessed the model’s ability to predict neural data on the basis of behavioral data. To do this, we refit the trivariate model to the full data set, but withheld the neural data for two randomly selected subjects: Subject 4 from the EEG experiment, and Subject 33 from the fMRI experiment. This withholding strategy is again illustrated by the orange blocks in Figure 2. We then generated predictions for the EEG data of Subject 4, and the fMRI data for Subject 33, on the basis of the behavioral data.

Figure 16 shows the predictions for the EEG data made for Subject 4. Panel a shows the PPDs for the difference between value conditions $V1$ and $V3$ (x -axis) against the difference between value conditions $V2$ and $V3$ (y -axis). Samples of the joint PPD are represented with shaded blue dots to show the relative density across the parameter space. Panel a also shows some summary statistics of Subject 4’s EEG data, reflected in the “+” symbol: the mean along each dimension is located at the center, and one standard deviation of the PPD along each dimension is represented as the length of the line (i.e., the horizontal line corresponds to the x -axis, and the vertical line corresponds to the y -axis). For comparison, the mean of the PPD is represented as the open circle. Plotting the PPD in this way allows us to interpret the relative differences in activation predicted by the model between the two value conditions. From our previous analyses (also see Figure 6), we might expect the model to predict that raw activation in the EEG signal would be highest in $V1$, and lowest in $V3$, implying that the differences between $V1$ and $V3$ would be positive and larger than the differences between $V2$ and $V3$. Given this intuition, we would expect the largest density of the PPD to be on the gray triangle in Panel a. The PPD, having been centered relative to Condition $V3$, places more density on positive values in both the x and y directions. Further, in the upper right quadrant of Panel a, the PPD has greater density in the half-quadrant representing values where $V1 - V3$ is higher than $V2 - V3$. Importantly, the model’s predictions are also consistent with Subject 4’s data in that both the filled circle and the “+” symbol fall in the gray area in Panel a.

Panel b shows how these predictions appear on the scalp. The first column shows the mean of the PPD (represented as the filled circle in Panel a) in the $V2 - V3$ (top) and $V1 - V3$ (bottom) conditions. The second col-

Figure 16: Posterior predictive distributions (PPDs) for the withheld EEG data of Subject 4. Panel a shows the full PPD for the difference between value conditions $V1$ and $V3$ (x -axis) against the difference between value conditions $V2$ and $V3$ (y -axis). The “+” symbol illustrates summary statistics of Subject 4’s EEG data: the center designates the mean along each dimension (i.e., the x and y axes), and one standard deviation of the data is represented as the length of the line (i.e., the horizontal line corresponds to the x -axis, and the vertical line corresponds to the y -axis). The mean of the PPD from the model is represented as the filled circle. Reference lines are used to designate important areas relating differences between conditions (see text for details). Panel b illustrates these predictions on the scalp: the means of the PPDs are shown in the first column whereas Subject 4’s data are shown in the second column. The topographic plots are colored coded according to the key on the far right side.

1053 umn shows Subject 4’s withheld data in the same conditions. In each scalp
 1054 topography plot, activation is color coded according to the key on the right
 1055 side. Comparing across panels, we conclude that the model’s predictions are
 1056 entirely consistent with the withheld subject’s data.

1057 A parallel analysis was performed for the withheld fMRI data of Subject
 1058 33. Similar to Figure 16, Figure 17a shows the PPD for the difference between
 1059 value conditions $V1$ and $V3$ (x -axis) against the difference between value
 1060 conditions $V1$ and $V2$ (y -axis). Summary statistics of Subject 33’s fMRI
 1061 data are plotted in Panel a of Figure 17 in the same way they were plotted
 1062 in Panel a of Figure 16. Given our previous analyses, we would expect the
 1063 opposite pattern of predictions from the EEG predictions above. That is,
 1064 we would expect the activation to be highest in Condition $V3$, and lowest in

Condition $V1$, implying that the predictions for $V1 - V3$ would be negative, and more negative than the predictions for $V2 - V3$. Hence, we should expect a high density of the model predictions, and the withheld data to fall in the gray half-quadrant illustrated in Panel a. Figure 17 confirms this prediction and shows that the predictions from the trivariate model are indeed consistent with the withheld data.

Panel b shows the average model predictions from Panel a (left column) beside Subject 33’s withheld fMRI data. The degree of activation in the dmFC is color coded according to the key on the far right side. Figure 17 shows that the model predicts that the difference in activation in the dmFC between value conditions $V2$ and $V3$ is smaller in magnitude than the difference in activation between value conditions $V1$ and $V3$. These predictions are in line with the withheld data, which further suggests that the trivariate model uses the inferred relationships between neural activity and the behavioral model to generalize accurately to new subjects.

5. Discussion

In this article, we have shown how the joint modeling framework (Turner et al., 2013a) can be extended to solve the more difficult challenge of integrating multiple neurophysiological measures with a behavioral model. Our results suggest that bivariate models, having either EEG or fMRI, can outperform behavioral-data-only models, and trivariate models, having both EEG and fMRI, can outperform bivariate models. The reason for this pattern of results is due to (1) the interrelationships among the three variables, and (2) the trivariate model’s ability to learn the important patterns in the data to facilitate better generalization. While our results certainly support our method for multi-variate extensions, there are a number of important limitations and benefits meriting further discussion.

