The militarization of islands and migration: tracing human mobility through US bases in the Caribbean and the Pacific

Corresponding Author

Emily Mitchell-Eaton^b

Authors

Jenna M. Loyd^a

Emily Mitchell-Eaton^b

Alison Mountz^c

- a. University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, Zilber School of Public Health and Urban Studies Program, 1240 N. 10th St., PO Box 413, Milwaukee, WI 53201-0413, jloyd@uwm.edu
- b. Syracuse University, Department of Geography, 144 Eggers Hall, Syracuse, NY 13244, USA, emmitche@syr.edu, 1-585-507-5886
- c. Wilfrid Laurier University, Balsillie School of International Affairs and Geography, 67 Erb Street West, Waterloo, ON N2L 6C2, Canada, amountz@wlu.ca

Acknowledgements

We thank everyone who participated in this research by sharing their time and insights. We are grateful to staff members at the Micronesian Area Research Center at the University of Guam, the Carter and Reagan Presidential Libraries, and the National Archives. This material is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation under Award #0847133 (Principal Investigator: Alison Mountz).

INTRODUCTION

Two persistent criticisms of President Barack Obama's administration were the ongoing imprisonment of 'foreign enemy combatants' on the United States (US) Guantánamo Bay Naval Base in Cuba and maintenance of historically high levels of non-citizen detention and deportation. These are seemingly disconnected issues, one concerning war powers and the other domestic policy. Both tend to be read as exceptional to American ideals of respect for the rule of law and inclusion. Yet historical examination of the basis – and bases (Vine, 2009) – of detention across US mainland and non-mainland territories reveals an intertwined history of militarization and “gradated zones of sovereignty” embedded in imperial formations (Stoler, 2013: 8; also see Benton, 2010). Indeed, islands have long functioned as grounds for national projects of migration control and exclusion *through* enforcement and detention in remote locations where jurisdiction and lack of autonomy make legal status and asylum seeking complex.

In this article, we bring imperialism and militarization into contemporary understandings of migration control and border studies by centering islands and US territories in our analysis. We emphasize both the historical and spatial continuities at work on islands in the confinement of people and their mobility. Within literatures on imperialism, colonialism, and empire, we observe the repetition of geographical patterns, including militarization, confinement, exceptionalism, and dispossession. Although processes of colonial and neocolonial control do not happen solely on islands, islands figure centrally in government efforts to control territory and human mobility (e.g., Burnett, 2005; Kaplan, 2006; Bastos, 2008; Vine, 2009; Lipman, 2012).

Taking a longer view of recent detention of asylum seekers on islands enables us to historicize two assertions that are frequently made in discussion of contemporary migration

control practices and uses of islands. First, we demonstrate a long-standing connection between US military operations abroad and US immigration at home. We ground this argument especially in discussion of the evacuation of Vietnamese refugees through Guam in 1975. Second, we show that military bases are located and maintained not only to exercise regional control, deter state aggression, and protect trade routes, but also to police the mobility of migrants and asylum-seekers. We ground this argument in discussion of Haitian asylum seekers detained in the Caribbean in the 1980s and 1990s. In so doing, we extend work by scholars of feminist geopolitics who argue that greater attention be paid to finer scales and marginalized groups to understand international relations (e.g., Hyndman, 2004; Sharp, 2004). This approach and these histories thereby provide insight into longstanding connections between US geopolitics and migration control efforts.

We accomplish our analysis by drawing on Ann Stoler's (2013) conceptualization of ruination, which we suggest enables careful inquiry into the relationships between colonial and imperial past and present. The heuristic of "colonial legacy," whereby the colonial past shapes the present, prevents us from grappling with how "imperial formations persist in their material debris, in ruined landscapes and through the social ruination of people's lives" (2013: 10). By contrast, *ruination* functions as "an active, ongoing process that allocates imperial debris differentially and *ruin* as a violent verb [...] unites apparently disparate moments, places, and objects" (2013: 7). Working with the concept of ruination enables us to connect apparently discrete moments when histories of US colonial territorial control combine with imperial geopolitical conflicts over human mobility in the form of humanitarian militarization (Williams, 2014). Rather than being understood as exceptional to or departure from military or border violence, migration operations narrated as humanitarian relate to and facilitate state violence.

Map 1. *Strategic Map of Our War With Spain*, 1898. (Source: Library of Congress)

Baldacchino and Milne (2006) coined the term “subnational island jurisdiction” to characterize the complex array of jurisdictions and degrees of sovereignty. An important insight from scholarship in island studies involves the complexity of island governance and status, alongside the observation that spatial forms of territorial control on islands rehearse longstanding forms of imperialism and empire at work everywhere. While we use the term *offshore* in this article, we work to problematize the term for its connotation of disconnection and exceptionalism. Island territories have complicated histories and forms of imperial belonging, exemplifying what Benton calls “disaggregated and uneven sovereignty” (2010: 30). The islands we discuss hold distinct territorial status as a result of multiple colonial histories of occupation and dispossession.

In order to provide historical context that can deepen understandings of contemporary domestic and transnational carceral landscapes (Mountz & Loyd, 2014), we draw on data collected during field research conducted from 2010 to 2013 for a project funded by the National Science Foundation. Qualitative methods proved necessary and appropriate for examination of migration and detention on islands due to the incomplete, dynamic, and often inaccurate reporting of statistics on marine and land interception and detention (Mountz, 2011). The research examined struggles over migration and asylum on islands where the United States, Australia, and Italy carry out “processing” and detention. Fieldwork was carried out by a team of researchers who conducted two field seasons in each of three field sites (Australia, Italy, and Guam and Saipan) and archival research on US and Australian policies. Research methods included over 200 semi-structured interviews, participant-observation that generated several hundred pages of fieldnotes, and extensive archival research. Researchers operationalized these

methods to examine specific histories of boat migrations and subsequent development of carceral spaces on islands and mainland territories, with particular attention to issues of access to sovereign territory and the right to seek asylum. Data analysis involved collaborative, inductive thematic coding using qualitative data analysis software.

In this article, we argue that the confinement of people on island bases, whether narrated as humanitarian rescue, migration management, refugee resettlement, or border enforcement, involves ruination that impairs human possibility and erodes access to rights. Furthermore, the government's categorization of people – as refugees, displaced, detainees, or migrants – informs the naming of these spaces, the administrative and legal processes to which they are subjected, and their treatment (by local communities, federal authorities, media, and law). In order to develop this argument, we first discuss contemporary scholarship on islands, sovereign power, imperialism, and empire. This discussion sets the stage for examination of islands as sites of US territorial control. In these places, the US carried out federal operations both to facilitate large-scale movements of refugees en route to resettlement and to deter asylum seekers who have arrived and made a claim for protection based on a well-founded fear of persecution if returned home (according to the 1951 *Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees* and its 1967 *Protocol*). In our next two sections, we illustrate these intersecting forces of militarization and humanitarianism through examination of Cold War histories of civilian mobility, first on the Pacific islands of Guam and Saipan and then in US migration enforcement operations at sea, the island territory of Puerto Rico, and on foreign territory in the Caribbean. In the final two sections of the paper, we analyze findings from these two regions, offering conclusions that address the importance, implications, and subsequent lines of inquiry that our findings engender.

MILITARIZATION AND RUINATION: CONTAINING HUMAN MOBILITY ON ISLANDS

There is growing appreciation for the colonial and neo-colonial work done on islands as sites that prove central to understanding contemporary forms of imperialism, empire, and what Gregory (2004) identifies as the colonial present (e.g., Perera, 2002; Burnett, 2005; Bastos, 2008; Vine, 2009). Indeed, territorial control of islands has produced a bewildering array of partial forms of governance and complex jurisdiction on islands (Steinberg, 2005; Baldacchino & Milne, 2006; Benton, 2010). Recurring themes of emergency and exception (Agamben, 2005) characterize much contemporary scholarship on colonialism, imperialism, and migration. As counterpoint, Stoler argues for sustained inquiry into “less dramatic durabilities of duress that imperial formations produce as ongoing, persistent features of their ontologies” (2013: 5; also see Benton, 2010).

