The Tension Between Private Benefits and Degradation

Externalities from Appropriation in the Commons

Esther Blanco ^{a*†}, Tobias Haller ^a, Maria Claudia Lopez ^{b*}, James M. Walker ^{c*}

^a Department of Public Finance, University of Innsbruck, Austria. Universitaetstrasse 15, Innsbruck, Austria 6020. E-mail: esther.blanco@uibk.ac.at; tobias.haller@uibk.ac.at.

^b Department of Community Sustainability, Michigan State University, United States. Natural Resource Building, 480 Wilson Road, East Lansing, MI 48824. E-mail: mlopez@msu.edu.

^c Department of Economics, Indiana University, United States. Wylie Hall, 100 South Woodlawn Avenue, Bloomington, Indiana 47405-7104. E-mail: walkerj@indiana.edu.

* The Vincent and Elinor Ostrom Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, United States. 513 N. Park Avenue, Bloomington, Indiana 47408-3895.

[†] Corresponding author. Telephone: +43 512 507 70214.

ABSTRACT

This experimental study examines behavior in a linear public goods game with an appropriation frame where we vary the value of individual benefits and the group losses from appropriation. Parallel to the literature on public goods provision, individual appropriation decreases with the marginal damage to the group that occurs through appropriation and increases in the private benefit from appropriation. In addition, we examine a novel set of decision situations where individual benefits and group damages change proportionately, as to hold the marginal per capita return constant. Individual responses to these proportionate changes are heterogeneous but on average, appropriation levels do not change significantly. These results are robust to two

experimental designs, a one-shot menu-design where subjects make multiple choices and a complementary set of sessions where participants make a single decision in a one-shot game.

Keywords: common-pool resource; public good; degradation externality; private benefit; laboratory experiment; asymmetry.

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1. Introduction

On a daily basis, individuals make decisions that affect ecosystem services. For example, the expansion of urban and agricultural land use reduces the size and characteristics of natural habitats. The importance of this issue is illustrated by the struggle of major carnivores to survive, and more generally by the need to develop programs to deal with the intrusion of wildlife on inhabited areas. Other less visible impacts from habitat destruction include jeopardizing the regulating services maintained by ecosystems (for example soil retention against desertification) and endangering provisioning services (such as plant-derived medicines). The implications of habitat destruction can be quite large and vary substantially across regions and ecosystems. Substantial research efforts are currently being undertaken to quantify the economic relevance of ecosystem services (see, for example, the Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity Global Initiative¹ or the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment²).

Previous literature addressing conservation of natural resources has provided extensive field and experimental evidence on management alternatives designed to avoid over-depletion of common pool resources (CPRs) and increasing the efficiency in use of those resources (Agrawal 2001; Anderies et al. 2011; Baland and Platteau 1996; Gordon 1954; Ostrom 1990; Wade 1988). This literature focused primarily on *production externalities*, whereby appropriation by one user reduces the value of appropriation effort (rent dissipation) by other users. An implication is that this literature has largely neglected the implications of appropriation on the conservation of ecosystem services provided by the natural resources (for relevant exceptions, see Ostrom 2007, 2009). To the extent that appropriation degrades the quality of such services to the group as a whole, it generates a negative externality referred to here as *degradation externalities*. In this

¹ [<http://www.teebweb.org/>] retrieved February 2, 2016.

² [<http://www.unep.org/maweb/en/Index.aspx>] retrieved February 2, 2016.

sense, conservation, in the form of reduced appropriation, avoids such degradation externalities and constitutes the provision of a public good.³

The appropriation decision environment in this study is isomorphic to a linear public good VCM decision environment. Appropriation leads to private benefits, but at a cost of degradation in value of a shared group fund.⁴ The central question addressed is to what extent appropriation levels respond to the tension between degradation externalities inflicted on the group and private benefits from appropriation. The consequences of appropriation are measured in terms of the efficiency in use of the resource as well as overall conservation of the group fund.

A first set of decision situations varies the magnitude of the degradation externalities, holding private benefits from appropriation constant. A second set of decision situations varies the magnitude of private benefits from appropriation, holding the magnitude of the degradation externalities constant. These two sets of parameter changes parallel the analysis of the relevance of variations in the marginal per capita return (*MPCR*) in VCM public goods games.⁵ A third set of decision situations increases the degradation externalities and the private benefits from

³ Production externalities occur as a “congestion” effect. As appropriation increases, the effect is to increase the marginal and average cost of appropriation for all units appropriated or reduce the marginal and average productivity of inputs used in appropriation. The magnitude of these externalities on individual appropriators depends on their individual levels of appropriation, increasing in the level of their appropriation. Degradation externalities explicitly focus on the impact of appropriation on the public good nature of the resource (ecosystem services). As modeled here, degradation externalities impact all users equally, independent of their individual appropriation levels.

⁴ Unlike earlier experimental studies designed to address the behavioral effects of alternative frames for investigating provision versus appropriation games, the choice of examining the appropriation game presented here is based on its simplicity and relevance to investigating the research questions under consideration. Studies by Andreoni (1995) and Sonnemans et al. (1998) address decision environments in which subjects’ decisions are framed in the context of negative externalities, or preventing a public bad. Travers et al. (2011) use a similar linear CPR appropriation game framed for fishing, focusing on the effect of alternative institutions. Also Dufwenberg, et al. (2011) address the comparison between behavior in “GIVE frame” and “TAKE frame” games. Cox, et al. (2013) includes a discussion of the isomorphism between the linear appropriation game studied in this paper and a provision game with the same marginal incentives. Two recent papers also consider comparisons between environments where only taking is possible, only giving is possible or both are part of the strategy set of subjects (Hoyer et al, 2014; Khadjavi and Lange, forthcoming).

⁵ The *MPCR* is defined as the ratio of an individual’s marginal return from the public good relative to the individual’s marginal private cost of contribution to the provision of the public good (Isaac et al. 1994).

appropriation proportionately, as to hold the ratio of the two constant. Previous experimental research that addresses the influence of variations in the *MPCR* on the voluntary provision of public goods examines variations in *either* the private return from keeping units of the endowment or the marginal value of the public good.⁶ To the best of our knowledge, however, this literature is silent on the impact of simultaneous variations of both components of the *MPCR* as to hold its value constant.

The investigation of simultaneous parameter changes in the context of the appropriation game is motivated by examples from the field where private benefits of appropriation are positively correlated with the value of ecosystem services, including for example, increased scarcity in water basins, reduced forest coverage, and hunting of endangered wildlife, among others. In these situations, increased scarcity induces a higher use value for remaining units of the resource (water for irrigation, wood for fuel, or animal parts for "traditional drugs"). At the same time, greater scarcity can lead to a higher marginal value of conservation (habitat maintenance in aquatic or forest ecosystems or biodiversity preservation). Analyzing situations where the *MPCR* remains constant is a special case that serves as a benchmark to investigate the tension between private benefits of appropriation and degradation externalities.