5.1. Reliance on Preprocessing Methodology

To date, all applications of our joint modeling framework rely on some preprocessing of the neural signal as a way to reduce the dimensionality of these measures. For example, in our processing of the EEG data above, we first computed the average EEG signal for each value condition and visually inspected these curves across time. We then chose a window of time where the EEG signal showed the most differentiation between the three

Figure 17: Posterior predictive distributions (PPDs) for the withheld fMRI data of Subject 33. Panel a shows the full PPD for the difference between value conditions $V1$ and $V3$ (x -axis) against the difference between value conditions $V2$ and $V3$ (y -axis). The “+” symbol illustrates summary statistics of Subject 33’s fMRI data: the center designates the mean along each dimension (i.e., the x and y axes), and one standard deviation of the data is represented as the length of the line (i.e., the horizontal line corresponds to the x -axis, and the vertical line corresponds to the y -axis). The mean of the PPD from the model is represented as the filled circle. Reference lines are used to designate important areas relating the variables across conditions (see text for details). Panel b illustrates these predictions in the brain: the mean of the PPDs are shown in the first column whereas Subject 33’s data are shown in the second column. In each axial slice, the degree of activation is colored coded according to the key on the far right side.

value conditions. This time window represented the period of time we suspected would be the most interesting from a cognitive perspective, but this procedure leaves much to be desired. First, it averages the wave form over time, and second, it averages over only four electrodes out of many. One could easily imagine the analyses performed here with improvements to the neural submodel such as decomposing the neural signal into its temporal and spatial aspects. Future work should endeavor to establish stronger data reduction techniques that are model driven, such as those used by topographic factor analysis (Manning et al., 2014; Gershman et al., 2011).

5.2. Generalization Depends on the Value of Conditioned Variables

Our bivariate and trivariate generative modeling analyses showed that adding neural measures constrains our knowledge about behavioral model parameters (see Figures 7, 10, and 13). In these analyses, constraint was observed through the additional precision (i.e., having less variance) in the posterior estimates, and importantly, this additional constraint facilitated more accurate predictions about withheld behavioral data. The additional constraint depends on a few important factors. First, consider the case of two arbitrary random variables (θ, δ) that have a joint multivariate normal distribution, as in the bivariate joint models presented above, where θ are the linked behavioral submodel parameters, and δ are the linked neural submodel parameters. When provided with neural data, the neural model parameters δ become *estimable*, allowing our model to infer an estimate for δ that comes from both the prior and the likelihood. In our modeling framework, having information about δ informs our understanding about θ . Recall that the distribution of (θ, δ) for all subjects depends on the hyper mean ϕ and the hyper variance-covariance matrix Σ . If we partition these hyperparameters according to what they correspond to in the behavioral and neural submodels, we obtain the following division:

$$\begin{aligned}\phi &= \begin{bmatrix} \phi_1 & \phi_2 \end{bmatrix}^\top \\ \Sigma &= \begin{bmatrix} \Sigma_{11} & \Sigma_{12} \\ \Sigma_{21} & \Sigma_{22} \end{bmatrix}.\end{aligned}$$

Here, parameters ϕ_1 and Σ_{11} correspond to behavioral submodel parameters θ , whereas parameters ϕ_2 and Σ_{22} correspond to neural submodel parameters δ . Given the properties of our linking function, if we know that δ equals a specific value, say $\delta = \delta^*$, then the distribution of θ *conditional* on δ is

$$\theta | \delta = \delta^* \sim \mathcal{N}(\phi^*, \Sigma^*),$$

1131 where

$$\begin{aligned}\phi^* &= \phi_1 + \Sigma_{12}\Sigma_{22}^{-1}(\delta^* - \phi_2) \\ \Sigma^* &= \Sigma_{11} - \Sigma_{12}\Sigma_{22}^{-1}\Sigma_{21}.\end{aligned}$$

1132 The important result is that the variance of the conditional distribution is
1133 reduced, specifically it is reduced by $\Sigma_{12}\Sigma_{22}^{-1}\Sigma_{21}$. While this amount does
1134 not depend on the specific value of δ^* , it clearly depends on δ 's variability.
1135 Furthermore, as the correlation between the neural and behavioral data
1136 approaches zero, the joint model reduces to a univariate model, such that
1137 $\phi^* = \phi_1$ and $\Sigma^* = \Sigma_{11}$. The gain of this from a modeling standpoint is that
1138 the constraint applied to both θ and δ becomes negligible, and the model
1139 effectively learns to ignore the neural data in its estimate of θ . Finally, the
1140 mean of the conditional estimate for θ does depend on δ^* , which suggests
1141 that the influence and constraint provided by the neural data will vary from
1142 one subject to another, and this variation is explained by the properties of
1143 that subject's neural data *relative* to the group. Specifically, as a subject's
1144 neural data become more unlike the group data (i.e., as $\delta^* - \phi_2$ increases),
1145 the constraint applied to the conditional distribution ($\theta|\delta = \delta^*$) increases.
1146 These results could have implications for a joint model's performance, and
1147 might explain why for some subjects, a joint model performed worse than a
1148 behavioral-data-only model (e.g., see Figure 7).