Consistent with topological imaginings of the work done by sovereign power to make and remake spaces through the law (Gregory, 2007), Stoler understands the process of ruination as actively creating conditions for degradation, exploitation, and waste. As a concept that builds well on geographers' explorations of topological remakings, ruination enables us to “refocus on the *connective tissue* that continues to bind human potentials to degraded environments” (ibid.: 7, emphasis in original). Ruined ecologies are the places that “people are *left with*: [...] what remains blocking livelihoods and health, [...] the aftershocks of imperial assault, [and] the social afterlife of structures, sensibilities, and things” (ibid.: 9, emphasis in original). We find these processes of ruination at work on islands where the US government uses its military facilities to immobilize and diminish the legal and political personhood of people who have been violently displaced from their countries of origin. As such, ruination extends Stoler's and Gregory's efforts

to connect colonial past with colonial present as places are continually remade.

While Guantánamo Bay, Abu Ghraib, and Diego Garcia recur in the literature as iconic sites of exception through which to study contemporary forms of American empire (e.g., Butler, 2004; Kaplan, 2005; Reid-Henry, 2007; Gregory, 2007; Sidaway, 2010; Dastyari & Effeney, 2012), many other islands and US military bases form the material basis for empire, extending influence and reach into remote geostrategic regions (Davis 2011, 2015; Vine 2009, 2012). “Military organizing logics,” according to Shigematsu and Camacho (2010), also bear the mark of successive colonialisms, relationships that have been particularly pernicious on islands (Bastos, 2008; Camacho, 2012; Espiritu, 2014).

Gregory (2004) connects colonial histories to contemporary conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Palestine. Gregory (2007) and other scholars have also traced these relationships through the contours of military spaces and island geographies. Kaplan (2005; 2007), for example, maps continuities between Cuba’s colonial past and present, wherein Guantánamo Bay represents a clear expression of cycles of occupation, conflict, and territorial control. Burnett (2005) locates the Pacific island of Palmyra as the only incorporated territory where US constitutional law applies. She traces its history through the Guanos Islands Act, an imperial move that granted Americans powers to claim uninhabited islands with phosphate rich guano (bird feces). Vine (2009) traces collusion of US and UK authorities in the removal of Chagossians (British citizens) from Diego Garcia to construct a vast US naval base that became a key platform in US action in ‘the war on terror.’ Central to this history was the US “strategic island concept,” imagined by US civil servant Stu Barber and developed into a strategy to utilize islands as sites from which a US sphere of influence would emanate during post-WWII decolonization, a time when global perceptions understood US hegemony to be in decline.

The concepts of ruination and imperial formation productively recast recent scholarship on sovereignty. Building on Carl Schmitt's (1985) work on sovereignty and exceptionalism, Giorgio Agamben (1998) argues that the blurred thresholds between inside and out have proven central to understanding modern forms of sovereignty and management of populations. In line with Agamben's (1998, 2005) conceptualization of the juridical construction of the camp as state of exception, *islands* can be understood as important sites where sovereign power works productively to blur inside and out, include through exclusion, through sovereign and non-sovereign territorial status (Baldacchino & Milne, 2006). The work of sovereign blurring of inside and out is well-established not only in political geography, but in the literature on migration control (Minca, 2007; Mountz, 2010). Coleman (2007), for example, demonstrates how US immigration policy works at the intersection of domestic and foreign policy. He shows how US federal authorities moved beyond US jurisdiction attached to sovereign territory and into foreign territory of Mexico to police migrants en route to the US, practices that simultaneously police the "interior" spaces of US mainland territory that are distant from the boundary between Mexico and the United States.

Influenced by Agamben, political geographers have increasingly studied constellations of sovereign, semi-sovereign, and non-sovereign sites in order to understand creative exercises in territorial control (Sparke, 2005; Gregory, 2007; Minca, 2007). Like authorities, migrants move through a panoply of overlapping jurisdictions and legal regimes as they make transnational journeys across multiple countries, borders, and intersections of land and sea (Walters, 2008; Pickering, 2014; Mountz & Loyd, 2014). Like political geographers writing about the productive configurations of sovereign power on land and at sea, migration scholars are drawing out the constellation of sites of control that thwart access to sovereign territory (Collyer, 2007; Mountz,

2011; Pickering, 2014). Migration control carried out on islands connects what lies within and beyond sovereign territory through the historical and contemporary movement of control practices and controlled populations. There, forms of militarized territorial control, sovereign, and biopolitical power intersect to rework the status of place and people. These fragmented geographies are consistent with histories of European imperialism understood as spatially elastic, legal relationships (Benton, 2010).

Given the recurrence of so-called exception, we, like Benton (2010), question whether the concept usefully explains the blurred geographies of sovereignty. We suggest that ruination provides a conceptual rubric to explain the accumulation of similar, though by no means identical, practices of sovereignty. Namely, ruination as a process redraws sovereign boundaries by re-enacting forms of territorial control that extend the endurance of ruinous ecologies and racialized forms of population control. Stoler (2013: 8) introduces the concept of “gradated sovereignty” alongside imperial formation and ruination:

Working with the concept of imperial formation rather than empire per se shifts emphasis from fixed forms of sovereignty and its denials to *gradated forms* of sovereignty and what has long marked the technologies of imperial rule – sliding and contested scales of differential access and rights. Imperial formations are defined by racialized relations of allocations and appropriations. Unlike empires, they are processes of becoming, not fixed things. Not least, they are states of deferral that mete out promissory notes that are not exceptions to their operation but constitutive of them: imperial guardianship, trusteeships, delayed autonomy, temporary intervention, conditional tutelage, military takeover in the name of humanitarian works, violent intervention in the name of human rights, and security measures in the name of peace.

Understanding the making of imperial formations through ruination enables us to understand how technologies of gradated sovereignty – such as joint civilian-military refugee resettlement operations, temporary safe haven, and carceral asylum practices – remake subjects, subjectivities, and spaces of migration control. These imperial formations take the shape of gradated and racially differentiated citizenship, legally codified by the 1901 Insular Cases, which applied a logic of racial inferiority to restrict citizenship rights to residents of certain US overseas territories (Torruella, 2007) and administrative categorizations of refugees and economic migrants that are used to rationalize differential responses to human mobility.

Islands with histories of migration and struggles over territoriality lay the groundwork for contemporary rounds of securitization of migration. Island imaginaries, which mobilize ideas about control, displacement, dispossession, invisibility, and insularity (Perara, 2002; Davis, 2005), prove central to these maneuvers. Orientalizing discourses *about* islands locate them in the geographical imagination as remote (e.g., Schalansky, 2009) places where unusual things happen (Taussig, 2004). As a result, discourses *about* islands often advance narratives of exceptionalism and exoticism (Davis, 2015). Yet, adding to the contributions of scholars of feminist geopolitics, these discourses are not the same as life on the ground. Attention to these islands as lived spaces reveals the historical and geographical contingency of militarization and geopolitics alike.

Themes of emergency and exceptionalism characterize enforcement responses to contemporary migration by boat, exemplified most recently by Mediterranean and Indian Ocean crossings. Government authorities also use exceptionalism to exploit island geographies. In this context, technologies of biopolitical control intersect productively with practices of migration management and discourses of humanitarianism to produce regulatory subjectivities, such as the

stateless, the undocumented, and the refugee (Lipman, 2012). These sites form a “carceral archipelago of empire” (Stoler, 2013: 22) that illustrates “a principle of managed mobilities, mobilizing and immobilizing populations, dislocating and relocating peoples according to a set of changing rules and hierarchies that orders social kinds” (Stoler, 2011). The actual space where these shifting determinations transpire “is not demarcated once and for all. Its borders shift as do the means to secure them” (ibid.).