In addition, we include two decision situations where game parameters are asymmetric across subjects. These decision settings are motivated by field cases where the magnitude of degradation externalities vary across appropriators due, for example, to differences in technologies used for appropriation (see Ostrom, et al. 1994).

⁶ For variation in the private return see Fischer et al. (1995), Falkner et al. (2000), Palfrey and Prisbrey (1996), Brandts and Schram (2001), and Blanco et al (2015). For variation in the marginal value of the public good, see Isaac and Walker (1988), Bagnoli and McKee (1991), Isaac et al. (1994), Offerman et al. (1996), Chan et al. (1999), Tan (2008), Reuben and Riedl (2009), Carpenter et al (2009), and Fischbacher et al. (2015).

The experimental decision setting includes sessions where participants make multiple decisions in a one-shot menu design and a complementary set of sessions where participants make a single decision in a one-shot game. By observing subjects' decisions in a number of parameter conditions in the menu design, without feedback information about other's decisions, we are able to investigate individual responses to parameter changes, as well as average responses pooling across subjects. The one-shot decisions in a single game serve as a robustness test of the results to potential framing or ordering effects in the menu design. Both sets of sessions address decision environments where there is no potential for signaling a willingness to cooperate, scope for reciprocal cooperation, or communication. A substantial proportion of the experimental studies using CPR and public goods games have focused on multiple decision-rounds, with feedback information on group decisions. The complementary approach in this study provides a mechanism for isolating subjects' responses to parameter changes, abstracting away from the dynamic effects associated with multiple-round game settings. Of course, additional behavioral mechanisms may play a role in subjects' responses to parameter changes in repeated interactions where group dynamics come into play.

2. The appropriation game setting

In the appropriation game, groups of n individuals face allocation decisions between a "Group Fund" and an "Individual Fund." Each group begins with a Group Fund endowment of t tokens and each individual begins with 0 tokens allocated to their Individual Fund. Individuals privately decide how many tokens to move (appropriate) from the Group Fund to their Individual Fund. Each token left in the Group Fund has a value of $1/n$ for each group member. Each token an individual i appropriates from the Group Fund, in a given decision situation s , yields a private benefit increasing the value of his/her Individual Fund by PB_{is} and reduces the value of the

Group Fund, generating a loss to the group of G_{is} . This loss to the group from appropriation is the degradation externality. Notice that the values of PB_{is} and G_{is} can vary across individuals and decision situations. Individuals can withdraw up to a maximum of e tokens from the Group Fund. The decision situations are parameterized such that $PB_{is} > (G_{is}/n)$, and $PB_{is} < G_{is}$ and $G_{is} > I$.

In summary, letting z_{is} denote the amount individual i appropriates from the Group Fund in a decision situation s , the payoff to an individual in tokens is

$$\pi_{is} = PB_{is} \cdot z_{is} + (t - \sum_{k=1}^n G_{ks} \cdot z_{ks})/n. \quad z_{is} \in (0, e) \quad (1)$$

To characterize individual incentives to appropriate, we define the marginal net benefit from appropriating, as well as the *MPCR* for an individual from foregoing appropriation. The marginal net benefit from appropriation in decision situation s is

$$\frac{\partial \pi_{is}}{\partial z_{is}} = PB_{is} - G_{is}/n. \quad (2)$$

The *MPCR* in decision setting s is defined as the ratio of the marginal value the individual receives from the Group Fund by avoiding the degradation externality relative to the private benefit from appropriation, $(G_{is}/n)/PB_{is}$.

To evaluate the implications of changes in appropriation at the group level we define economic efficiency, as well as the conservation outcomes of the Group Fund. Economic efficiency (E_s), for decision situation s is defined as

$$E_s = (P_s - \min P_s) / (\max P_s - \min P_s) \quad (3)$$

where P_s is the group payoff in decision situation s , $\min P_s$ is the minimum possible payoff in s , which occurs at full appropriation, and $\max P_s$ is the maximum possible payoff in s which occurs at zero appropriation. For the decision situations we investigate, $\min P_s$ varies across decision situations, while $\max P_s$ is constant across situations. Thus, for identical appropriation levels, efficiency varies across decision situations through changes in P_s , as well as through changes in

$\min P_s$. The conservation outcome for the Group Fund depends on the total loss in value imposed through appropriation and is measured as

$$C_s = t - (\sum_{k=1}^n G_{ks} Z_{ks}). \quad (4)$$

2.1. Game parameters

All decision situations included groups of four, with an initial endowment of 400 tokens in the Group Fund, from which each individual could appropriate up to 25 tokens to their Individual Fund. The seven decision situations are summarized in Table 1. Note that for the values of G_{is} under study, the value of the Group Fund remains positive even if subjects appropriate at full capacity.

(Table 1 about here)

The seven decision situations were designed to allow us to investigate changes in subject's decisions across three types of situations. One set of decision situations varies G_{is} , holding the value of PB_{is} constant at the level of 1, in both symmetric and asymmetric settings. In symmetric settings, the value of G_{is} takes high, medium and low values of 3.6, 2.4, and 1.2, respectively (decision situations $G^H PB^L$, $G^M PB^L$, $G^L PB^L$). Thus, these decision situations yield $MPCR$ values of 0.9, 0.6, and 0.3, respectively. In the asymmetric setting $G^{Asy} PB^L$, two subjects are assigned $G_{is}=3.6$ and two are assigned $G_{is}=1.2$, for an average group G_s of 2.4 (average $MPCR=0.6$). A second complementary set of decision situations varies PB_{is} holding G_{is} constant. The value of PB_{is} takes high, medium, and low values of 3, 2 and 1 respectively.

A third set of decision situations examines subjects' responses to simultaneous changes in G_{is} and PB_{is} , holding the $MPCR$ constant at a value of 0.3. In the symmetric settings, higher private benefits from appropriation are coupled with higher degradation externalities to create high, medium or low conditions (decision situations $G^H PB^H$, $G^M PB^M$, and $G^L PB^L$). In the

asymmetric setting $G^{Asy}PB^{Asy}$, two subjects are assigned high degradation externalities and high private benefits from appropriation ($G_{is}=3.6$ and $PB_{is}=3$) and two subjects are assigned low degradation externalities and low private benefits from appropriation ($G_{is}=1.2$ and $PB_{is}=1$), yielding an average value of $G_s=2.4$ and $PB_s=2$ (and $MPCR=0.3$).⁷

2.2. Theoretical considerations and behavioral conjectures

As $PB_{is} < G_{is}$, the social optimum outcome that maximizes group earnings is for all individuals to appropriate 0 tokens from the Group Fund. Because $PB_{is} > (G_{is}/n)$, the marginal net benefits from appropriation are positive in each of the decision situations; $\frac{\partial \pi_{is}}{\partial z_{is}} > 0$. Thus, assuming individuals make decisions based strictly on own income maximization, each individual has a dominant strategy to move e tokens from the Group Fund, and we would therefore expect no treatment differences. This is however a strong assumption. Despite the fact that the parameter manipulations we investigate do not change the Nash equilibrium for self-interested payoff-maximizing individuals, they do change the size of marginal net benefits from appropriating (see equation 2).