1149 5.3. The Shrinkage Paradox

1150 In the hierarchical models presented in this article, we assumed a hi-
1151 erarchical structure that captured both subject-specific and group-specific
1152 effects. One of the major benefits of hierarchical modeling is the “borrow-
1153 ing” of information from one subject (i.e., the lower level of the hierarchy)
1154 to another. This happens because the parameters for any given subject are
1155 informed by that subject's data, but the pattern of subject-specific param-
1156 eters is informed through the estimation of group-level parameters. While
1157 this may seem like a bottom-up process, it is actually also top-down. For
1158 example, when a new subject is added to the data, the model can already
1159 generate predictions for that subject's data on the basis of the other subjects
1160 in the data set. In this way, the estimation of subject-specific parameters in
1161 a hierarchical model consists of a mixture of two quantities: (1) the informa-
1162 tion learned about the subject from the subject's own data, and (2) what the
1163 model predicts for the subject's parameters given the other subjects in the

data set. In statistical terms, these quantities are known as the likelihood function and the prior predictive distribution, respectively.

For the types of experiments we typically see in psychology and neuroscience, the prior predictive distribution can be quite sparse, having density in regions of the parameter space that are not informative for a specific subject. However, as the number of observations increase, the model’s reliance on the prior predictive distribution diminishes because the likelihood function begins to dominate what we know about this individual. Said another way, the influence of the likelihood is proportional to the number of observations for that subject. In an analogous way, the influence of the prior predictive distribution is proportional to the number of subjects in the extant data set. With many subjects in the set, the prior predictive distribution will be more reflective of the average subject-to-subject patterns in the set.

The tradeoff dynamics between the prior predictive distribution and the likelihood function are important because they have a direct effect on a model’s predictive accuracy. Consider a new subject who has just been added to a small (e.g., 20 subjects) set of data. Further suppose that the data for this subject are relatively sparse, consisting of only a few observations. If the first 20 subjects had been fit hierarchically, the model’s prediction for the parameters of this new subject would primarily be generated from the prior predictive density as a result of this subject’s sparse data. However, if we had estimated the new subject’s parameters *independently* of the hierarchical model, the parameter estimates would only consist of the information in the data themselves, and would not have the information conveyed by the hierarchical model. If we then compared the estimates of this subject’s parameters obtained from the hierarchical model to those obtained independently, we should expect some differences. A typical pattern of results is that the independently-obtained estimates are more extreme – meaning they depart from the group average – than the estimates put forth by the hierarchical model (Rouder and Lu, 2005; Rouder et al., 2005). This phenomenon is known as “shrinkage”, and is sometimes regarded as a disadvantage of hierarchical modeling.

Shrinkage can be explained simply as a model’s tendency to hedge its bets. If we know very little about a new subject, but we know a lot about what subjects typically look like, it would make sense to make predictions about a subject that reflect our most informed base of knowledge. Statistically speaking, this is actually the optimal behavior (Gelman et al., 2004; Christensen et al., 2011). Despite this, it can happen for some subjects that the predic-

tions are inaccurate because they are more reflective of group statistics than subject specific statistics. Models are especially susceptible to these errors when data are completely withheld. For example, in the trivariate modeling section we generate predictions for neural data on the basis of behavioral data alone. The predictions about neural data were based on three things: (1) the behavioral data for those subjects, (2) the prior predictive knowledge about the neural model parameters, and (3) the prior predictive knowledge of the relationship between behavioral and neural model parameters. None of these three things contribute to the likelihood function for the neural model parameters, and as a result, the model generates predictions that are reflective of the group statistics. This was not a problem in our prediction for EEG data (see Figure 16), but for the fMRI data, the predictions for the relative changes in BOLD activity across conditions were not as extreme as they should have been. In Figure 17, this is illustrated in Panel a by the distance of the “+” symbol from the point $(0,0)$ relative to the filled circle. The interpretation is that the model made less extreme predictions than what was observed in the data. While these predictions are still accurate, it may not generally be the case, and it is important to keep the concept of shrinkage in mind when evaluating the predictive accuracy of joint models.

5.4. *Contrasts with Data Fusion Methods*

Combining EEG and fMRI measurements is a difficult, but fruitful endeavor. EEG measures have excellent temporal resolution, but have rather limited spatial information, whereas fMRI measures provide good spatial resolution, but lack good temporal resolution. Hence, combining both measures to understand brain function would capitalize on the benefits of each modality, potentially providing new insight to old questions. In addition to the methods of data fusion discussed in the introduction, another method attempting to combine these measures is through simultaneous recordings, where a subject performs a task in an MRI scanner while wearing an EEG net. This approach has yielded new methods for obtaining temporal components that can be associated with clusters of activation determined by fMRI that contribute to the generation of the electrical signal (see Huster et al., 2013, for a review), but does suffer from complications due to artifacts produced from the simultaneous methodology (e.g., Mulert and Lemieux, 2009; Ullsperger and Debener, 2010; Cottureau et al., 2015). By contrast, the method we have proposed here focuses on linking parameters of a cognitive model to both behavior and multiple brain measures. The method proposed