While humanitarianism and militarization are narrated as exceptional to the norms of liberal subjectivity and civilian rule of law, a longer historical perspective underscores that these are ongoing, related processes that constitute differentiated legal relationships and spaces. Militarization, following Geyer, is the “contradictory and tense social process in which civil society organizes itself for the production of violence” (1989: 79). Approached from the perspective that Neocleous advances wherein war power and police power are “predicative on one another” (2014: 13), militarized operations draw on martial symbols, ideologies, technologies, and practices to re-constitute civilian and military relations, police and war operations. The struggle over the use of military spaces, personnel, or weaponry for war-making or ostensibly civilian or humanitarian operations, then, can be understood both as a struggle over the legitimate deployment of violence and over the remaking of relationships between domestic and foreign, civilian and military spaces. As such, the militarization of the US-Mexico border in the 1980s and 1990s (Dunn, 1996), can be understood as one contested moment and place where formally separate military and civilian branches of government long have been deployed together to address human mobility (c.f. Loyd, 2014).

In this article, then, we build upon these histories of US imperialism and militarization of islands, migration, and refugee operations in two key regions and historical moments: the Pacific

island of Guam in the 1970s, and Puerto Rico and the Caribbean in the 1980s and 1990s. Though we center these particular moments, long-standing imperial and colonial histories laid the geopolitical and legal groundwork for such militarized migration operations to occur. We argue that humanitarian rescue – whether cast in terms of refugee resettlement operations or militarized border enforcement – is itself a form of ruination. While narrated as rescue, these operations consolidate related processes of destruction through dispossession (political, economic, and military destruction of home, belonging, property, rights) or death (loss of life at sea, in detention, or through forcible return). The military and civilian resources mobilized to intercept and detain at sea and on land remake places, though these processes are by no means unidirectional, inevitable, or permanent. Local and transnational groups push back, and these negotiations feature centrally in the histories we rehearse about US use of Pacific and Caribbean island territories to organize and deter migration.

Pacific

At the close of the Spanish American War in 1898, Spain ‘ceded’ Puerto Rico, Guam, and many other island territories to the United States in an inter-colonial agreement, the Treaty of Paris. The regions of the Pacific and Caribbean thereby are linked in shared imperial formation through similar processes of militarism, (re)occupation, dispossession, and resistance that shape events occurring over three quarters of a century later. Although largely overlooked in dominant narratives of the geopolitics of US migration, US military bases in these colonized spaces figure as key sites in the history of US migration control.

At the official close of the Vietnam War, the US military transferred some 130,000 Vietnamese refugees to the US mainland from April to September of 1975 through Operation

Baby Life, Operation Frequent Wind, and Operation New Life (Army After Action Report, Operation New Life, 1977). As Nguyen (2012) explains, the framing of the displaced as beneficiaries of US humanitarian rescue constituted an immense ideological feat, as the US military was perpetrating the very war from which those refugee subjects ostensibly were being saved. The production of the refugee as the privileged (and thus indebted) beneficiary of US benevolence would become central to the working of what Nguyen terms ‘liberal empire.’ Such benevolence underscored the necessity of US humanitarian militarism and the utilization of its colonial and imperial geography.

The vast majority of Vietnamese refugees were transferred through Guam, and the military also used Wake Island, Hawai’i, and the Philippines in its operations (as depicted in the photograph in Figure 1). All of these sites were current or former US territories and hosted the US military’s most active bases at the time. Why did the US military deem these specific territories and bases suitable for the “processing” and detention of upwards of 130,000 refugees? First, pre-existing on-site military personnel and spaces were pivotal to the success of these operations. On Guam, military rhetoric relied upon a naturalizing logic of administrative know-how, territorial capacity, and proximity to Vietnam (Interview, Guam, July 2012; Army After Action Report, 1977). Thus, Guam and other Pacific Islands were not only considered tactically ‘suitable’ by the military for refugee detention, but were also legally accessible to the military for this use because of the islands’ preexisting incorporation into US colonial geography (Davis, 2011). In other words, the colonial status of Guam and other US territorial islands was a precondition to their inclusion in the range of sites the US mobilized for use in refugee operations.

	CAPACITY	CURRENT POPULATION	DEPARTED PAST 24 HOURS	PROJECTED OUT NEXT 24 HOURS	AWAITING REPATRIATION
WAKE	40,000	24,492	370	1,23	1471
SEIC	8,000	78	0	0	42
ENROUTE	100,000	0	0	0	0
SEA AIR	6,000	0	0	0	0
CAMP PENDLETON	15,500	1,067	275	300	208
FORT CRAPPER	29,000	22,836	209	300	211
HOLIN AFB	5,428	4,252	152	100	43
INHANTOWN GAP M.R.	15,000	14,296	206	15	18
IN HAMTOWN	19,000				

Fig. 1. Refugee resettlement discussions on Guam, 1975. (Source: Micronesia Area Research Center, University of Guam)

By May 7, 1975, after Vietnamese refugees had been transported from Saigon to Guam by cargo ship and airlifts, twelve refugee camps had been established on the island. The largest among these were Asan Beach, Tin City at Anderson Air Force Base, and Tent City at Orote Point, whose refugee population peaked at just over 39,000 (Army After Action Report, 1977). Each of these sites had been previously used by the US military in some capacity. Tin City, for example, was a former army barracks. Asan Beach was a housing facility for civilian contractors, which had been condemned due to unsafe conditions prior to being repurposed as a refugee camp. Orote Point, located in the US Naval Station, was commemorated in official parlance as a site where the US liberated Guam from Japanese occupation during World War II (Army After

Action Report, 1977; Espiritu, 2014). In total, the arrivals constituted a fifty percent increase in Guam's population at the time.

While exerting a great deal of power over these spaces, the US military nonetheless was constrained in its use of base infrastructure for refugee resettlement operations. Two and a half decades had passed since the enactment of the Guam Organic Act of 1950, after much contestation and debate. The Organic Act is the US federal law that established Guam as a US unincorporated territory and transferred political authority from the US Navy to the US Department of Interior. In many ways, the implementation of the Organic Act set the terms for ongoing struggles over governance between the island administration and the federal government, particularly over the military's continuing expansion and appropriation of land for training, testing, and housing facilities.

Because of residents' concerns over resource constraints, local politicians had to garner their support by framing refugee transfers as a matter of humanitarian need, rather than one of military strategy. However, a series of news articles from April 1975 exposes the contingency of the US military's use of Guam to process refugees. At a town hall meeting, Governor Ricky Bordallo called local rumors of a food shortage "emotional, irrational reactions" (Elliott, 1975). When asked by residents why he was bringing refugees to Guam, Bordallo responded, "I am not bringing in the refugees. The U.S. government is bringing them in. Our government is merely recognizing its commitment to freedom and democracy." He then conceded that, "No doubt, there [would be] some inconvenience." The governor also stressed that "Guam [was] just a staging area and that the military was responsible for full logistical support."

Bordallo's statement obscures the colonial basis of the military's presence on Guam, situating Guam's geopolitical relationship with the United States as a reciprocal, mutually

beneficial relationship. It also frames the military base as an exceptional site, as if it were detached somehow from the island of itself, which simultaneously obscures Guam's centrality to the US military presence in the region. The notion of bases as detached from the island spaces they occupy is intimately connected to the framing of island residents as themselves 'detachable' and movable (Vine, 2009; Kothari & Wilkinson, 2010). Islanders are often perceived through the imperialist gaze of the US military as transplantable, having no connection to their specific island of origin. Occupied islands are similarly treated as interchangeable. As a result, the US military's use of non-sovereign islands for the confinement and "processing" of refugees who are themselves being produced as transplantable is naturalized from the vantage point of the military and federal government agencies involved.