Previous research on social dilemma settings has shown individuals' decisions appear to reflect complex and diverse motivations beyond simple self-income maximization (see research summarized in Camerer 2003; Camerer and Fehr 2006; Ostrom and Walker 2003). For example, Andreoni (1990) proposes two reasons for individuals to contribute to a public good, namely altruism and warm glow. Altruism is modeled as being dependent on total supply of the public good, whereas warm glow is modeled as being dependent on an individual's contributions to the

⁷ In decision situation $G^{Asy}PB^{Asy}$, the two players with $G_{is}=3.6$ and $PB_{is}=3$ have earnings at the Nash Equilibrium of 115 tokens, higher than their earnings at the social optimum (100 tokens). However, in decision situation $G^{Asy}PB^{Asy}$ it is still the case that group earnings are maximized if zero tokens are removed from the group fund.

public good. More recently, Goeree et al. (2002) build on the work of Andreoni (1990) in a study designed to disentangle the effects of altruism and warm-glow, where they manipulate the payoffs subjects receive from contributions to the public good in the form of external returns (marginal benefits to others from contributions) and internal returns (marginal benefits to the contributor).⁸

Adapting the approach of Andreoni (1990) and Goeree et al (2002) to our setting, where subjects' appropriation creates degradation to the Group Fund, the associated utility function incorporating altruism and warm glow, for individual i in decision situation s can be represented by the general function:

$$U_{is} = (PB_{is} \cdot z_{is}, t - \sum_{k=1}^n (G_{ks} \cdot z_{ks}), e - z_{is}) \quad (5)$$

The first component is the private benefit from appropriation to subject i , the second is the value of the Group Fund following *group* appropriation, and the third is the units available to subject i that were not appropriated. The second term captures altruism, interpreted as the concern for the earnings of other members of the group, that derive from the group fund that is not lost through appropriation. The third term captures warm-glow, accounting for the utility gained from maintaining the public good.

Utility is assumed to increase in all three components. Thus, *ceteris paribus*, decreasing PB_{is} or increasing G_{is} would decrease utility (through the first and second components of the utility function). Ultimately, the implications from variations in PB_{is} and G_{is} will depend on the weights that an individual assigns to each of these attributes, the specific functional form of the utility function, and the potential changes in appropriation levels (of subject i and other subjects in his/her group) induced by the variations in PB_{is} or G_{is} .

⁸ Other studies addressing the role of altruism in explaining behavior in one-shot public goods games include Levine (1998) and Cox and Sadiraj (2007).

In summary, we hypothesize that a portion of the subjects will make decisions that are motivated by concerns beyond simple own-income maximization and these decisions are systematically affected by variations in G_{is} and PB_{is} . More specifically, for guiding the reporting of results, we present two behavioral conjectures regarding the influence of manipulations in G_{is} and PB_{is} on appropriation decisions.

Conjecture 1: *Ceteris paribus* increasing the value of degradation externalities or decreasing the value of private benefits, resulting in an increase in the $MPCR$, results in lower levels of appropriation from the Group Fund.

This conjecture refers to a comparison of decision situations where subjects face different $MPCRs$. Based on an assumption of altruistic or warm-glow preferences as posited in equation 5, we can expect that a set of subjects follow appropriation strategies that might be altered for the parameter manipulations described in conjecture 1. It is straightforward to see from equation 2 that, *ceteris paribus*, the larger the degradation externalities to the group from appropriation, G_{is} , the smaller the marginal net benefit from appropriation ($\frac{\partial \pi_{is}}{\partial z_{is}} / \partial G_{is} < 0$). The opposite is true for increases in PB_{is} ($\frac{\partial \pi_{is}}{\partial z_{is}} / \partial PB_{is} > 0$). In addition, decreasing PB_{is} or increasing G_{is} would decrease appropriation through the first and second components of the utility function in equation 5. In addition to the theoretical literature on other regarding behavior, the motivation for conjecture 1 follows from evidence in VCM games that group cooperation levels increase in the magnitude of the $MPCR$, holding group size constant (see references in footnote 6).

Our experimental design allows for examining conjecture 1 in what we will refer to as primary and secondary tests across pairs of decision situations. Primary tests of conjecture 1 include comparisons in which all subjects *within* each of the two decision situations under comparison face the same $MPCR$ and a different $MPCR$ *across* them. Secondary tests of

conjecture 1 include decision settings where subjects within one or both of the paired decision settings face different parameters that entail different values of $MPCR$. To the extent that other group member's incentives may affect a subject's own decisions, the secondary comparisons do not represent a pure test of the conjecture. Finally, in addition to testing conjecture 1 in relation to average individual responses by subjects, we also report evidence on the percentage of subjects that (weakly and strictly) respond to increases in the $MPCR$ by lowering individual appropriation.

Conjecture 2: Simultaneous variations in degradation externalities and private benefits that yield the same $MPCR$ result in the same average level of appropriation across individuals.

This conjecture refers to a comparison of decision situations where subjects face the same $MPCR$, but different values of the parameters G_{is} and PB_{is} . Note that this conjecture is framed as a neutral effect across individuals. That is, the conjecture is that *average* behavior will not change if the $MPCR$ is held constant while varying G_{is} and PB_{is} . Observing a neutral average effect in this case is not transparent as there are multiple reasons for why a proportionate change in G_{is} and PB_{is} could affect subjects' behavior.

Consider a situation where G_{is} and PB_{is} are multiplied by the same positive factor a . In this setting, a subject who previously chose an interior appropriation z_{is} can obtain the same payoff outcome for the first component of equation 5 by appropriating (z_{is}/a) (the value of the Individual Fund). However, the value of the second component (the value of the Group fund after appropriation) depends not only on an individual's appropriation but also on that of the other group members. So, if a subject desires to do so, he/she could decrease to (z_{is}/a) his/her appropriation from the Group Fund and therefore have the same effect on the Group Fund when

G_{is} increases by the factor a ; but he/she has no control over what other group members might do. In this regard, one could certainly imagine a subject making a decision regarding the effect he/she has on the Group Fund dependent on expectations of others' decisions.

Beyond the actual values of the two components, there is also the issue of how subjects will translate those outcomes into utility. The model as developed is general and could certainly allow for utilities where the three components interact with each other (are not simply additive), as well as allowing for utilities that are dependent upon expected relative earnings across group members.