1239 here could also be used with simultaneous data collection, but it need not be,
 1240 obviating the difficulties of collecting high-quality EEG data inside the scan-
 1241 ner. However, our method is not without its own limitations. Specifically,
 1242 our method assumes the same basic cognitive process underlies the decision
 1243 making behavior observed in each of these experimental conditions, and that
 1244 changes across experimental conditions manifests in the neural data in sim-
 1245 ilar ways. There is some evidence that the context of experimental settings
 1246 influences decision making behavior. Van Maanen et al. (2015) asked sub-
 1247 jects to perform the three tasks in two separate conditions, one condition was
 1248 performed in an fMRI scanner and the other was not. They then analyzed
 1249 the behavioral data using the LBA model, and compared the parameter es-
 1250 timates across the two conditions for all three experiments. In two of the
 1251 experiments, the nondecision time parameter was larger in the fMRI con-
 1252 dition reflecting slower motor movements, and in one of these experiments,
 1253 the degree of attentional focus was less in the fMRI condition. Although
 1254 not reported (but see Rodriguez et al., 2014), we performed a similar analy-
 1255 sis comparing parameter estimates across EEG and fMRI blocks in our data.
 1256 Our model comparisons were not as extensive as in Van Maanen et al. (2015),
 1257 but we found only marginal differences between the two modalities, and felt
 1258 assured that our assumptions about the decision making behavior across con-
 1259 ditions was justified. We speculated that the differences between our analysis
 1260 and Van Maanen et al.’s analysis may be due to the subjective nature of the
 1261 decision process used in our task. Regardless, future research using the joint
 1262 modeling approach described here will need to properly scrutinize the differ-
 1263 ence in the decision making behavior across conditions. That is not to say
 1264 that the decision making behavior needs to be identical across experimental
 1265 conditions. Context-dependent effects like those observed in Van Maanen
 1266 et al. (2015) can still be accommodated using our joint modeling approach,
 1267 but may require additional theoretical overhead in the instantiation of the
 1268 behavioral (or neural) submodel.

1269 *5.5. Neural Data as a Means for Model Selection*

1270 In this manuscript, we have only considered a single behavioral (sub)model
 1271 to capture the behavioral data. However, the extent to which neural data
 1272 correlate with model parameters is highly contingent on the fidelity of the
 1273 model itself. One of the primary benefits of this modeling approach is that
 1274 it is not committed to any particular submodel for either the neural or be-
 1275 havioral data. This lack of commitment manifests as a strength: one can

choose a submodel on the basis of convenience (e.g., mathematical tractability), theoretical endorsement, or simply personal preference. Being able to easily switch between different models also allows for a direct model comparison by way of fit statistics, and prediction performance – a feature of joint modeling that is similar in spirit to other integrative cognitive model comparison methods (Purcell et al., 2010; Mack et al., 2013).

We have speculated elsewhere how using the joint modeling framework can be used to facilitate a more elaborated model comparison analysis on the basis of neural data (cf. Turner, 2015). For example, Turner (2015) showed how tractography measures between the presupplementary motor area and the striatum could be used to better constrain model predictions for new subjects when behavioral data are withheld. Using the same neural measure, Turner (2015) showed how the LBA model and a reduced drift diffusion model compared in fits to both the neural and behavioral data. Ultimately, the LBA model outperformed the reduced drift diffusion model. While we speculate that neural data can provide greater constraint and benchmark tests of cognitive theory, future analyses are needed to better address the interplay of neuroscience and model selection (but see Purcell et al., 2010; Mack et al., 2013; Ditterich, 2010).

5.6. *Toward a Common Theoretical Framework*

In many ways, the typical experimental design in cognitive neuroscience is similar to those of experimental psychology. First, an experiment is designed with at least two conditions. We then go collect data to fill up the cell blocks in the design. Finally, we perform some statistical test to compare the distribution of data across the cell blocks. Such a procedure can tell us *which* brain regions/areas are sensitive to the experimental manipulation, and even the magnitude of the sensitivity, but this procedure can say nothing about *why* these regions change activity from a mechanistic point of view. Furthermore, while this analytic procedure is essential in statistically testing experimental manipulations within a study, it can sometimes be difficult to aggregate across multiple studies, especially when these studies use different types of neural measures, such as EEG and fMRI. We see this as a limitation, stemming directly from a lack of commitment to a particular theoretical framework. Our joint modeling approach attempts to resolve this limitation. By using a cognitive model, which ostensibly instantiates a cognitive theory, we are better postured to interpret neural function through the lens of a cognitive model. In addition, the joint modeling framework

1313 allows for seamless integration across multiple studies, modalities, and even
1314 imbalanced experimental designs (see, e.g., Figure 2).

1315 **6. Conclusions**

1316 In this article, we have described a method for integrating EEG, fMRI,
1317 and behavioral data into one cognitive model. The model assumes the pres-
1318 ence of different submodels that capture the modality-specific effects of inter-
1319 est. Important parameters describing changes across experimental conditions
1320 are then linked together to facilitate communication across modalities in the
1321 data set. Our approach has many advantages, in particular, it is amenable
1322 to imbalanced experimental designs including different modalities, and dif-
1323 ferent numbers of subjects per modality. Our method is also well suited for
1324 generating predictions for new data, withheld data, or missing data for any
1325 modality of interest. Finally, our approach centers on the instantiation of a
1326 particular mechanistic cognitive theory, allowing us to interpret brain data
1327 through the lens of a cognitive model, and provide a unifying theoretical
1328 framework for multi-modal measures of cognition.

7. References

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1576 Appendix A. Technical Details of the Behavioral Model

1577 While the basic idea of our hierarchical LBA model for intertemporal
 1578 choice was presented in Rodriguez et al. (2014) (also see Turner et al., 2013b),
 1579 some of the core assumptions of the model have been changed to facilitate a
 1580 comparison between the behavioral model and the joint models used in the
 1581 subsequent sections.