In Guam, as in other base sites, local concerns over the military's ability to materially provide for refugees and detainees, and to prevent them from moving beyond the base confines, were soon papered over by the discourse that resettlement was a humanitarian effort. Many local politicians claimed that these operations would enable Guam to repay a debt owed to the US for its 'liberation' of Guam from Japanese occupation after WWII. This logic would be reiterated years later by President Clinton in recognizing Guam's "willing[ness] to share land" in service of the US pursuit of peace in the region (Guam Centennial Video, 1998). Such paternalistic tropes of humanitarian gratitude, Nguyen (2012) and Espiritu (2014) emphasize, not only constructed Vietnamese refugees as owing subjects, but also worked to rehabilitate the US as a caring nation.

Nevertheless, it must be underscored that the public response on Guam to yet another military "repurposing" was not unified. The public statements made by Governor Bordallo contrast with other popular responses to the military's use of the island for refugee resettlement. These include both xenophobic reactions to the Vietnamese refugees as well as concerns for

refugees' health and safety in the camps (Interview, Guam, July, 2012). Additionally, a number of local residents supported the Vietnamese repatriate movement (Lipman, 2012; Interview, Guam, July, 2012). Such challenges to the increasingly dominant narrative of military humanitarianism were often, and continue to be, paired with broader criticisms of US occupation of the island (Bevacqua, 2014).

However, some local support for the military's use of the island is still evident in public discourse on Guam. This support is at times premised upon the memory of the Vietnamese refugee operations. In interviews and media statements, many of Guam's public officials have pointed to historical refugee operations on Guam as evidence of the island's capacity for expanded populations (i.e. refugees, asylum-seekers, or military troops) and military operations. Amid recent debates over a proposed military build-up on Guam, which would transfer up to 5,000 Marines (US Department of the Navy, 2014) as well as live-fire training operations to the island, a former immigration officer from Guam commented that the Vietnamese refugee operations of the 1970s could, and perhaps should, be used as fodder to support the pro-build-up position (Interview, Guam, July 2012). As the former immigration officer explained:

[Y]ou know, when they were talking about the Marines coming to Guam and there was just 8,000 and I hear all the local people making bad comments, good and bad comments, how they're going to cope with this. So when they were talking about, "Oh, how are we going to deal with this?" Historically, we have dealt with it. We have. I'm not sure why the short memory, but we have dealt with it. So and I said that to the governor, this new governor. I said, "Governor, here's something that you can use when you have to make a fight for your position" (Interview, Guam, July 2012).

These arguments show the material and discursive durability of the militarized refugee operations, reanimating the logics and physical sites of those operations in service of furthering military projects. As Stoler suggests, “Ruins draw on residual pasts to make claims on futures” (2013: 21).

The refugee operations of the 1970s in the Pacific, which were premised upon the US military’s ability to ‘island-hop’ through legal jurisdictions and colonial sites, serve as material and discursive precedent to contemporary US military base siting strategies. Such strategies are exemplified in US military use of islands worldwide as the US expands its ‘empire of bases’ (Camacho, 2012) to more than 1,000 base locations globally. Vine (2012) refers to the military’s practice of ‘island-hopping’ as the ‘lily-pad strategy,’ borrowing from the military’s own vernacular. He identifies ‘lily pad’ bases as “small, secretive, inaccessible facilities with limited numbers of troops, spartan amenities, and prepositioned weaponry and supplies,” a base model increasingly used by the US military in offshore operations (Vine, 2012: para. 8). Understanding the ‘lily-pad’ logic makes it clearer how islands, bases, and other remote sites become central to the transiting and detention of other ostensibly transplantable populations, including refugees and asylum-seekers. As these populations are moved *through* base networks, islands and other base communities become sites in US imperial formation.

However, sustained local resistance to becoming part of such networks can trigger a rerouting of the military’s circuitry through other sites and communities. Espiritu (2014) explains that the US turned to its Guam facilities after the Government of Philippines refused to allow more refugees to pass through Clark Air Force Base. As Lipman (2012), Stoler (2013), and others emphasize, military and imperial operations are never given; they are always constrained and challenged by a range of subjects and factors. For Lipman, such contingency has a “double-

edgedness”: “On the one hand, contingency refutes a preordained future and emphasizes the possibility of both agency and chance, while on the other hand, contingency implies dependence and interrelationship—one event or action is of course contingent on the next” (2012: 2).

Understanding this ‘doubled-edged’ nature of contingency not only illuminates contestations over militarized spaces, but also alerts us to moments of decolonial resistance (Davis, 2011; 2015).

Caribbean

In 1980, only five years after the resettlement of Indochinese refugees through Guam, a new migration ‘crisis’ unfolded 9,000 miles away in the Caribbean. Some of the same military bases on the US mainland used in 1975 were put back to work to confine and resettle new groups of people. Over a six-month period in 1980, 125,000 Cuban nationals and 15,000 Haitian nationals arrived in Florida by boat. To process “Cuban-Haitian entrants,” as the federal government categorized some of these migrants, the US relied on a network of civilian and military spaces in Florida, Arkansas, Pennsylvania, Indiana, and Wisconsin. President Jimmy Carter and subsequent administrations committed to a two-pronged policy of deterrence to prevent another “migration emergency.” The first prong relied on detention. The second prong entailed interception at sea and confinement offshore. Repurposed and active US military facilities were fundamental elements of this strategy. This military infrastructure knit together the inside and outside of sovereign territory into dispersed imperial formation.

This strategy was distinctly racialized, as Stoler suggests (also see Loyd, 2015). Krome is perhaps the best known, and most infamous, of these sites (detailed by Dow, 2004; Lipman, 2013). Krome North and South had been Nike missile bases built soon after the 1962 Cuban

missile crisis, and then decommissioned in 1974. As Lipman (2013: 119) writes, the Florida National Guard member charged with locating facilities for housing Cuban refugees was surprised that the government decided to use the facilities at Krome: “[I]n my oral report I told my Commanding Officer that the mosquitoes would be impossible to control ... This place sucked even for Army personnel. Mosquitoes kept on coming even in the sunlight.”

Cuban asylum seekers initially were held at the Krome North site, while Haitian asylum seekers were confined in overcrowded military barracks at Krome South, miles away from Miami. While both groups faced terrible conditions, they proved worse for Haitians, who soon were the only group at Krome North (Cubans were either resettled or transferred to another federal facility). In September 1980, the Dade County Department of Public Health sued the federal government and ordered closure of the facility for several health violations: inadequate sewage and water systems, dirty portable toilets, severe overcrowding in residential facilities, signs of rodent infestations, locked fire exits, and inadequate laundry facilities (Dade County Department of Public Health, unpublished letter). The lawsuit added to election-year pressures faced by President Carter and governors in Florida and Arkansas, where Cuban entrants whom the government could not resettle (legally or logistically) were confined.

In response to local political concerns about the increase in arrival of Haitian nationals, the INS had implemented the Haitian Program in 1978, which featured mass asylum hearings and mandatory detention. Advocates sued the federal government over its discriminatory treatment of Haitian nationals and won the case. Rather than end detention, President Ronald Reagan's administration issued an executive order that required the confinement of *all* asylum seekers while their claims were being adjudicated. The INS was then not in the practice of operating long-term detention facilities. The practice of mandatory detention meant that the INS

had to locate or construct space for detention. In April 1981, the INS surveyed jails in Florida, federal Bureau of Prisons facilities, and seven military sites, including Krome North and South; Eglin Air Force Base (AFB) near Fort Walton, Florida; Ellington AFB near Houston, Texas; Hamilton AFB near San Francisco, California; Craig AFB near Selma, Alabama; and a former Naval radar site near Roanoke Rapids, North Carolina (General Accounting Office, 1983).