Further, proportionate increases in G_{is} and PB_{is} do not have a neutral effect on marginal incentives to appropriate. The marginal private gain from appropriation increases (as can be seen from equation 2) when G_{is} and PB_{is} increase proportionally. This is because the increase in G_{is} is divided by n whereas the increase in PB_{is} is not. Thus, the opportunity costs of making cooperative decisions increase as G_{is} and PB_{is} increase.

We interpret the third component similar to Andreoni (1990) and Goeree, et al. (2002). This warm glow component is based on a motivation for appropriating at a level less than capacity, simply for the sake of cooperating, irrespective of the gain to other group members that this creates. If this motivation is based in part on a heuristic, it may well be that the subject's response to this motivation is affected by the range of possible decisions, which does not vary across treatments in this study.

There are other motives such as guilt aversion or inequity aversion that could also lead to similar incentives to take others' earnings into consideration when making appropriation decisions in one-shot games, thus inducing responses to changes in G_{is} or PB_{is} . For example, Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) address the relevance of guilt aversion based on second order

beliefs (beliefs about others' beliefs). Similarly, inequity aversion has been used to motivate out of equilibrium decisions in one-shot public goods games (see Fehr and Schmidt, 1999 and Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000).⁹

In sum, the motivations for responding to variations in G_{is} or PB_{is} are multiple. Previous experimental literature on public goods games suggests that individuals are quite heterogeneous in response to parametric changes that affect the private benefits of non-cooperation and the group benefits of cooperation (see Ledyard 1995 and Chaudhuri 2011). Thus, finding support for this conjecture will depend on the distribution of choices across individual subjects and whether they tend to be sufficiently offsetting to lead to the neutral average effect conjectured.

Both primary and secondary tests will also be used for defining the paired comparisons relevant to conjecture 2, pairings in which the $MPCR$ is held constant. In addition, we report evidence on the percentage of subjects that balance proportional changes in G_{is} and PB_{is} as to hold appropriation constant, the percentage of subjects that (weakly and strictly) appropriate in a pattern consistent with a priority on private incentives whereby appropriation increases as PB_{is} increases, and the percentage of subjects that (weakly and strictly) appropriate in a pattern consistent with a focus on the Group Fund loss from appropriation whereby appropriation decreases as G_{is} increases.

3. The experimental decision settings

The experiment was conducted in two phases. In the first phase, a total of 124 Colombian university students participated in 8 sessions. These subjects made one-shot decisions in a menu

⁹ Attention has also been devoted to motivations relevant in repeated or sequential settings, such as kindness and reciprocity (Rabin 1993, Charness and Rabin 2002, Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 2004), as well as signaling in a forward looking inter-temporal contexts (Isaac et al 1994).

design with the 7 decision situations shown in Table 1. The sessions for the menu design experiments included from 8 to 20 subjects.¹⁰ In the second phase, a total of 236 Austrian university students participated in 10 sessions. These subjects made one-shot decisions in a single game design. The decision settings examined in the second phase were the symmetric decision situations shown in Table 1. For these single game experiments, two sessions were conducted for each decision situation, with each session including either 24 or 20 subjects.¹¹

In both phases, at the start of each session subjects were seated at private work stations and presented with a packet that included paper copies of initial instructions and instructions for the decision situation(s) with subject-specific parameters. In Colombia, the instructions for the sessions utilizing the menu design explained that each subject would make choices in each of seven decision situations, and their compensation would be based on the outcome of one of the decision situations chosen randomly at the end of the experiment, after all decisions were final. In addition, the decision situation chosen for compensation would be the same for all participants in the session. In Austria, subjects were paid for their decisions in the single game played. For purposes of computing earnings, groups of four were created anonymously based on subject numbers that were assigned randomly at the beginning of the experimental session. All decisions and earnings were private information. Decision situations were described in tokens with a conversion rate of US \$0.124 per token in Colombia and US \$ 0.920 per token in Austria.¹²

¹⁰ The composition of the menu sessions is as follows: One session included 8 subjects, one 12 subjects, four 16 subjects, and two 20 subjects.

¹¹ Conceived as a robustness test of the results of the sessions utilizing the menu design, the one-shot single game sessions included only symmetric decision situations. For the one-shot single game sessions nine sessions included 24 participants and one included 20 participants (a G^LPB^L session).

¹² Decision situations were described in tokens with a conversion rate of 220 Pesos per token in Colombia and 0.1 Euros per token in Austria. The average payments were US\$15 in Colombia (26238 Colombian pesos, by the time of the experiment, one US dollar was valued at approximately 1765 Colombian pesos) and US\$10.50 Euros in Austria (9.659 Euros, by the time of the experiment one dollar was and valued at 0.9195 Euros).

The experimenters publicly reviewed the instructions, where a situation was described as follows. Each group began with a Group Fund of 400 tokens. Each group member began with an Individual Fund containing 0 tokens. Each person's decision task was to decide privately and independently whether to move tokens from the Group Fund to his/her own Individual Fund, up to a maximum of 25 tokens. Each person's decision was in tokens (0,1,..., 24 or 25). In $G^L PB^L$ subjects received 1 token in their Individual Fund for each token moved from the Group Fund. At the same time, each token appropriated, reduced the size of the Group Fund by 1.2 tokens. The size of the final Group Fund equaled the initial Group Fund after accounting for tokens moved by all group members and for the size of the parameter G_{is} . In each group of four, an individual's earnings were the sum of the value of that person's Individual Fund plus an equal share ($1/4$) of the value of the final Group Fund for his/her group. The instruction for the remaining symmetric decision situations varied only in regard to the values of parameter G_i or the parameter PB_i . The two asymmetric decision situations examined in the menu design contained additional instructions regarding the assignment of different values of G_{is} to group members ($G^{Asy} PB^L$) or different values of G_{is} and PB_{is} to group members ($G^{Asy} PB^{Asy}$).¹³ The instructions for each of the decision situations included a quiz to check subjects' understanding of the decision situations (see the online supplement for a translation of instructions).

In the sessions using the menu design the experimenter reviewed all decision situations and then displayed a summary slide with the parameters for all decision situations. Concurrently, decision sheets were distributed to subjects, who then completed two copies using pen and paper: one to hand back to the experimenter after all decisions were final and one to keep until the end

¹³ For example, for $G^{Asy} PB^L$, the instructions stated "Decision Situation 4 is the same as Decision Situation 1, except for the following change: For two members of each group, tokens moved to their Individual Fund reduce the value of the final Group Fund by 3.6 tokens. For the other two members of each group, tokens moved to their Individual Fund reduce the value of the final Group Fund by 1.2 tokens."

of the session. As in Brandts and Schram (2001), Goeree et al. (2002), and Blanco, et al. (2015), it was the subjects' choice to determine the order in which he/she made decisions in the seven decision situations. Importantly, the decision for any situation could be revised as long as the experimenter had not announced that the time to make decisions had ended.¹⁴ In the single game design sessions, subjects made their single decision after the experimenter reviewed the decision situation for the relevant game.