1582 Figure A.18 provides an illustrative diagram of our LBA model of in-
 1583 tertemporal choice. To provide a formal description of the model, we denote
 1584 the RT on the i th trial for the j th subject in the v th value condition as
 1585 $RT_{i,j,v} \in (0, \infty)$, and the corresponding choice as $C_{i,j,v}$ where $C_{i,j,v} \in \{I, D\}$.
 1586 I and D are the immediate and delayed rewards respectively. The model as-
 1587 sumes that evidence for I and D is accumulated independently in separate ac-
 1588 cumulators. For a given trial, both accumulators begin with some choice bias,
 1589 which is provided as independent amounts of starting point evidence $\{a_I, a_D\}$,
 1590 sampled from a common uniform distribution $\mathcal{U}[0, A_j]$, where A_j is the upper
 1591 bound of the starting point for Subject j . Evidence then increases through
 1592 time at rates $\{d_I, d_D\}$, which are sampled from independent normal distribu-
 1593 tions with means $\{\mu_{v,I,j}, \mu_{v,D,j}\}$. Mean accumulation rates vary across value
 1594 conditions (i.e., the first index) and subjects (i.e., the third index), whereas
 1595 the standard deviation σ_j is the same for both immediate (I) and delayed
 1596 (D) alternatives, but varies across subjects. Therefore, $d_I \sim \mathcal{N}(\mu_{v,I,j}, \sigma_j)$ and
 1597 $d_D \sim \mathcal{N}(\mu_{v,D,j}, \sigma_j)$. Each accumulator gathers evidence ballistically until the
 1598 point at which one accumulator reaches the response threshold b_j . The ob-
 1599 served response time is the sum of the decision time plus some extra time τ_j
 1600 attributed to non-comparison and selection processes, such as temporal dis-
 1601 counting and motor execution. Letting $\{a_I, a_D\} = \mathbf{a}_{i,j,v}$ and $\{d_I, d_D\} = \mathbf{d}_{i,j,v}$,
 1602 the response time on Trial i for Subject j is given by

$$RT_{i,j,v} = \min_{\{I,D\}} \left(\frac{b_j - \mathbf{a}_{i,j,v}}{\mathbf{d}_{i,j,v}} \right) + \tau_j, \quad (\text{A.1})$$

1603 and the choice $C_{i,j,v}$ corresponds to the accumulator that reached the response
 1604 threshold b_j first. The model provides a closed-form and joint account of
 1605 response time and choice probability across value conditions by specifying
 1606 “defective” probability density functions (PDFs) for I and D in terms of the
 1607 parameters just described (see Brown and Heathcote, 2008, for details).

1608 We made two reparameterization choices from our previous application
 1609 of the model (Rodriguez et al., 2014) to facilitate the hierarchical estimation

Figure A.18: Our Linear Ballistic Accumulator model for intertemporal choice. Following the presentation of a stimulus and some non-decision time τ , information accumulates ballistically for each alternative. The accumulation processes for both the immediate (left panel) and the delayed (right panel) reward alternatives are independent. Once enough evidence b has been accumulated, a decision is made that corresponds to the accumulator that reaches the threshold first. The model assumes trial-to-trial variation in both starting point and drift rate.

1610 procedure (see below). The first involved modeling the upper boundary of
 1611 the starting point A_j in terms of the response boundary b_j . The starting
 1612 point parameter A_j is bounded by 0 and b_j , and this parameter-specific
 1613 boundary can result in poor estimation efficiency in our sampling procedure.
 1614 Consequently, we chose to model the proportion of the upper starting point
 1615 boundary parameter to the response threshold parameter by estimating

$$\alpha_j = A_j/b_j.$$

1616 The parameter α_j is still bounded by 0 and 1, and so in the specification
 1617 of the model below, we will use the logit transformation to put α_j on a
 1618 space that has infinite support (i.e., $\alpha_j \in (-\infty, \infty)$), which will improve the
 1619 accuracy of our estimated posteriors.

1620 Following our folding process described in the methods, our data consisted
 1621 of three response time distributions, one for each of the value conditions V
 1622 (see Figure 5). Our second reparametrization involved the drift rate param-
 1623 eters for these response time distributions. Of considerable importance was
 1624 the difference in the accumulation rates for the most likely alternative (given
 1625 our experimental manipulation) across these value conditions. To model this
 1626 effect, we introduced the parameters $\eta_j^{(1)}$, and $\eta_j^{(2)}$ to capture the difference
 1627 in the rates of accumulation from the $V3$ condition to the $V2$, and from the
 1628 $V3$ condition to the $V1$ condition, respectively. Formally, we set

$$\begin{aligned}\mu_{V3,SHV,j} &= \text{logit}^{-1}(\nu_j), \\ \mu_{V2,SHV,j} &= \text{logit}^{-1}\left(\nu_j + \eta_j^{(1)}\right), \text{ and} \\ \mu_{V1,SHV,j} &= \text{logit}^{-1}\left(\nu_j + \eta_j^{(2)}\right),\end{aligned}$$

1629 where $\text{logit}^{-1}(x)$ represents the inverse logit transformation of x , ν_j is the
 1630 “equipreference” drift rate parameter for Subject j , and “SHV” is the sub-
 1631 jectively higher valued option. To satisfy scaling conditions of the model, we
 1632 imposed a constraint such that the drift rates sum to one across each of the
 1633 value conditions, namely that in condition V , the following should hold:

$$\mu_{V,SHV,j} + \mu_{V,SLV,j} = 1.$$

1634 We estimated LBA model parameters using a hierarchical Bayesian pro-
 1635 cedure (see Rodriguez et al., 2014; Turner et al., 2013b, for details). To