Many of the sites that met the INS's criteria for housing and perimeter security were not politically feasible. Repeatedly, local communities and their elected city, state, and federal officials objected to INS proposals to use neighboring military facilities for detention. Some cited environmental issues. The City Manager for Roanoke Rapids, North Carolina, for example, wrote to explain that there were "several problems in taking this action – the lack of an adequate sewage system serving the proposed site is only one" (Hurlocker, unpublished letter). He went on to discuss the county's high rate of unemployment and concern that refugees would add to the county's heavy social service burden. In 1981, Texas Congressman Ron Paul held a hearing attended by 200 people regarding the use of Ellington AFB. One woman in attendance said: "I don't want to see my house robbed or homosexuality brought in" (*Port Arthur News*, 1981). She further predicted: "If you bring them in here you're opening a can of worms I don't want to see my children or my neighbors raped or murdered." Indeed, racism, homophobia, and xenophobia were not uncommon. The Ku Klux Klan held a rally outside of Fort Chaffee, where Cuban entrants were confined in central west Arkansas, and this crisis has been cited as significant in Governor Bill Clinton losing the governorship that year (Sartori, 2001; Maddux, 2005).

Given this degree of opposition on the mainland, the territorial status of Puerto Rico perhaps appeared to offer greater latitude for the White House. Carter began to pursue the use of Fort Allen, near Ponce, Puerto Rico for detaining Haitians. But as on the mainland, the plan

faced opposition; the Commonwealth and municipalities in Puerto Rico successfully sued to block the base's use. President Carter, in turn, issued Executive Order 12244, which exempted the base from the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, the Clean Air Act, the Noise Control Act, and the Solid Waste Disposal Act (Steenland, unpublished letter). A GAO investigation into the detention of Haitian asylum seekers questioned the use of this facility, noting that it "would not provide easy access for attorney advocates and voluntary agencies" and that there was the possibility of "terrorist acts" by Puerto Rican nationalists (GAO, 1983: 26).

When Reagan entered office, his administration announced it would transfer Haitian asylum seekers to Fort Allen in August 1981. Given the legal injunction, Reagan sent Associate Attorney General Rudolph Giuliani to negotiate with the governor of Puerto Rico. The deal they struck would reduce the number of people who could be confined there to 800 (GAO, 1983: 30; Giuliani, unpublished letter). Local pushback did not stop, though. Some months later, the mayor of San Juan, Hernan Padilla, wrote to US Attorney General William French Smith, "to alert you and the Reagan administration to potential problems that may occur at some future time if immediate actions are not taken by the Federal government to improve the living conditions for the Fort Allen refugees"

Padilla's letter is compelling for capturing the complex mix of colonial negotiation and terms of humanitarianism at play. He explained that he had supported the transfer from overcrowded conditions at Krome as a "humanitarian gesture to our neighbors in the Caribbean, and because I realized the urgent need of the Reagan administration to find an alternative location for the Haitian refugees." Padilla went on to explain how the initial opposition by Puerto Ricans to the transfer of Haitian refugees faded as "the Puerto Rican people were able to view first-hand the political, economic and social plight of these people." Similar to the terms of

responsibility invoked in Guam by Governor Bordallo and some residents, Padilla explained that “there grew a greater recognition of the responsibility of Puerto Rico to assist the Federal government in this matter.”

Yet, this sense of humanitarian obligation also contributed to a growing “outcry over the living conditions at Fort Allen, including charges of human rights violations.” Indeed, Padilla wrote, the “public image of Fort Allen today is one of a Federal government-sponsored prison or concentration camp, with severe environmental problems and living conditions not suitable for human habitation.” He situated this image problem within the broader geopolitical context of the Caribbean basin. “At a time when we are strongly condemning the oppressive actions of other governments, we want to avoid similar criticism from other nations. As a Puerto Rican, as an American citizen, I do not want this issue to become an embarrassment [sic] to the Nation, to Puerto Rico or to the Reagan Administration.”

Padilla’s use of the term refugee is notable considering that the Carter and Reagan administrations assiduously avoided calling Haitian asylum seekers refugees, and instead classified them as economic migrants, illegal immigrants, and for a time Cuban-Haitian entrants. Moreover, his careful tracing of gradated sovereignties does not exemplify what we might call gradated responsibility, but rather multiple, perhaps cumulative, claims to responsibility for fellow Caribbean residents, as Puerto Ricans, colonial subjects, and American citizens.

The use of Fort Allen to confine Haitians was short-lived, closing in less than two years, after which negotiations turned toward its joint military and civilian prison use (Quirós, unpublished letter). In the next decade, the US military base at Guantánamo Bay became central to its efforts to prevent migration to Florida. Following the 1994 coup against popular left Haitian president Jean-Bertrand Aristide, Haitian refugees once again fled by boat, and once

again were intercepted by US Coast Guard ships. By July 1994, over 16,000 Haitians were being provided “safe haven” at Guantánamo (Koh, 1994). Meanwhile, another large group of 30,000 Cubans left the country after Castro announced that he would allow them to leave. But, departing from the Cold War welcome the US largely had extended to Cubans, this group of asylum seekers would not be allowed to reach Florida. By August 1994, 23,000 Cubans also were confined on Guantánamo.

The segregation between Haitians and Cubans at Guantánamo echoed that at Krome in 1980, but the space of this offshore operation proved significantly different. As the base grew increasingly crowded, the US looked even farther afield—not to mainland military bases as in the early 1980s—but to other US military facilities and other sovereign nations in the Caribbean. The US began to construct additional “safe haven” camps in Antigua, Dominica, St. Lucia, Suriname, and the Turks and Caicos, and used space on a US military base in Panama to confine 9,000 Cubans (Koh, 1994: 154-55).

On ruination, contingency, and pushback

The connection between US militarization in the Caribbean and Pacific is rooted in a shared history of nineteenth century imperial conquest, and in the more recent repurposing of these spaces from their World War II and Cold War uses. Understood through the analytical lens of imperial ruination, the US was able to engage in war in Vietnam not only because of its colonial acquisitions in the Pacific nearly a century before, but because its colonial acquisitions in the Pacific and Caribbean were linked to those on the US mainland, creating a trans-regional scale of US empire. A compelling illustration of this point is the (re)use of Fort Chaffee, a military installation in Arkansas, to resettle Vietnamese and Cuban refugees in 1975 and 1980

respectively. Fort Chaffee and neighboring Fort Smith are located on the former border of the US and Indian Territories, an area pivotal to the oversight of the territories and eventual establishment of US sovereignty in what is now the state of Oklahoma.

The use of US military bases as part of refugee resettlement and migration deterrence operations illustrates the articulation of colonial and military geographies, and the contingent uses of military facilities for migration operations. Throughout this article, we have highlighted the relevance of contingency as ‘double-edgedness’ (Lipman, 2012), both constricting the absolute aims of the US military and empire on island bases and communities while linking (albeit partially and uncertainly) those communities as it opens up space for local pushback. As such, it is important to recognize that US federal-level negotiations with mainland base communities are structured by different political and legal conditions than those in US territories.

While most contemporary discussions of military detention treat it as an exceptional 9/11 phenomenon (for a notable exception see Sexton and Lee, 2006), the operations we have discussed illustrate a more mundane and longer historical geopolitics of migration in which the military’s role has always been present, if varied over time. At first glance, military spaces *seem* well-suited to the task of managing complex operations during times of geopolitical crisis. But as these cases suggest, the uses of *particular* military bases were subjected to multiple political, legal, and geostrategic determinations, or contingencies.

Even as mainland and offshore military sites were repurposed for refugee resettlement operations and efforts to prevent the settlement of undesirable asylum seekers, the use of these places was neither smooth nor unopposed. Repeatedly, elected officials and their constituents objected to the repurposing of a local military facility for asylum seekers on environmental,

economic, social, and, xenophobic grounds. For example, residents near Ellington insisted that they supported national security uses of the base, but that refugee detention was not one of them.

But attributing opposition to use of these facilities solely to local concerns (however principled or unprincipled) diverts attention from the systemic racism embedded within federal detention and deterrence policies. For example, a memo from one President Reagan staffer to another concerning the “working assumption that Haitian deportation rates are necessarily low” suggested that the government needed to make a major investment in judges and prosecuting attorneys to “rapidly reduc[e] the number of Haitian illegals” (Horowitz, unpublished memorandum). This memo illustrates that the legal and material conditions facing Haitian nationals in the US or elsewhere was secondary, if not irrelevant, to executive branch commitments to limiting Haitians’ presence in the US.