4. Results

The data from the two experimental phases provide support for both behavioral conjectures. First, *ceteris paribus*, increasing the size of degradation externalities or decreasing private benefits from appropriation, results in a decrease in average appropriation. Second, proportional increases in degradation externalities and the private benefit from appropriation result in average appropriation levels that are not statistically different for the relevant comparisons.

4.1 Menu design results

In this section we present the results for the menu design experiments. Because subjects made only one decision for each parameter configuration, and there was no feedback between decision situations, the analysis focuses on individual behavior instead of group behavior. Table 2

¹⁴ The order of presentation of the decision situations to the subjects was based on simplicity. That is, in the initial decision situations only the value of G_{is} changed, followed by introducing a decision situation with asymmetry in G_{is} . The presentation then moved to decision situations where both G_{is} and PB_{is} changed. All decision situations were presented before any decisions were made. Allowing subjects to change their decisions before being finalized allowed the subjects to reflect on differences in the games. Based on an examination of the decision sheets, 51% the subjects made at least one change (often several) to their decisions before finalizing them. Before receiving feedback on decisions from other group members, subjects made incentivized forecasts of the average per-person appropriation level of other group members, following Croson (2007). In the sessions with the menu design, this entailed making 7 forecasting decisions (subjects kept the copy of their game decisions while making forecasts) and one forecast in the single game design. Finally, all subjects completed a survey.

presents summary statistics, efficiency and the final value of the Group Fund. Using the within-subject structure of the experimental design, Table 3 presents average differences in treatment conditions, and the statistical significance of these differences relevant to primary tests of conjecture 1 (dark grey) and conjecture 2 (light grey). Table 4 contains the corresponding analyses for secondary tests of conjecture 1 (dark grey) and conjecture 2 (light grey).¹⁵

(Tables 2, 3, and 4 about here)

Conjecture 1 implies that, *ceteris paribus*, increasing the value of G_{is} or decreasing the value of PB_{is} will result in lower average levels of appropriation from the Group Fund. As one can see in Table 2, average appropriation in decision situation $G^L PB^L$ is 14.52 tokens, decreasing to 9.62 tokens in $G^M PB^L$ and further decreasing to 6.81 tokens in $G^H PB^L$. Similarly, average appropriation in decision $G^H PB^H$ is 13.28 tokens, decreasing to 6.81 tokens in $G^H PB^L$; and average appropriation in decision $G^M PB^M$ is 13.73 tokens, decreasing to 9.62 tokens in $G^M PB^L$. As shown in Table 3, all primary tests of conjecture 1 are statistically significant at the 1% level, including the comparison tests that involve the asymmetric decision setting $G^{Asy} PB^{Asy}$. In addition, as shown in Table 4, all secondary tests of conjecture 1 are also statistically significant at the 1% or 5% level.

In addition to average individual responses, the frequency of individual responses in the symmetric decision situations reveals that 52.42% of subjects' strictly decrease appropriation as the value of G_{is} increases from low, to medium and to high, in agreement with the directional

¹⁵ The results are robust to OLS and Tobit analyses available in the online supplement. All primary and secondary comparisons relevant for conjecture 1 are statistically significant and those relevant for conjecture 2 are not statistically significant, except for $G^L PB^L$ vs. $G^{Asy}(1.2) PB^L$ and $G^{Asy}(1.2) PB^{Asy}(1)$ for OLS and Tobit analyses and comparison $G^M PB^L$ vs. $G^{Asy}(3.6) PB^L$ for Tobit analyses.

prediction of Conjecture 1. This figure rises to 91% when weak inequalities are included.¹⁶ Similarly, when increasing the value of PB_{is} between $G^M PB^L$ and $G^M PB^M$ 59.68% (84.68%) of subjects strictly (weakly) increase appropriation. Between the values $G^H PB^L$ and $G^H PB^H$ 66.13% (90.32%) of subjects strictly (weakly) increase appropriation.

Moreover, as one can see from the efficiency measures presented in Table 2, there is strong correlation between efficiencies and $MPCR$. In particular, for the symmetric decision situations $G^L PB^L$, $G^M PB^L$ and $G^H PB^L$ efficiency increases from 42% to 62% to 73% as $MPCR$ increases. Thus, as the magnitude of degradation externalities increases, the level of reduction in appropriation is sufficiently large to lead to increases in overall efficiency. Holding G_{is} constant, efficiency also increases as PB_{is} decreases ($G^M PB^M$ (45%) vs $G^M PB^L$ (62%) and $G^H PB^H$ (47%) vs $G^H PB^L$ (73%)). This, however, does not necessarily imply that overall conservation of the Group Fund increases as $MPCR$ increases. Referring to Table 2, for decision situations $G^L PB^L$, $G^M PB^L$ and $G^H PB^L$ total conservation of the Group Fund decreases from 330.30 tokens to 307.65 tokens, and to 301.94 tokens, respectively.

Examining both primary and secondary comparisons relevant for conjecture 2 shown in Tables 3 and 4 reveals that there is broad support for the conjecture that average appropriation is not significantly different in comparisons where G_{is} and PB_{is} change proportionally as to hold $MPCR$ constant.¹⁷ Primary comparisons result from symmetric decision situations with the same values of the $MPCR$ and from the asymmetric decision situation Pooled $G^{Asy} PB^{Asy}$, where all participants face an $MPCR$ of 0.3. Secondary tests relevant to conjecture 2 result from

¹⁶ The latter case includes some subjects who appropriate 0 tokens in every decision situation and others who appropriate at the maximum allowable level of 25 tokens.

¹⁷ The t-tests are non-significant in all cases. There are four cases in Table 3 in which the non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-rank test is statistically significant at the 5% level.

comparisons with the two subgroups of subjects drawn from the asymmetric decision situation $G^{\text{Asy}}\text{PB}^{\text{L}}$, where each subgroup faces different *MPCR*s.