1636 construct the hierarchical model, we must first make assumptions about the
 1637 distributions of subject-specific parameters. To do this, we first transformed
 1638 the parameters so that they had continuous, infinite support (i.e., can take
 1639 on any real value). In our case, for parameters bounded by zero, we applied
 1640 a log transformation, and for parameters bounded by zero and one, we ap-
 1641 plied a logit transformation. Following these transformations, we specified
 1642 the following priors for the subject-specific parameters:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \nu_j &\sim \mathcal{N}(\nu_\mu, \nu_\sigma), \\
 \eta_j^{(1)} &\sim \mathcal{N}(\eta_\mu^{(1)}, \eta_\sigma^{(1)}), \\
 \eta_j^{(2)} &\sim \mathcal{N}(\eta_\mu^{(2)}, \eta_\sigma^{(2)}), \\
 \log(\sigma_j) &\sim \mathcal{N}(\sigma_\mu, \sigma_\sigma), \\
 \log(\tau_j^{(k)}) &\sim \mathcal{N}(\tau_\mu^{(k)}, \tau_\sigma^{(k)}), \\
 \text{logit}(\alpha_j) &\sim \mathcal{N}(\alpha_\mu, \alpha_\sigma), \text{ and} \\
 \log(b_j) &\sim \mathcal{N}(b_\mu, b_\sigma),
 \end{aligned}$$

1643 where $k \in \{1, 2, 3\}$ represents the three different folded value conditions, as
 1644 described above. The nondecision time parameter τ_j was allowed to vary
 1645 across value conditions because previous modeling results showed that this
 1646 choice provided the best fit to the data (Rodriguez et al., 2014).

1647 Finally, we complete our model by specifying priors for the hyperparam-
 1648 eters. Given the assumptions of normality for the subject-specific parameters,
 1649 we can establish a conjugate relationship between the prior and posterior dis-
 1650 tributions at the hyper level. To do this, we specified the following priors for
 1651 the group-level means:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \nu_\mu &\sim \mathcal{N}(0.5, 0.8), \\
 \eta_\mu^{(1)} &\sim \mathcal{N}(0, 100), \\
 \eta_\mu^{(2)} &\sim \mathcal{N}(0, 100), \\
 \sigma_\mu &\sim \mathcal{N}(0.5, 0.8), \\
 \tau_\mu^{(k)} &\sim \mathcal{N}(0.75, 0.8), \\
 \alpha_\mu &\sim \mathcal{N}(1.5, 0.8), \text{ and} \\
 b_\mu &\sim \mathcal{N}(1.5, 0.8),
 \end{aligned}$$

1652 and the following priors for the group-level standard deviations,

$$\begin{aligned}
\nu_\sigma &\sim \Gamma^{-1}(4, 10), \\
\eta_\sigma^{(1)} &\sim \Gamma^{-1}(4, 10), \\
\eta_\sigma^{(2)} &\sim \Gamma^{-1}(4, 10), \\
\sigma_\sigma &\sim \Gamma^{-1}(4, 10), \\
\tau_\sigma^{(k)} &\sim \Gamma^{-1}(4, 10), \\
\alpha_\sigma &\sim \Gamma^{-1}(4, 10), \text{ and} \\
b_\sigma &\sim \Gamma^{-1}(4, 10),
\end{aligned}$$

1653 where $\Gamma^{-1}(a, b)$ denotes the inverse gamma distribution with shape param-
1654 eter a , and scale parameter b . This particular choice of a and b for the
1655 priors produces a skewed distribution placing weight on appropriate ranges
1656 of the parameters. Specifically, when $a = 4$ and $b = 10$, the prior has an
1657 approximate 95% credible set of (1.14, 9.05), and an expected value of 3.32.
1658 These choices reflect our *a priori* beliefs: we did not expect the between-
1659 subject variability to be less than 1, and felt that larger values would become
1660 increasingly less likely to account for these data.

1661 While our prior selections were informed by other similar modeling appli-
1662 cations (see, e.g., Rodriguez et al., 2014; Turner et al., 2013b), we remained
1663 somewhat conservative in our choices to avoid undue parameter constraint,
1664 because the model structure was considerably different from prior research
1665 using the hierarchical version of the LBA model.

1666 Appendix B. Technical Details of the Bivariate Joint Model

1667 The joint model used in both the EEG and fMRI analyses was equivalent,
1668 although both the neural and behavioral data changed. Where possible, we
1669 kept the behavioral portion of the joint model equal to the behavioral-data-
1670 only model, described above. However, given the joint structure of some
1671 components of the model, the models are not exactly equivalent in the way
1672 they capture the data.

1673 We begin by discussing the neural portion of the joint model. We first
1674 processed the neural data to provide a single-trial measure of neural activity
1675 for each individual subject (see the main text for details). We denote the
1676 neural data on the i th trial for the j th subject in the v th value condition as
1677 $N_{i,j,v}$. Because we folded the data, $v \in \{1, 2, 3\}$, where $v = 3$ when $P_D =$