Indeed, broader Cold War geopolitical and military strategies were significant in this staff member’s political calculus. The memo concluded with an assessment of the tense negotiations over using Fort Allen on Puerto Rico. The ostensible necessity of speeding deportations was underscored by the fact that (a) we have very little to give in the way of additional benefits for Puerto Rico; and (b) that benefits are in any event likely to have little bearing on Puerto Rican acceptance of the use of Fort Allen. The issue of pride, triggered by Puerto Rico’s perceived use as a dumping ground is not likely to be assuaged by incremental benefits hurriedly promised (ibid.)

As suggested by Mayor Hernan Padilla’s concerns regarding the Cold War image problem of detention appearing as a concentration camp, geopolitical considerations were not unidirectional. When the Reagan administration consulted with a group of Florida government officials, advocacy groups, and Congressional Black Caucus representatives about the Cuban and Haitian

refugee crisis in the state, they rejected the use of detention and interdiction on the high seas because it was “inconsistent with our condemnation of Asian countries’ treatment of boat people” (Jordan, unpublished memorandum; Pear, 1981).

While resistance from local residents, elected officials, and the military itself was decisive in making some sites unavailable, the active negotiations and brokering between different players often led to their repeated use. When Guam commemorated the events of Operation New Life in 2010 with a series of public ceremonies, a local newspaper reflected on the role of resident communities during the crisis: “the success of the refugee evacuation through Guam was due to cooperation between the U.S. military, the local business community and island residents, many of whom volunteered at the refugee camps providing food, clothing and medical treatment” (Pacific Daily News, 2010). Speaking at a commemorative symposium on Guam titled “Operation New Life: Untold Stories (35 years later),” University of Guam President and former delegate from Guam to the U.S. House of Representatives Robert Underwood described the event as ‘primarily a story about individual human struggle’ and said that ‘for us [for Guam] its about how we responded to it’” (Pacific Daily News, 2010).

To some degree, Underwood’s remarks represent a rewriting of Guam’s experience during the refugee crisis, reminiscing about a collective, unified humanitarian response, while obscuring the messiness of local dynamics at the time. Such reframing is evidence of the protracted imperial formations that are part and parcel of ruination, a process that continues to shape collective public life in the sites where imperialism’s effects have been most pernicious. But that rewriting also can be interpreted as a strategy of local resistance, or as a reclamation of the past interpellated for local purposes. One of Underwood’s letters to President Clinton, which he penned in 1994 as US Congressional delegate for Guam, reveals the deeply uneven political

relationship between the US and Guam. Underwood criticizes the US military's announcement that it would send B-52s to Guam in anticipation of North Korean aggression without prior consultation with Guam's political leaders (Underwood, unpublished letter). "Mr. President, the People of Guam support you in this difficult and tenuous period of negotiation with North Korea. We pledge our support, as we always have, for the security interests of the United States. We only ask that, as you and your staff plan for a variety of contingencies, you remember us, the American community closest to the Korean peninsula." In emphasizing Guam's support, Underwood alludes to Guam's willingness to sacrifice territory and to "share space" and resources with Vietnamese refugees, past and ongoing sacrifices that Guam's public officials so often invoke in appeals to colonial benevolence or compassion.

The dichotomy often posed between the good refugee and humanitarian nation on the one hand (Espiritu, 2014), and racist, homophobic, NIMBY local residents on the other, fails to capture the generative logic of humanitarian militarization uniting onshore and offshore spaces. Ticktin (2011) argues that contemporary discourses of immigration exercise the politics of humanitarianism through construction of "the morally legitimate suffering body." Like Ticktin and Williams (2014; 2015) in her analysis of humanitarian narratives of border enforcement along the Mexico-US border, we demonstrate that such subjectivities are pronounced in militarized migrant operations, particularly those narrated as rescue of 'legitimately suffering' people.

Operational exercises that link migration management to humanitarian forms of militarism are practices of ruination that continue militarized degradation and violence and perpetuate racialized tropes of rightful and rightless migrants. Boat interceptions and subsequent detention of those on board frequently are narrated in terms of humanitarian rescue and

patronizing forms of protection even as the same people are subject to detention and denial of entry. The detention of a group of HIV+ Haitian people on Guantánamo in the mid-1990s, even *after* they had met the UN standard for credible fear for persecution, exemplifies the racialization of humanitarianism (Paik, 2013). The interchangeable use of “detention” and “processing” is another good example of the slippery movement between humanitarianism and militarization in migration management (whether refugee resettlement or detention) (see Lipman, 2012; Paik, 2013).

As Davis (2011; 2015) argues, geographies of US militarism and imperialism are shaped not only by the military’s unilateral implementation of strategies, but also by local resistance to those strategies that is often articulated through an anticolonial consciousness and rooted in self-determination. Understanding Guam as a place of its own, as a homeland for its indigenous Chamorro population – rather than simply as a US base – is imperative for the reclaiming of local narratives of Guam’s historical and contemporary meanings (Bevacqua, 2014; Davis, 2005; Kothari & Wilkinson, 2010). Similarly, the political struggle over narratives and practices of humanitarianism in Puerto Rico underscores the fraught nature of both sovereignty and federal definitions of and response to migration crisis. Retaining understandings of islands as places that exist despite and beyond the ruination of humanitarian militarism, also opens up profound possibilities for the rights of people in transit in and through islands.

CONCLUSIONS

Before the United States used Guantánamo to imprison ‘enemy combatants’ in the war on terror, it used this and other military bases to confine Haitian and Cuban asylum seekers in the 1980s and 1990s. This longer history illustrates how racialized forms of ruination shift, but also

accumulate (Kaplan, 2005). We have argued that imperialism and militarism are the larger historical and political forces that have long animated migration and border management in the United States, particularly during the second half of the 20th century. This militarized migration management has dug deeply grooved geographies into semi-sovereign, offshore, and base sites such as those we discussed in Guam, the Caribbean, and Fort Chaffee. Humanitarian militarism, interception, and detention as ‘rescue’ are built onto and into this carceral archipelago, with the militarization of islands part and parcel of the geopolitical ‘management’ of human mobility.

Degrees of gradated sovereignty in refugee-receiving and resettling sites are not merely theoretical zones, but materially shaped by and themselves shaping possibilities of acceptance and resistance in those sites. This, of course, is grounded in what ‘receiving’ or base communities have to leverage, offer, or threaten in negotiations with federal and military agencies. Possibilities of pushback are also conditioned by the legal and jurisdictional contingencies of the sites themselves. Thus, various forms of resistance materialize in these sites, ranging from direct confrontation with the machinations of US military empire to more quotidian objections to the imperial state’s attempts to control space and subjectivities in zones conceptualized by Jones (2012: 687) as ‘spaces of refusal.’

As we have argued, the double-edgedness of contingency (Lipman 2012) reproduces processes of ruination, while also intersecting with possibilities of resistance. The challenges to state claims of humanitarianism made by imperial subjects, including local political actors and community activists in formally colonial and formally sovereign territories, are also evidence of local pushback. Nonetheless, the US framing of militarism – and imperial occupation itself – as humanitarian has been used repeatedly to bolster local support for militarized migration management. Used by federal, state, and local actors in the sites we examine, with differing

outcomes, this tactic underscores how contingencies of territorial status shape local strategies and possibilities for pushback. Indeed, the repurposing of asylee detention on Fort Allen into a prison space and xenophobic opposition on the mainland illustrates the blurring of these spaces and cautions against refusal as necessarily liberatory.

Finally, the repeated US framing of militarized migration operations as ‘humanitarian’ has cultivated two apparently opposing narratives. First, the deserving, suffering immigrant is paired with the selfless and serving ‘receiving’ community – good victims and the good communities who take them in. In contrast, unworthy or unwanted migrants meet up against the provincial, xenophobic communities that refuse to ‘host’ new migrant populations. While they appear disconnected, these tropes are scripted together as part of powerful military and imperial discourses and processes of ruination. This militarized binary, then, works to obscure the imperial violence of displacement and racialized construction of territorial sovereignty.