In regard to frequencies of individual responses in the relevant symmetric decisions situations, 19% of the participants do not change their appropriation decisions across the three game settings $G^{\text{L}}\text{PB}^{\text{L}}$, $G^{\text{M}}\text{PB}^{\text{M}}$, and $G^{\text{H}}\text{PB}^{\text{H}}$. Further, 6% of the subjects appropriate in a pattern strictly consistent with a priority on private incentives whereby appropriation increases as PB_{is} increases from $G^{\text{L}}\text{PB}^{\text{L}}$ to $G^{\text{M}}\text{PB}^{\text{M}}$ to $G^{\text{H}}\text{PB}^{\text{H}}$ (an additional 18% of subjects increase appropriation between two of the three decision situations and do not change behavior in the other paired comparison). Interestingly, up to 19% of the subjects follow a pattern that is strictly consistent with a focus on the Group Fund loss from appropriation whereby appropriation decreases as G_{is} increases from $G^{\text{L}}\text{PB}^{\text{L}}$ to $G^{\text{M}}\text{PB}^{\text{M}}$ to $G^{\text{H}}\text{PB}^{\text{H}}$ (an additional 15% of the subjects decrease appropriation between two of the three decision situations and do change behavior in the other paired comparison).¹⁸ In summary, as G_{is} and PB_{is} are changed proportionately in these three decision settings, average appropriation across subjects does not change significantly, which is a result of counterbalancing decisions by subjects who do not change their decisions, subjects who systematically increase appropriation as private incentives increase, and subjects who systematically decrease appropriation as group losses from appropriation increase.

Finally, we observe that the symmetric decision situations where the *MPCR* remains constant have very similar efficiencies, whereas the conservation of the Group Fund varies substantially, from a maximum of 330.30 tokens for $G^{\text{L}}\text{PB}^{\text{L}}$ to a minimum of 208.77 tokens for $G^{\text{H}}\text{PB}^{\text{H}}$ (see Table 2). These two decision situations represent the opposite extremes of resource

¹⁸ Out of the 124 subjects who participated in the study, 29 could not be classified according to the strategies described here. However, by relaxing the strict equality condition by one or two token deviations, six of these 29 subjects could be reclassified as balancing private incentives to appropriate against the Group Fund loss from appropriation.

appropriation contexts in our experimental design, namely low degradation externalities with low private benefits and high degradation externalities with high private benefits.

4.2 Single game results

The one shot single game experiments provide evidence of the robustness of the findings from the menu design as related to conjectures 1 and 2. Because subjects made a single decision, the results reported are based strictly on between-subject comparisons. Summary statistics from these experiments are reported in Table 5.¹⁹ Table 6 presents primary comparisons relevant to conjecture 1 (dark grey) and conjecture 2 (light grey). Treatment comparisons of average individual appropriation, efficiency and final value of the group fund are consistent with the results presented in section 4.1. Given the focus on symmetric decision environments in the single-decision sessions, secondary comparisons do not play a role.

(Tables 5 and 6 about here)

¹⁹ Using our notation, the baseline appropriation game of Cox et al. (2013) is parameterized with $G_{is}=3$ and $PB_{is}=1$. These parameter values are the average resulting from the parameter values of $G^H PB^L$ ($G_{is}=3.6$ and $PB_{is}=1$) and $G^M PB^L$ ($G_{is}=2.4$ and $PB_{is}=1$) in this study. Cox et al. (2013) observe an average individual appropriation rate of 38.1% of maximum appropriation capacity, very close to the 32.86% (menu sessions) and 39.2% (single game sessions) resulting from the average of these two treatments in our study. The similarity of these two percentages is noteworthy given the design differences between the two studies, including different maximum appropriation values and the use of only a single-choice mechanism in Cox et al. In comparing the results from the menu sessions and single game sessions in this study, despite consistent responses to treatments across the two experimental designs, we observe higher average appropriation levels in the single game sessions.

5. Discussion and conclusions

The results from the appropriation decision situations examined in this study show that subjects systematically decrease appropriation as degradation externalities derived from appropriation increase or private benefits from appropriation decrease. These results, from an appropriation game context, parallel the evidence from public goods games related to the role of the *MPCR* as a determinant of contributions. In particular, these results complement the findings of Goeree et al. (2002) in which subjects in a menu design experiment systematically responded to both the internal value of their contribution to the public good, as well as the external value of contributions to other group members. This systematic individual response cannot be explained by income-maximizing self-interested preferences. Altruism, warm-glow, guilt aversion or inequity aversion are potential motivations driving these results in the one-shot decision environment studied here.

A second set of results show that when changes in degradation externalities are accompanied by proportional variations in private benefits to appropriate, such that the *MPCR* is held constant, *average* appropriation levels across decision situations is not significantly different. This result stems from individual responses that are heterogeneous, but are counterbalancing on average. This finding contributes importantly to the public goods literature that addresses the implications of variations in the *MPCR* from provision of the public good. To our knowledge, this is the first study that simultaneously varies both the public benefit from cooperation and the private benefit from non-cooperation, holding the *MPCR* constant. Evidence in support of the findings reported here is based on both within-subject and between-subject responses to parameter changes with different subject pools. The alternative experimental designs provide a robustness check of findings.

The economic implications from the changes in appropriation levels discussed above are quite different depending on how one chooses to evaluate outcomes. Subjects facing higher levels of degradation externalities reduce appropriation sufficiently as to increase the economic efficiency of resource use and only mildly reduce overall conservation outcomes. Yet, when increases in degradation externalities are accompanied by proportionate increases in the private benefit to appropriate, economic efficiency remains fairly stable but there is a clear negative effect on conservation outcomes. Thus, the results suggest the need for conservation policies that carefully consider alternative interpretations of outcomes that take into consideration overall appropriation levels, efficiency in use, and the level of conservation measured by the size or quality of the stock of the resource.

Of course, the findings presented here are limited to a context in which there is common information and a stark institutional setting that does not allow for collective action that might facilitate cooperation. Yet, gaining an understanding of individual responses to relative changes in the damage caused from appropriation and the benefit from resource appropriation is a necessary first step in designing programs whose intention is to ameliorate inefficiencies in use of natural resources and to promote conservation. Further research efforts should extend these findings from a static environment to dynamic settings where flows of ecosystem services can be seen as the cumulative ‘dividend’ that society receives from natural resource capital, whereby maintaining the stock of such capital allows the sustained provision of future flows of ecosystem services.

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Table 1. Decision setting names and parameters (menu design).

Decision setting	Resource damage value: G_{is}	Private benefit value: PB_{is}	$MPCR$	Marginal net benefits from appropriation	Decision situation
$\mathbf{G^H PB^L}$	3.6	1	0.9	0.1	1
$\mathbf{G^M PB^L}$	2.4	1	0.6	0.4	2
$\mathbf{G^L PB^L}$	1.2	1	0.3	0.7	3
$\mathbf{G^{Asy} PB^L}$	3.6 / 1.2	1	0.6 (average)	0.4 (average)	4
$\mathbf{G^H PB^H}$	3.6	3	0.3	2.1	5
$\mathbf{G^M PB^M}$	2.4	2	0.3	1.4	6
$\mathbf{G^{Asy} PB^{Asy}}$	3.6 / 1.2	3 / 1	0.3	1.4 (average)	7

G_{is} (degradation externality to the group), PB_{is} (marginal private benefit from appropriation). In the decision situation $\mathbf{G^{Asy} PB^L}$, the value of $MPCR$ is 0.9 for two subjects in each group and 0.3 for two subjects, yielding an average value of $MPCR$ of 0.6. Otherwise, in all designs, the stated $MPCR$ is common for all individuals and groups. Decision setting number was the order of presentation of the decision situations in the experimental instructions in the menu sessions. Decision sheets included all decision situations and it was the subjects' choice to determine the order in which he/she made decisions.