1678 $\{0.5\}$, $v = 2$ when $P_D = \{0.3, 0.7\}$, and $v = 1$ when $P_D = \{0.1, 0.9\}$. Because
1679 the neural data for each trial is an average, by the central limit theorem,
1680 each $N_{i,j,v}$ is normally distributed. For the $v = 3$ condition, the parameter
1681 ϵ_j captures the mean neural activation. Similar to the η parameters in the
1682 behavioral model, we modeled the difference in neural activation across value
1683 conditions by introducing the variables $\delta_j^{(1)}$ and $\delta_j^{(2)}$ for the $v = 2$ and $v =$
1684 1 value conditions, respectively. We also capture the variability in neural
1685 activation with the parameter ζ_j , which was constrained to be the same
1686 across each value condition. Formally, we assume the neural data for the j th
1687 subject in the v th value condition arise from the following distributions:

$$\begin{aligned} N_{i,j,3} &\sim \mathcal{N}(\epsilon_j, \zeta_j), \\ N_{i,j,2} &\sim \mathcal{N}(\epsilon_j + \delta_j^{(1)}, \zeta_j), \text{ and} \\ N_{i,j,1} &\sim \mathcal{N}(\epsilon_j + \delta_j^{(2)}, \zeta_j). \end{aligned}$$

1688 For each subject, we then assumed the following priors for ϵ_j and ζ_j :

$$\begin{aligned} \epsilon_j &\sim \mathcal{N}(\epsilon_\mu, \epsilon_\sigma), \text{ and} \\ \log(\zeta_j) &\sim \mathcal{N}(\zeta_\mu, \zeta_\sigma). \end{aligned}$$

1689 For the group-level parameters, we specified the following priors for the
1690 group-level means:

$$\begin{aligned} \epsilon_\mu &\sim \mathcal{N}(0, 10), \text{ and} \\ \zeta_\mu &\sim \mathcal{N}(0, 10), \end{aligned} \tag{B.1}$$

1691 and the following priors for the group-level standard deviations

$$\begin{aligned} \epsilon_\sigma &\sim \Gamma^{-1}(7, 90), \text{ and} \\ \zeta_\sigma &\sim \Gamma^{-1}(7, 90). \end{aligned}$$

1692 The principle behind joint modeling is to use both neural and behavioral
1693 data to enforce constraint on a particular cognitive theory (Turner et al.,
1694 2013a; Turner, 2015). In our modeling application, we wish to use the neural
1695 signature across value conditions to constrain the differences in the rate of
1696 accumulation across these value conditions. Following this motivation, we
1697 specify a link between the parameters $\delta_j^{(1)}$ and $\eta_j^{(1)}$, as well as between the

parameters $\delta_j^{(2)}$ and $\eta_j^{(2)}$, by specifying

$$\begin{aligned} \left(\delta_j^{(1)}, \eta_j^{(1)} \right) &\sim \mathcal{N}_2 \left(\phi^{(1)}, \Sigma^{(1)} \right), \text{ and} \\ \left(\delta_j^{(2)}, \eta_j^{(2)} \right) &\sim \mathcal{N}_2 \left(\phi^{(2)}, \Sigma^{(2)} \right), \end{aligned}$$

where $\mathcal{N}_p(a, b)$ represents the multivariate normal distribution of dimension p with mean vector a and variance-covariance matrix b . Note that $\phi^{(k)} = [\delta_\mu^{(k)}, \eta_\mu^{(k)}]$, where $\eta_\mu^{(k)}$ is the critical behavioral model group-level parameter by which we draw a comparison to the behavioral-data-only model (see Figures 7 and 10). Specifying the structure in this way is equivalent to the following specification:

$$\left(\delta_j^{(1)}, \eta_j^{(1)}, \delta_j^{(2)}, \eta_j^{(2)} \right) \sim \mathcal{N}_4 \left(\phi^*, \Sigma^* \right),$$

where

$$\begin{aligned} \phi^* &= [\phi^{(1)}, \phi^{(2)}]^\top = [\delta_\mu^{(1)}, \eta_\mu^{(1)}, \delta_\mu^{(2)}, \eta_\mu^{(2)}]^\top \\ \Sigma^* &= \begin{bmatrix} \Sigma^{(1)} & 0 \\ 0 & \Sigma^{(2)} \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} \left(\delta_\sigma^{(1)} \right)^2 & \delta_\sigma^{(1)} \eta_\sigma^{(1)} \rho_1 & 0 & 0 \\ \delta_\sigma^{(1)} \eta_\sigma^{(1)} \rho_1 & \left(\eta_\sigma^{(1)} \right)^2 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & \left(\delta_\sigma^{(2)} \right)^2 & \delta_\sigma^{(2)} \eta_\sigma^{(2)} \rho_2 \\ 0 & 0 & \delta_\sigma^{(2)} \eta_\sigma^{(2)} \rho_2 & \left(\eta_\sigma^{(2)} \right)^2 \end{bmatrix} \end{aligned}$$

where ρ_1 and ρ_2 are correlation parameters. However, as we will see below, with the appropriate selections for the prior distributions, one can establish a conjugate relationship between the prior and posterior of $\phi^{(k)}$ and $\Sigma^{(k)}$, making the estimation more efficient via Gibbs sampling (Robert and Casella, 2004; Gelman et al., 2004). With the exception of $\eta_j^{(1)}$ and $\eta_j^{(2)}$, all other parameter specifications for the behavioral submodel were equivalent to the behavioral-data-only model presented above.