This article contributes to existing literature on political geographies of migration, geopolitics of mobility, border enforcement, detention, and migration control. As we have shown through Cold War moments in the Pacific and Caribbean, consideration of the past enables us to better understand the present. Stoler’s concept of ruination as imperial formation proved central to this analysis. We have built on existing literature (Gregory, 2004; Kaplan, 2005; Vine, 2009; Benton, 2010; Kramer, 2011; Lipman, 2012; Neocleous, 2014) to reframe these historical moments as well as the present. This article, thereby, provides a longer historical view to practices of state humanitarian aid in securitized border regions (Walters, 2010; Williams, 2015) that highlight the productive struggles over military and civilian spaces and operations (Neocleous, 2014).

While these processes continue to unfold in the Pacific and the Caribbean, these histories

offer potential to reframe contemporary state efforts to control and contain human mobility in various regions around the world. At present, similar dynamics are unfolding for migrants and asylum seekers crossing into the southern United States, into southern Europe across the Mediterranean, and en route to Australia by way of the Indian Ocean. In each region, intersecting narratives of border enforcement as national security and militarism as humanitarian rescue cloud a technocratic infrastructure of exclusionary migration management.

For example, during summer 2014, national media attention was drawn to the plight of Central American minors entering the United States from Mexico. The scripting of this crisis resulted in thousands of unaccompanied children being held at detention facilities, many of which are former or current military sites. This is only the most recent example of processes that, as we show, have transpired for several decades at many of the same sites. Whereas hysterical discourses of exceptionalism shaped public discourse about these arrivals, our article suggests reframing ‘crisis’ (Mountz, 2010; Mountz and Hiemstra, 2014) through an analysis of its temporal and spatial continuities. The more clearly we connect such disparate yet recurring patterns and places, the more powerfully we can criticize the optics of migration and territorial control that capitalize on logics of race, imperialism, and militarization.

As such, this article poses new questions and opens potential new lines of inquiry for political geographers and migration scholars. Whereas political geographers have shown increasing interest in islands and archipelagoes as empirical and theoretical lines of inquiry (Mountz, 2011; Mountz, 2014), more work remains to bring scholarship in political geography into conversation with literature on imperialism, empire, and race, work that is thriving in cultural and American studies. Building on Stoler (2013: 8), we “look at imperial formations, rather than empire... Away from fixed forms of sovereignty ...toward gradated forms of

sovereignty, processes of becoming.” Similarly, migration scholars often become mired in forms of methodological nationalism (Wimmer and Glick Schiller, 2002) that reify traditional conceptions of power with nation-states as primary territorial units of migration governance. In fact, this article focuses on US imperial formations at the risk of overlooking other nation-states involved in transnational forms of militarization through migration control in Cold War contexts. Canada, for example, resettled significantly higher numbers (per capita) of Vietnamese refugees during US operations of the mid-1970s discussed here. This analysis raises as many questions as it answers, therefore, about the intersection of colonial histories of territorial control and racialized, militarized forms of humanitarian rescue as migration control. Our hope, however, is to critique migration management *and* imperial formations, and the many forms they take *beyond* those discussed in this article.

REFERENCES

Agamben, G. (1998). *Homo Sacer*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Agamben, G. (2005). *State of Exception*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Baldacchino, G., & Milne, D. (2006). Exploring sub-national island jurisdictions: An editorial introduction. *The Round Table*, 95(386), 487-502.

Bastos, C. (2008) Migrants, settlers and colonists: The biopolitics of displaced bodies. *International Migration*, 46, 27-54.

Benton, L. (2010). *A Search for Sovereignty*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bevacqua, M. L. (2014). Nasion Chamoru. *Guampedia*. Retrieved from:

<http://www.guampedia.com/nasion-chamoru/>

Burnett, C.D. (2005). The edges of empire and the limits of sovereignty: American Guano

Islands. *American Quarterly*, 57(3), 779-803.

Butler, J. (2004). *Precarious Life*. New York: Verso.

Camacho, K. L. (2012). After 9/11: Militarized borders and social movements in the Mariana

Islands. *American Quarterly*, 64(4), 685-713.

Clinton, W.J. (1998). *Guam Centennial Video*, June 21, 1998. Records concerning Guam: FOIA

2006-0195-F. William J. Clinton Presidential Library, Little Rock, AR.

Coleman, M. (2007). Immigration geopolitics beyond the US-Mexico border. *Geopolitics*,

39(1), 54-76.

Collyer, M. (2007). In-between places: Trans-Saharan transit migrants in Morocco and the

fragmented journey to Europe. *Antipode*, 39(4), 668-690.

Dade County Department of Public Health. Unpublished letter to the Cuban-Haitian Task Force,

dated September 8, 1980, "Krome South [1]" folder, Box 5, RG-220 Cuban-Haitian Task

Force, Jimmy Carter Presidential Library, Atlanta, GA.

Dastyari, A., & L. Effeney. (2012). Immigration detention in Guantánamo Bay (not going anywhere anytime soon). *Shima: The International Journal of Research into Island Cultures*, 6(2), 49-65.

Davis J. S. (2011) The US military base network and contemporary colonialism: Power projection, resistance and the quest for operational unilateralism. *Political Geography*, 30(4), 215-224.

Davis, J. S. (2005). Representing place: “Deserted isles” and the reproduction of Bikini atoll. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 95(3), 607-625.

Davis, J. S. (2015). *The Empire’s Edge*. Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press.

Department of the Army, Operations and Readiness Directorate. (1977). After action report: Operations New Life/New Arrivals, U.S. Army support to the Indochinese Refugee Program. Washington, D.C.

Dow, M. (2004). *American Gulag*. Berkeley, Cal: University of California Press.

Dunn T. J. (1996). *The Militarization of the U.S.–Mexico Border 1978–1992*. Austin, TX: CMAS Books.

Elliott, C. (1975, April 24). Island not jeopardized, Ricky says. *Pacific Daily News*.

Espiritu, Y. L. (2014). *Body Counts*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Foucault, M. (1977). *Discipline and Punish*. New York: Random House LLC.

Geyer, M. (1989). "The militarization of Europe, 1914–1945." In *The Militarization of the*

Western World, edited by J. R. Gillis, 65–102. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1989.

Giuliani, R. Unpublished letter to Frederick Richmond, July 31, 1981, "Fort Allen – INS" folder,

Box 52, Subject Files of the Associate Attorney General Rudolph Giuliani, 1/1981-

6/1983, Office of the Associate Attorney General (AAG), RG 60 General Records of the

Department of Justice, National Archives II, College Park, MD.

Government Accountability Office (1983). *Detention Policies Affecting Haitian Nationals*.

Washington, D.C.

Gregory, D. (2004). *The Colonial Present*. Malden, Mass: Blackwell.

Gregory, D. (2007). Vanishing points: law, violence, and exception in the global war prison. In

D. Gregory, & A. Pred (Eds.), *Violent Geographies* (pp. 205–236). New York and

London: Routledge.

Horowitz, M. unpublished memo to Frank Hodsoll dated July 15, 1981, "Detention Center and Chaffee Working (7)" folder, Box 8, Series II: President's Task Force on Immigration and Refugee Policy, 1980-August 1981, Suberies A: Subject File, 1980-1981, Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, CA.

Hurlocker, H. Unpublished letter to John Cannon dated December 31, 1980, "New Entrant Processing Center (New Sites)" folder, Box 6, RG-220 Cuban-Haitian Task Force, Jimmy Carter Presidential Library, Atlanta, GA.

Hyndman, J. (2004) Mind the gap: bridging feminist and political geography through geopolitics. *Political Geography* 23(3): 307-322.