Table 2. Individual-group level appropriation (menu design).

Decision setting	<i>MPCR</i>	Average individual appropriation (0–25 tokens)	Frequency of maximum allowable appropriation	Frequency of minimum appropriation	Efficiency (0–100%)	Final Value of the Group Fund (initial value 400 tokens)
$G^H PB^L$	0.9	6.81 (7.99)	6.45%	41.94%	72.76%	301.94
$G^M PB^L$	0.6	9.62 (8.63)	6.45%	28.23 %	61.52%	307.65
$G^L PB^L$	0.3	14.52 (9.37)	28.23%	16.94%	41.92%	330.30
$G^{Asy} PB^L$	0.6	10.01 (9.08)	15.35%	27.42%	67.20%	
	(average)	$G_{is}= 3.6$ 7.90 (7.67)	$G_{is}=3.6$ 4.84%	$G_{is}= 3.6$ 30.65%		314.06
		$G_{is}= 1.2$ 12.11 (9.93)	$G_{is}=1.2$ 25.81%	$G_{is}= 1.2$ 24.19%		
$G^H PB^H$	0.3	13.28 (9.18)	26.61%	12.10%	46.88%	208.77
$G^M PB^M$	0.3	13.73 (9.11)	24.19%	12.10%	45.08%	268.19
$G^{Asy} PB^{Asy}$	0.3	13.49 (9.94)	29.03%	19.35%	43.97%	
		$G_{is}=3.6, PB_{is}=3$ 14.52 (9.38)	$G_{is}=3.6, PB_{is}=3$ 32.26%	$G_{is}=3.6, PB_{is}=3$ 11.29%		265.53
		$G_{is}=1.2, PB_{is}=1$ 12.47 (10.45)	$G_{is}=1.2, PB_{is}=1$ 25.81%	$G_{is}=1.2, PB_{is}=1$ 27.42%		

Total observations = 124. Standard deviations in parentheses. Group appropriation is based on groups formed randomly at the beginning of the experiment. Group composition is the same for all decision situations. All efficiency calculations are derived from average appropriations reported in Table 2; average earnings for the asymmetric conditions are calculated through the average of the earnings from each of the two sub-groups of subjects in these treatment conditions.

Table 3. Primary comparisons relevant for conjecture 1 (dark grey) and conjecture 2 (light grey): Average differences, t-tests and Wilcoxon tests for menu sessions.

Decision setting	$G^H PB^L$	$G^M PB^L$	$G^L PB^L$	$G^H PB^H$	$G^M PB^M$	$^a G^{Asy} (3.6)$ $PB^{Asy} (3)$
$G^H PB^L$	n.a.					
$G^M PB^L$	-2.81 t=-6.28 (0.000) z=-6.83 (0.000)	n.a.				
$G^L PB^L$	-7.70 t=-10.24 (0.000) z=-8.18 (0.000)	-4.90 t=-7.88 (0.000) z=-7.94 (0.000)	n.a.			
$G^H PB^H$	-6.47 t=-7.38 (0.000) z=-7.00 (0.000)	-3.66 t=-4.41 (0.000) z=-4.18 (0.000)	1.23 t= 1.41 (0.162) z=2.29 (0.022)	n.a.		
$G^M PB^M$	-6.92 t=-8.75 (0.000) z=-7.48 (0.000)	-4.11 t=-5.93 (0.000) z=-5.82 (0.000)	0.78 t=1.06 (0.290) z=1.96 (0.050)	-0.45 t=-0.78 (0.436) z=-1.30 (0.194)	n.a.	
$^a G^{Asy} (3.6)$ $PB^{Asy} (3)$	-7.27 t=-5.32 (0.000) z=-4.92 (0.000)	-3.66 t=-3.16 (0.004) z=-3.11 (0.002)	1.66 t= 1.34 (0.187) z=2.14 (0.033)	-0.02 t=-0.02 (0.988) z=0.43 (0.669)	0.16 t=0.15 (0.883) z=1.19 (0.234)	n.a.
$^a G^{Asy} (1.2)$ $PB^{Asy} (1)$	-6.08 t=-6.62 (0.000) z=-5.56 (0.000)	-4.08 t=-5.03 (0.000) z=-4.29 (0.000)	0.39 t=0.39 (0.698) z=0.43 (0.668)	-0.40 t=-0.29 (0.773) z=-1.04 (0.299)	0.32 t=0.29 (0.776) z=-0.67 (0.501)	2.05 t ^c =1.15 (0.253) z ^c =1.27 (0.204)
Pooled $G^{Asy} PB^{Asy}$	-6.68 t=-8.12 (0.000) z=-7.35 (0.000)	-3.87 t=-5.49 (0.000) z=-5.23 (0.000)	1.02 t=1.29 (0.2003) z=1.97 (0.049)	-0.21 t=-0.24 (0.809) z=-0.69 (0.491)	0.24 t=0.31 (0.758) z=0.18 (0.859)	n.a. ^b

Differences in means are constructed from the perspective of the treatment outcome in the column cell minus the treatment outcome in the corresponding row cell. p-values in parentheses. n.a. refers to not applicable. If not otherwise stated, the statistics derive from paired t-tests and Wilcoxon signed-rank tests.

a The computations in these rows and columns are based on 62 observations per sample. In the asymmetric treatment conditions, half of the subjects were in the low condition and half were in the high condition.

b This comparison does not apply. The Pooled $G^{Asy} PB^{Asy}$ is constructed with the decisions of subjects from the low and high PB_{is} values in the asymmetric treatments.

c Given the experimental design, these two tests are based on between-subject comparisons. Individual subjects did not participate in both the high and low conditions in the asymmetric treatments. The reported test statistics are derived from an unpaired t-test and a Wilcoxon rank-sum test.

Table 4. Secondary comparisons relevant for conjecture 1 (dark grey) and conjecture 2 (light grey): Average differences, t-tests and Wilcoxon tests for menu sessions.