The final step in constructing the joint model is to specify priors for the hyperparameters $\phi^{(k)}$ and $\Sigma^{(k)}$ for $k \in \{1, 2\}$. Following Turner et al. (2015b), we specified a joint prior on $\phi^{(k)}$ and $\Sigma^{(k)}$ so that

$$p \left(\phi^{(k)}, \Sigma^{(k)} \right) = p \left(\phi^{(k)} | \Sigma^{(k)} \right) p \left(\Sigma^{(k)} \right),$$

1717 where

$$\begin{aligned}\phi^{(k)}|\Sigma^{(k)} &\sim \mathcal{N}_2(\mu_0, s_0^{-1}\Sigma^{(k)}), \text{ and} \\ \Sigma^{(k)} &\sim \mathcal{W}^{-1}(\Phi, d_0),\end{aligned}$$

1718 where $\mathcal{W}^{-1}(a, b)$ denotes the inverse Wishart distribution with dispersion
1719 matrix a and degrees of freedom b . We set d_0 equal to the number of linked
1720 parameters plus two (i.e., $d_0 = 2 + 2 = 4$), Φ is the identity matrix (i.e.,
1721 a matrix containing ones on the diagonal, and zeros on the off diagonal) of
1722 dimension (2×2) , $s_0 = 1/10$, and μ_0 is a vector containing two zeros. These
1723 choices were made to establish a conjugate relationship between the prior and
1724 posterior, so that analytic expressions could be derived for the conditional
1725 distributions of $\phi^{(k)}$ and $\Sigma^{(k)}$, while still specifying uninformative priors.

1726 When estimating the joint posterior distribution of the bivariate model
1727 parameters, we used a combination of Gibbs sampling for the group-level
1728 (Gelman et al., 2004), and differential evolution with Markov chain Monte
1729 Carlo for the subject-level (DE-MCMC; Turner et al., 2013b). For the sub-
1730 ject level estimates, we used 24 chains, and obtained 10,000 samples after a
1731 burn-in period of 10,000 samples. Thus, our estimates of the joint posterior
1732 distributions are based on 240,024 samples. The burn-in period allowed us
1733 to converge quickly to the high-density regions of the posterior distribution,
1734 while the rest of the samples allowed us to improve the reliability of the esti-
1735 mates. Convergence and overall fidelity of the chains were assessed through
1736 visual inspection and the coda package in R (Plummer et al., 2006).

1737 Appendix C. Technical Details of the Trivariate Joint Model

1738 Where possible, the specification of the trivariate model was equivalent
1739 to the bivariate model above. The important difference between these two
1740 models is the additional data structure, with the trivariate model containing
1741 both EEG and fMRI. Using the notation in Figure 1, we denote the EEG
1742 data as $E_{i,j,v}$, and the fMRI data as $F_{i,j,v}$. In the model, we super script the
1743 parameters ϵ_j , ζ_j , $\delta_j^{(1)}$, and $\delta_j^{(2)}$ with an F for the fMRI data and an E for
1744 the EEG data. Hence, we assume the neural data arise from the following

1745 distributions:

$$\begin{aligned}
F_{i,j,3} &\sim \mathcal{N}\left(\epsilon_j^{(F)}, \zeta_j^{(F)}\right), \\
F_{i,j,2} &\sim \mathcal{N}\left(\epsilon_j^{(F)} + \delta_j^{(1,F)}, \zeta_j^{(F)}\right), \\
F_{i,j,1} &\sim \mathcal{N}\left(\epsilon_j^{(F)} + \delta_j^{(2,F)}, \zeta_j^{(F)}\right), \\
E_{i,j,3} &\sim \mathcal{N}\left(\epsilon_j^{(E)}, \zeta_j^{(E)}\right), \\
E_{i,j,2} &\sim \mathcal{N}\left(\epsilon_j^{(E)} + \delta_j^{(1,E)}, \zeta_j^{(E)}\right), \text{ and} \\
E_{i,j,1} &\sim \mathcal{N}\left(\epsilon_j^{(E)} + \delta_j^{(2,E)}, \zeta_j^{(E)}\right).
\end{aligned}$$

1746 The prior structure on $\epsilon_j^{(E)}$, $\epsilon_j^{(F)}$, $\zeta_j^{(E)}$, and $\zeta_j^{(F)}$ for the trivariate model were
1747 identical to the prior structure on ϵ_j and ζ_j in the bivariate model above.
1748 However, in the trivariate model, the linking procedure relating neural and
1749 behavioral submodels is slightly different. Namely, we assume

$$\begin{aligned}
\left(\delta_j^{(1,F)}, \delta_j^{(1,E)}, \eta_j^{(1)}\right) &\sim \mathcal{N}_3\left(\phi^{(1)}, \Sigma^{(1)}\right), \text{ and} \\
\left(\delta_j^{(2,F)}, \delta_j^{(2,E)}, \eta_j^{(2)}\right) &\sim \mathcal{N}_3\left(\phi^{(2)}, \Sigma^{(2)}\right).
\end{aligned}$$

1750 The prior structure on ϕ and Σ in the trivariate model is identical to the
1751 prior structure in the bivariate model above, with the following exceptions:
1752 $d_0 = 3 + 2 = 5$, Φ is the identity matrix of dimension (3×3) , and μ_0 is a
1753 vector containing three zeros.

1754 When estimating the joint posterior distribution of the trivariate model
1755 parameters, we ran our sampling algorithm with 24 chains for 20,000 samples
1756 after a burnin period of 10,000 samples, and then thinned the samples by re-
1757 taining every other iteration. This process helped to reduce autocorrelation
1758 in the chains, which we suspected would arise due to the high dimensionality
1759 of the model. Hence, the estimates of the posterior distribution of the trivari-
1760 ate model were also based on 240,024 samples, to maintain consistency with
1761 the bivariate models. Convergence and overall fidelity of the chains were as-
1762 sessed through visual inspection and the coda package in R (Plummer et al.,
1763 2006).