Jones, R. (2012). Spaces of refusal: rethinking sovereign power and resistance at the border. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 102(3), 685-699.

Jordan, E. unpublished memorandum to Kate Moore dated April 2, 1981, "Governor's and refugee" folder, Box 3, Moore, Kate files, Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, CA.

Kaplan, A. (2005). Where is Guantánamo? *American Quarterly*, 57(3), 831-858.

Koh, H. H. (1994). America's offshore refugee camps. *University of Richmond Law Review*. 29,

Kothari, U., & Wilkinson, R. (2010). Colonial imaginaries and postcolonial transformations:

Exiles, bases, beaches. *Third World Quarterly*, 31(8), 1395-1412.

Kramer, P. (2011). Power and connection: Imperial histories of the United States in the world.

American Historical Review, 116(5), 1348-1391.

Lipman, J. K. (2012). "Give us a ship": The Vietnamese repatriate movement on Guam, 1975.

American Quarterly, 64(1), 1-31.

Lipman, J. K. (2013). "The fish trusts the water, and it is in the water that it is cooked": The

Caribbean origins of the Krome Detention Center, *Radical History Review*, 115, 115-141.

Loyd, J. M. (2014). One if by land, two if by sea, *The New Inquiry*, 28, 14-17.

Loyd, J. M. (2015). Carceral citizenship in an age of global apartheid. *Occasion*. 8: 1-15.

Maddux, T. R. (2005). Ronald Reagan and the Task Force on Immigration, *Pacific Historical*

Review, 74(2), 195-236.

Minca, C. (2007) Agamben's geographies of modernity. *Political Geography*, 26, 78-97.

Mountz, A. (2010). *Seeking Asylum*. Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press.

Mountz, A. (2011). Islands as enforcement archipelago: Haunting, sovereignty, and asylum on

islands. *Political Geography*, 30, 118-128.

Mountz, A. (2014). Political Geography II: Islands and archipelagoes. *Progress in Human Geography*. DOI: 10.1177/0309132514560958.

Mountz, A., & Hiemstra, N. (2014). Chaos and crisis: Dissecting the spatiotemporal logics of contemporary migrations and state practices. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 104(2), 382-390.

Mountz, A., & Loyd, J. M. (2014). Transnational productions of remoteness: Building onshore and offshore carceral regimes across borders. *Geographica + Helvetica*, 69, 1-10.

Neocleous, M. (2014). *War Power, Police Power*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Nguyen, M. T. (2012). *The Gift of Freedom*. Duke University Press.

Pacific Daily News (2010). Operation New Life: The Vietnamese Arrival on Guam 35 Years

Later. August 14, 2010. Retrieved from

http://www.pacificnewscenter.com/index.php?view=article&id=7220%3Awish-grated-million-dollar-payments-suspended&option=com_content&Itemid=18

Padilla, H. unpublished letter to William French Smith dated January 12, 1982, "Refugees 1982" folder, Box 159, Subject Files of the Attorney General William French Smith, Office of

the Attorney General (AAG), RG 60 General Records of the Department of Justice,
National Archives II, College Park, MD.

Paik, A. N. (2013). Carceral quarantine at Guantánamo: Legacies of US imprisonment of Haitian refugees. *Radical History Review*, 115, 142-168.

Pear, R. (1981, April 28). Report on refugees urges a crackdown. *New York Times*. Retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com/1981/04/28/us/report-on-refugees-urges-a-crackdown.html>.

Perera, S. (2002). What is a camp? Borderlands e-journal 1, no. 1. Retrieved from http://www.borderlands.net.au/vol1no1_2002/perera_camp.html.

Perera, S. (2009). *Australia and the Insular Imagination: Beaches, Borders, Boats, and Bodies*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Pickering, S. (2014). Floating carceral spaces: Border enforcement and gender on the high seas. *Criminology and Penology*, 16(2), 187-205.

Port Arthur News (1981, June 21). Ellington as refugee center draws fire.

Quirós, C. S. unpublished letter to Alan C. Nelson February 9, 1983. "Fort Allen – INS" folder, Box 52, Rudolph Giuliani, 1/1981-6/1983, Subject Files of the Associate Attorney

General, Office of the Associate Attorney General (AAG), RG 60 General Records of the
Department of Justice, National Archives II, College Park, MD.

Reid-Henry, S. (2007). Exceptional sovereignty? Guantánamo Bay and the re-colonial present.

Antipode, 39(4), 627–648.

Sartori, M. E. (2001). The Cuban migration dilemma: An examination of the United States'

policy of temporary protection in offshore safe havens. *Georgetown Immigration Law*

Journal 15: 319-355.

Schalansky, J. (2009). *Atlas of Remote Islands*. New York: Penguin Books.

Schmitt, C. (1985). *Political Theology*. University of Chicago Press.

Sexton, J., & Lee, E. (2006). Figuring the prison: Prerequisites of torture at Abu Ghraib.

Antipode, 38(5), 1005-1022.

Sharpe, J. (2004). Doing feminist political geography. In L. Staeheli, E. Kofman, L. Peake (eds.),

Mapping Women, Making Politics. New York: Routledge, pp. 87-98.

Sidaway, J. (2010). 'One island, one team, one mission': Geopolitics, sovereignty, 'race' and

rendition. *Geopolitics*, 15(4), 667-683.

Sparke, M. (2005). *In the Space of Theory*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Steenland, P. R. unpublished letter to Rudolph W. Giuliani dated August 25, 1981, “Fort Allen – INS” folder, Box 52, Subject Files of the Associate Attorney General Rudolph Giuliani, 1/1981-6/1983, Office of the Associate Attorney General (AAG), RG 60 General Records of the Department of Justice, National Archives II, College Park, MD.

Steinberg, P. (2005). Insularity, sovereignty and statehood: The representation of islands on portolan charts and the construction of the territorial state. *Geographiska Annaler*, 87(4), 253-265.

Stoler, A. (2011). Colony. *Political Concepts*. Retrieved on 20 October 2014 from : <http://www.politicalconcepts.org/issue1/colony/>.

Stoler, A. (ed) (2013). *Imperial Debris*. Durham: Duke University Press.

Taussig, M. (2004). *My Cocaine Museum*. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press.

Ticktin, M. (2011). *Casualties of Care*. Berkeley, Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Torruella, J. R. (2007). Insular Cases: The Establishment of a Regime of Political Apartheid, *The U. Pa. J. Int'l L.*, 29, 283.

Underwood, R. Unpublished letter from Congressman Robert A. Underwood to President

William J. Clinton, June 14, 1994. Records concerning Guam: FOIA 2006-0195-F.

William J. Clinton Presidential Library, Little Rock, AR.

US Department of the Navy (2012). Guam and CNMI Military Relocation (2012) Roadmap

Adjustments: Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement. Retrieved on 30 December

2014 from <http://guambuildupeis.us/about/faq>

Vine, D. (2009). *Island of Shame*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Vine, D. (2012). *TomDispatch*. The lily-pad strategy: How the Pentagon is quietly transforming

its overseas base empire and creating a dangerous new way of war. Retrieved from

<http://www.tomdispatch.com/blog/175568/>

Walters, W. (2008). Bordering the sea: Shipping industries and the policing of stowaways,

Borderlands e-journal, 7(3), 1–25. Retrieved from www.borderlands.net.au

Walters, W. (2010). Foucault and frontiers: notes on the birth of the humanitarian border. In U.

Brockling, B. Krasmann, & T. Lemke (Eds.), *Governmentality*. New York: Routledge.

Williams, J. (2014). The safety/security nexus and the humanitarianisation of border

enforcement. *Geographical Journal* DOI: 10.1111/geoj.12119 *

Williams, J. (2015). From humanitarian exceptionalism to contingent care: Care and enforcement at the humanitarian border. *Political Geography* 47: 11-20.

Wimmer, A. & Glick Schiller, N. (2002). Methodological nationalism and beyond: Nation-state building, migration, and the social sciences. *Global Networks*, 2(4), 301-334.