Decision setting	${}^a\mathbf{G}^{\text{Asy}}(\mathbf{3.6})$ $\mathbf{PB}^{\text{L}}$	${}^a\mathbf{G}^{\text{Asy}}(\mathbf{1.2})$ $\mathbf{PB}^{\text{L}}$	$\mathbf{G}^{\text{Asy}}\mathbf{PB}^{\text{L}}$	$\mathbf{G}^{\text{H}}\mathbf{PB}^{\text{L}}$	$\mathbf{G}^{\text{M}}\mathbf{PB}^{\text{L}}$	$\mathbf{G}^{\text{L}}\mathbf{PB}^{\text{L}}$
${}^a\mathbf{G}^{\text{Asy}}(\mathbf{3.6})$ $\mathbf{PB}^{\text{L}}$	n.a.			-0.66 t=-0.97 (0.337) z=-1.01 (0.311)	2.95 t=4.24 (0.000) z=4.29 (0.000)	8.27 t=7.69 (0.000) z=5.82 (0.000)
${}^a\mathbf{G}^{\text{Asy}}(\mathbf{1.2})$ $\mathbf{PB}^{\text{L}}$	-4.21 t ^c = -2.64 (0.009) z ^c =-2.20 (0.028)	n.a.		-5.73 t=-6.28 (0.000) z=-5.60 (0.000)	-3.73 t=-4.70 (0.000) z=-4.48 (0.000)	0.74 t=0.98 (0.329) z=0.88 (0.381)
$\mathbf{G}^{\text{Asy}}\mathbf{PB}^{\text{L}}$	n.a. ^b	n.a. ^b	n.a.	-3.19 t=-5.22 (0.000) z=-5.27 (0.000)	-0.39 t=-0.64 (0.524) z= -0.08 (0.938)	4.51 t= 6.11 (0.000) z=5.51 (0.000)
$\mathbf{G}^{\text{H}}\mathbf{PB}^{\text{H}}$	-6.60 t=-5.74 (0.000) z=-5.04 (0.000)	0.05 t=0.04 (0.969) z=0.87 (0.386)	-3.27 t=-3.65 (0.000) z=-3.11 (0.002)	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
$\mathbf{G}^{\text{M}}\mathbf{PB}^{\text{M}}$	-6.77 t=-6.56 (0.000) z=-5.76 (0.000)	-0.68 t=-0.68 (0.502) z=0.51 (0.608)	-3.73 t=-4.85 (0.000) z= -4.17 (0.000)	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
${}^a\mathbf{G}^{\text{Asy}}(\mathbf{3.6})$ $\mathbf{PB}^{\text{Asy}}(\mathbf{3})$	-6.61 t=-5.27 (0.000) z=-4.96 (0.000)	-2.40 t ^c =-1.39 (0.168) z ^c =-1.42 (0.156)	-6.61 t=-5.27 (0.000) z=-4.96 (0.000)	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
${}^a\mathbf{G}^{\text{Asy}}(\mathbf{1.2})$ $\mathbf{PB}^{\text{Asy}}(\mathbf{1})$	-4.56 t ^c =-2.77 (0.006) z ^c =-2.30 (0.021)	-0.36 t= -0.37 (0.713) z=-0.59 (0.558)	-0.35 t=-0.37 (0.713) z=-0.59 (0.558)	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Pooled $\mathbf{G}^{\text{Asy}}\mathbf{PB}^{\text{Asy}}$	-5.59 t ^c =-3.88 (0.000) z ^c =-3.63 (0.000)	-1.38 t ^c =-0.89 (0.374) z ^c =-0.86 (0.389)	-3.48 t=-4.17 (0.000) z=-4.49 (0.000)	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.

Differences in means are constructed from the perspective of the treatment outcome in the column cell minus the treatment outcome in the corresponding row cell. p-values in parentheses. n.a. refers to not applicable. If not otherwise stated, the statistics derive from paired t-tests and Wilcoxon signed-rank tests.

a The computations in these rows and columns are based on 62 observations per sample. In the asymmetric treatment conditions, half of the subjects were in the low condition and half were in the high condition.

b These comparisons do not apply. The Pooled $\mathbf{G}^{\text{Asy}}\mathbf{PB}^{\text{Asy}}$ is constructed with the decisions of subjects from the low and high $\mathbf{PB}_{\text{is}}$ values in the asymmetric treatments.

c Given the experimental design, these tests are based on between-subject comparisons. Individual subjects did not participate in both the high and low conditions in the asymmetric treatments. The reported test statistics are derived from unpaired t-tests and Wilcoxon rank-sum tests.

Table 5. Individual-group level appropriation (single game design).

Decision setting	<i>MPCR</i>	Average individual appropriation (0–25 tokens)	Frequency of maximum allowable appropriation	Frequency of minimum appropriation	Efficiency (0–100%)	Final Value of the Group Fund (initial value 400 tokens)
$G^H PB^L$	0.9	7.54 (8.858)	10.42%	50%	69.84%	291.42
$G^M PB^L$	0.6	12.06 (10.724)	29.17%	35.42%	51.76%	284.22
$G^L PB^L$	0.3	17.41(9.544)	45.45%	18.18%	30.36%	316.43
$G^H PB^H$	0.3	16.60 (9.113)	37.5%	16.67%	33.60%	160.96
$G^M PB^M$	0.3	16.38 (9.838)	39.58%	20.83%	34.48%	242.75

Total Observations per treatment: $G^H PB^L = 48$, $G^M PB^L = 48$, $G^L PB^L = 44$, $G^H PB^H = 48$, $G^M PB^M = 48$. Standard deviations in parentheses. Group appropriation is based on groups formed randomly at the beginning of the experiment.

Table 6. Primary comparisons relevant for conjecture 1 (dark grey) and conjecture 2 (light grey): Average differences, unpaired t-tests and Wilcoxon rank-sum tests for single game sessions.

Decision setting	$G^H PB^L$	$G^M PB^L$	$G^L PB^L$	$G^H PB^H$	$G^M PB^M$
$G^H PB^L$	n.a.				
$G^M PB^L$	-4.52 t= -2.25 (0.027) z=-2.17 (0.030)	n.a.			
$G^L PB^L$	-9.87 t=-5.13 (0.000) z=-4.50 (0.000)	-5.35 t= -2.53 (0.013) z=-2.28 (0.023)	n.a.		
$G^H PB^H$	-9.06 t=-4.94 (0.000) z=-4.43 (0.000)	-4.54 t=-2.23 (0.028) z=-1.91 (0.056)	0.81 t= 0.413 (0.681) z=0.71 (0.479)	n.a.	
$G^M PB^M$	-8.83 t=-4.62 (0.000) z=-4.19 (0.000)	-4.31 t=-2.05 (0.043) z=-1.85 (0.064)	1.03 t= 0.51 (0.610) z=0.54 (0.590)	0.22 t=0.12 (0.906) z=-0.09 (0.931)	n.a.

Differences in means are constructed from the perspective of the treatment outcome in the column cell minus the treatment outcome in the corresponding row cell. p-values in parentheses. n.a. refers to not applicable.